On August 23, 2023, Zimbabwe’s citizens will cast votes in both presidential and legislative elections. President Emerson Mnangagwa is seeking reelection, nominated again by the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). Nelson Chamisa, who narrowly lost the 2018 presidential election to Mnangagwa, is running for the newly created Citizens’ Coalition for Change (CCC). The presidency is decided by absolute majority; for the legislature, the National Assembly, 210 of the 270 total seats are single-member constituencies. The remaining 60 seats are reserved for women parliamentarians and are awarded proportionally. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) is responsible for administering the vote.

Following the ouster of former president Robert Mugabe in a 2017 military coup that brought Mnangagwa to power, the 2018 elections fell short of delivering progress towards a democratic transition. A lack of transparency around the ZEC’s decision-making and its inadequate consultation with opposition parties in the preelection period reduced confidence in the body’s independence. After the Constitutional Court rejected a petition from the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), challenging the 2018 presidential election results, popular belief in the political independence of electoral institutions further eroded. Security forces violently cracked down on protesters demanding results after vote-counting delays raised fears of manipulation; none of the perpetrators of the violence were held to account. These still-unaddressed challenges of the 2018 polls have driven fears that the 2023 elections, too, will be marked by violence and repression.

Given the lack of meaningful reforms to ensure the ZEC’s independence and the uneven playing field for political parties, international rights groups and bodies have expressed concerns over the potential for Zimbabwe to hold credible elections in 2023. ZANU-PF continues to misuse state resources for campaigning, and in 2022, relatives of ruling party politicians and loyalists were appointed to the ZEC as election commissioners. Police block opposition party meetings and rallies, and public broadcasters give preferential coverage to ZANU-PF. In rural districts, the ruling party distributes land and food aid to secure support. Escalating political violence and intimidation against opposition politicians and their supporters also forebode of violence during the election period.

While it is highly unlikely that this year’s elections would allow for an opposition victory, Mnangagwa and other ruling party officials have an interest in overseeing a peaceful and credible electoral process. Faced with hyperinflation, high unemployment, and other economic crises, the government and ruling party have sought greater international legitimacy to attract aid, investments, and economic relief through the lifting of targeted sanctions. ZANU-PF likely sees the 2023 elections as an opportunity to both consolidate power and further exploit divisions that have plagued Zimbabwe’s opposition since the death of longtime MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai. 

Since taking power in 1980, ZANU-PF has carried out severe crackdowns on the political opposition, critical media, and other sources of dissent. President Mnangagwa’s administration has largely retained the legal, administrative, and security architecture inherited from the Mugabe regime, and after an initial period of improvement, stepped up repression to consolidate its authority. Endemic corruption, weak rule of law, and poor protections for workers’ and land rights remain among Zimbabwe’s critical challenges.

 

Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day: 

• Internet shutdowns: Network disruptions and the intentional degradation of internet quality are major concerns for Zimbabwe’s elections. Internet speeds have regularly been slowed in response to political events, including opposition rallies in February 2022, protests in 2020 over poor economic conditions and government mismanagement of COVID-19, and protests over fuel prices in 2019, during which the government ordered a national shutdown. If ordered by the government in this year’s elections, the throttling or full shutdown of internet connectivity in Zimbabwe would inhibit media and civil society groups’ abilities to report on electoral conditions, undermining transparency of the electoral process and decreasing public faith in the vote. Shutdowns and degradation of service could also allow cover for security services to act with impunity and meet protesters with violence in the event of unrest following the vote.
• Blocks on websites and social media platforms: Access to independent online sources of information has been limited during political moments in Zimbabwe on multiple occasions. In the aftermath of the 2018 elections, state-owned internet service provider (ISP) TelOne blocked a website providing election information after it published the voters’ roll online. In response to fuel protests in 2019, blocks were imposed on social media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Reddit, in addition to the ordered internet shutdown. Blocks on websites and social media in 2023 could hinder transparency of the electoral process, preventing people from accessing accurate electoral information, discussing their views and campaigning, and communicating about conditions at local polling stations.
• Harassment and intimidation: Journalists, activists, and members of the opposition and their supporters are likely to face online harassment ahead of and during the election period, including from ZANU-PF supporters. During the 2018 elections, Mnangagwa encouraged young ZANU-PF supporters to dominate the digital space, and called again for supporters to fight critics on social media in 2019. These statements have emboldened trolls who seek to harass, intimidate, and undermine the credibility of journalists, opposition leaders, human rights activists, and others who criticize the ruling party, increasing the frequency and intensity of such online harassment. Journalists and activists have been threatened with, and in some cases, victims of abduction and torture in retaliation for online activity. Pervasive online and offline harassment of critical voices, coupled with the dominance of progovernment narratives online, could lead to greater self-censorship and limit the diversity of viewpoints and independent information available to citizens ahead of election day in 2023. 
• Arrests and prosecutions for online activities: Online criticism of government officials or members of state security services has been met with arrests, fines, and imprisonment. The Cyber and Data Protection Act, enacted in December 2021, imposed new criminal penalties on online speech, and has been used to arrest journalists due to their reporting and social media users for criticizing political figures and security officials. Some prominent critics of the government arrested for online activity have been released on the condition they agree to government restrictions on their social media use. Legal repercussions for online speech can contribute to widespread self-censorship, and fears of reprisals—against those who speak out online or those who share information about conditions at local polling stations—could limit transparency, enable greater electoral irregularities, and undermine the credibility of election results.
• Technical attacks: Cyberattacks could be a vector for digital interference in Zimbabwe’s elections. In 2018, the ZEC’s website was hacked and defaced following deadly police attacks on protesters after election results were announced. Cyber forensic analysis well after the incident revealed that the ZEC’s site still had critical security deficiencies that allowed the initial attack to occur. There is no evidence that officials have taken steps to address vulnerabilities that hackers may exploit during the 2023 elections. While the 2018 hack was an overt defacement, more subtle attacks in the future could sow confusion about the accuracy of election information and further undermine the credibility of official election results. 

Zimbabwe has a score of 39 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a restrictive online and offline environment for opposition groups, human rights activists, and journalists, a history of network interference and restricted connectivity during political events, and both legal criminal penalties and extralegal retaliation for critical online speech. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 28 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2022, with an internet freedom score of 49 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Zimbabwe country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.