STAY UP TO DATE: The Effects of the US Foreign Aid Freeze on Freedom House
Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2024

Chile

Free
86
100
A Obstacles to Access 24 25
B Limits on Content 32 35
C Violations of User Rights 30 40
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
Chile_hero_map

header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2023 – May 31, 2024

Chile has one of the world’s most open online environments, bolstered by strong protections for free expression and widespread access to the internet. While authorities do not censor political, social, or religious online content, journalists sometimes face criminal complaints for investigative or other sensitive work. The risk of lawsuits, harassment, and surveillance can encourage self-censorship online. Authorities have worked to strengthen legal safeguards for data protection in recent years.

  • In April 2024, the National Congress enacted a law to recognize internet access as a public service, as part of the government’s plan to eliminate the digital divide (see A2).
  • In September 2023, the Supreme Court ordered internet service provider (ISP) Mundo Pacífico to block 23 illegal gambling sites. Other ISPs reached an agreement with the Undersecretariat of Telecommunications (SUBTEL) to implement the block, despite not having received a court order to do so. The incident raised questions about how these sites are regulated in Chile (see B1 and B3).
  • The Cybersecurity Framework Law, published in April 2024, strengthened data privacy and security standards by explicitly acknowledging a right to encryption and establishing the National Cybersecurity Agency (ANCI). The law had yet to enter into force by the end of the coverage period, pending additional regulations (see C4 and C8).
  • A new data-protection framework, the Personal Data Protection Act, neared passage, and was ultimately approved by the National Congress in August 2024, after the coverage period. The new law will enter into force two years after it is published, and creates an independent Personal Data Protection Agency, which the country lacks under the current framework (see C6).

header2 Political Overview

Chile is a stable democracy that has experienced a significant expansion of political rights and civil liberties since the return of civilian rule in 1990. Ongoing concerns include corruption and unrest linked to land disputes with Indigenous Mapuche people.

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 6.006 6.006

Chile is a leader among Latin American countries for internet access. According to SUBTEL, 94.3 percent of households reported having access to the internet in 2023,1 up from 79.3 percent penetration in 2016.2

The country’s internet speeds for fixed-line connections are among the fastest in the world. According to Ookla, as of May 2024, the median download speed for fixed broadband was 274.46 Megabits per second (Mbps), while the median upload speed was 185.06 Mbps—ranking at 3 out of 181 countries examined. However, mobile internet speeds in Chile are notably slower. That same month, the median mobile download and upload speeds were 38.30 Mbps and 13.38 Mbps, respectively, ranking 71 out of 147 countries.3

In recent years, Chile has continued to expand a robust fiber-optic network. According to SUBTEL, fiber optics accounted for 69.7 percent of all fixed connections as of March 2024, up from 68.1 percent in early 2023.4 In December 2021 Chile became the first country in Latin America to deploy a fifth-generation (5G) network for mobile, and has since increased 5G availability.5 According to official statistics, there were more than 4.2 million 5G connections in Chile as of March 2024, a 74 percent increase over the previous year.6

Connectivity disruptions have occurred due to natural disasters. However, strong resilience measures have helped mitigate the impact of these events. In early February 2024, a series of catastrophic wildfires took place in the Valparaíso region,7 causing damage to the telecommunications infrastructure. SUBTEL reported that almost 300 communications antennas had been knocked out of service from either physical damage or power outages during the peak of the disaster on February 3.8 On February 5, mobile service providers Movistar and Entel reported that 95 and 97 percent of their respective networks were functioning normally in the region.9 During the disruption, authorities encouraged users to enable National Emergency Roaming on their devices, allowing affected individuals to connect to the closest working network and maintain telephone, data services, and short message service (SMS).10 SUBTEL said that it had urged telecommunications companies to adopt resilience measures in preparation for potential wildfires beginning in September 2023.11

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 3.003 3.003

In Chile, internet access is not prohibitively expensive for most of the population and there are relatively few barriers to access. In recent years, the government has taken steps to boost connectivity among underconnected communities.

Robust competition in the telecommunications market has helped to keep consumer prices relatively low (see A4), despite inflation and cost-of-living challenges. At least six mobile plans are available for 10,000 pesos ($11.49) or less per month.1 According to the UK-based price comparison site Cable, the average cost of 1 gigabyte (GB) of mobile data was 555.56 pesos ($0.64) in 2023,2 while the average monthly broadband plan cost 20,990 pesos ($21.86) in 2024.3 The National Institute of Statistics’ 2023 Supplementary Income Survey, in the most recent data available, found that the median monthly income was 582,559 pesos ($669.50).4

Analysts have noted that gaps in internet access are less pronounced in Chile than in much of Latin America.5 Approximately 12 percent of the population lives in rural areas, according to 2017 census data,6 making Chile a highly urbanized country. However, rural connectivity in Chile lags behind urban areas of the country, with just over 50 percent of rural households having access to mobile internet overall.7 A 2022 study led by the UC Survey Center found that 96.9 percent of households in the top income quintile had access to the internet, compared to 81.3 percent of households in the lowest income quintile.8

In recent years, certain initiatives have attempted to address existing divides. In April 2024, as part of the government’s Zero Digital Divide Plan 2022–25, the National Congress enacted a law recognizing internet access as a public service. Once complementary regulations are issued, the law will require telecommunications companies to provide coverage to all users within a service area, rather than parts of a single municipality, and will make subsidies available to assist with internet bills.9 Launched by President Boric’s government in May 2022, the plan focuses on four aspects: enacting fair regulations, upgrading digital infrastructure, establishing a public telecommunications company, and addressing obstacles in vulnerable communities, such as cable theft.10 Satellite internet services, such as Starlink, offer another option for connectivity in hard-to-reach rural areas.11

In July 2023, the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean (CAF) announced that, in cooperation with the Chilean government, it would undertake studies to better understand existing connectivity gaps. The joint study is meant to be a precursor for a larger investment into projects that aim to close the digital divide.12

Despite a net neutrality law that does not allow service providers to “arbitrarily distinguish content, applications or services based on their source of origin or ownership” (see B6), zero-rating plans—which offer free access to certain platforms and content—remain popular for mobile plans under the argument that they offer “free social networks.”13

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 6.006 6.006

The state does not have the legal authority to force telecommunications providers to restrict connectivity or block access to digital platforms. There are no government-imposed connectivity restrictions in Chile.

While the government has developed public-private partnerships with telecommunications companies to invest in infrastructure improvements,1 the internet infrastructure in Chile is privately owned and operated.2 As such, there is no possibility for the state to centralize control over the infrastructure.

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 5.005 6.006

There relatively few obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers, and the state does not exercise undue manipulation over the market. While competition is generally robust, the fixed-line and mobile sectors are led in practice by a handful of large telecommunications providers.1

According to December 2023 statistics from SUBTEL, the fixed-line market was led by Movistar (30.7 percent of connections), followed by VTR (23.9 percent), Mundo (18.4 percent), Entel (7.1 percent), GTD (7.0 percent), and Claro (6.8 percent), with smaller groups holding 6.0 percent of the market. The mobile market was slightly more concentrated. Entel led the market with 34.6 percent of all mobile connections, followed by WOM (25.7 percent), Movistar (20.9 percent), Claro (16.7 percent), and VTR Móvil (1.3 percent); others accounted for 0.8 percent.2 Initiatives such as the Chilean Telecommunications Cooperative (COTEL) have helped to support small and medium-sized providers entering the market.3

The General Telecommunications Law (Law 18,168), originally enacted in 1982, was meant to encourage competition in the telecommunications market and help spearhead privatization of the sector.4 Article 2, for instance, ensures free and equal access to telecommunications for all people and guarantees that anyone may apply for a permit or concession.5 Modifications to these concessions must take place according to the law, helping to reduce arbitrariness in the regulatory framework. While the law requires public or private legal entities who want to obtain a telecommunications concession to be incorporated and located in Chile, there are otherwise no restrictions on foreign ownership or investment.6

Telecommunications companies have taken some actions in recent years with the potential to dilute competition. In June 2024, after the coverage period, it was announced that América Móvil would acquire a 91 percent controlling stake in ClaroVTR, a joint venture between América Móvil’s Claro (a prominent mobile provider) and Liberty Latin America’s VTR Communications (a prominent fixed-line provider).7 The companies had received regulatory approval for the joint venture in October 2022.8 In December 2023, the National Economic Prosecutor’s Office (FNE) approved the sale of Entel’s fiber-optic assets to fiber-optic wholesale company OnNet, a deal that threatened to raise barriers to entry for wholesale-based providers.9

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 4.004 4.004

While Chile’s internet regulator is administratively dependent on the government, it has consistently exercised independence in practice.

SUBTEL, the country’s telecommunications regulator, was established in 1977 during the military dictatorship led by Augusto Pinochet and operates within the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications (MTT). Its main responsibilities include creating telecommunications policies; publishing technical standards on telecommunications and managing compliance; overseeing of the radio spectrum; and awarding concessions, permits, and licenses, in accordance with the law.1 Additionally, SUBTEL is empowered to work with the Ministry of National Defense and other entities to regulate the importation and manufacture of telecommunications equipment.2

The Undersecretary of Telecommunications, who serves as the head of SUBTEL, is appointed by the country’s president. While this creates the potential for politicization, the head of SUBTEL has typically held a technical background or experience in the industry. The current undersecretary, Claudio Araya San Martín, who was appointed by President Boric at the start of his administration in 2022, previously worked as an adviser to SUBTEL’s Telecommunications Development Fund.3 SUBTEL’s efforts to achieve certain strategic objectives, particularly efforts to expand connectivity and reduce the digital divide (see A2), have transcended political administrations.

Decisions made by SUBTEL are generally considered to be fair and transparent. SUBTEL complies with MTT and other legal requirements4 that public entities conduct citizen consultations.5 Additionally, regulations such as the 2008 access to information law (Law 20,285)6 and the 2014 law on lobbying (Law 20,730)7 help to ensure that SUBTEL’s operations are transparent and open to public scrutiny.

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

The state does not typically intervene to block websites or digital platforms, and political, social, and religious content remains freely accessible. However, during the coverage period, authorities ordered the blocking of websites used for illegal gambling.

In September 2023, a Supreme Court ruling forced ISP Mundo Pacífico to block access in Chile to several international online betting websites, on grounds that Polla Chilena de Beneficencia, Chile’s state-owned gambling entity, is the only company authorized to operate gambling platforms.1 Later that month, SUBTEL announced that it would instruct, in coordination with the Superintendency of Gambling Casinos (SCJ), other ISPs to block the 23 online betting sites named as illegal in the Supreme Court ruling.2

SUBTEL’s decision to expand the application of the Supreme Court’s ruling to ISPs not named in the case was somewhat unusual, since judicial decisions in Chile typically only have binding effects with respect to the cases in which they are issued.3 ISPs have historically not been held responsible for the content of third parties (see B2 and B3).4 According to reporting from November 2023, operators of the gambling sites circumvented the decision by modifying the URLs ordered to be blocked.5

In line with international standards, ISPs in Chile have long implemented measures to block or filter content that does not adhere to international human rights standards, such as child sexual abuse imagery. In 2008, VTR, in collaboration with the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), implemented a filter to automatically block webpages containing child sexual abuse imagery—the first ISP in Latin America to do so.6 There is no evidence that such technology has been used to censor content protected by international human rights standards.

  • 1“Corte Suprema acoge recurso de protección y ordena a proveedora de servicios de internet bloquear acceso a sitios de apuestas internacionales on line [Supreme Court accepts protection appeal and orders internet service provider to block access to international online betting sites],” Poder Judicial de la Republica de Chile, September 13, 2023, https://www.pjud.cl/prensa-y-comunicaciones/noticias-del-poder-judicial….
  • 2Carlos González Lucay, “Otra mazazo para las apuestas online: Subtel acuerda con todas las compañías bloquear las plataformas de juego [Another blow for online betting: Subtel agrees with all companies to block gaming platforms],” La Tercera, September 22, 2023, https://www.latercera.com/el-deportivo/noticia/otro-mazazo-para-las-apu….
  • 3Flavia Carbonell, “Variations on Judicial Precedent: From the Perspective of the Chilean Legal System,” Problema Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho, December 2022, DOI:10.22201/iij.24487937e.2022.16.5.17577
  • 4Matias Hercovich, “Responsabilidad de los ISP por contenidos ilícitos o infractores de terceros [Responsibility of ISPs for illegal or infringing content from third parties],” Revista Chilena De Derecho Y Tecnología, 2(1). 2013, https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-2584.2013.25889
  • 5“El nulo efecto del fallo de la Tercera Sala de la Suprema sobre casinos online: todos los sitios de apuestas siguen operando [The null effect of the ruling of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court on online casinos: all betting sites continue to operate],” Ex-Ante, November 6, 2023, https://www.ex-ante.cl/el-nulo-efecto-del-fallo-de-la-tercera-sala-de-l….
  • 6Karina Morales, “Proveedor chileno de internet bloquea acceso a sitios de pornografía infantil [Chilean internet provider blocks Access to child pornography sites],” Emol, October 2, 2008, https://www.emol.com/noticias/tecnologia/2008/10/02/324439/proveedor-ch….
B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 3.003 4.004

Political, social, and religious content is not subject to widespread removal or other restrictions, though judges do issue orders to remove content under some circumstances. Because intermediaries do not face undue responsibility for opinions expressed by third parties (see B3), there are no obvious incentives for platforms to remove content.

There is no provision in Chilean law that explicitly protects the “right to be forgotten,” or the ability to remove or deindex certain content from the internet, though the principle has been upheld in some cases by the country’s courts.1 Critics have cautioned that the right to be forgotten could be abused to censor legitimate journalistic content or otherwise limit free expression online.2 When ruling on the right to be forgotten, Chile’s Supreme Court has acknowledged the tension between it and other existing rights, such as freedom of expression, the right to access information, and the right to privacy (see C1). Analysis conducted between January 2023 and April 2024 found that, of 24 judicial rulings on the issue, 18 were decided against the request to delete or restrict information—demonstrating a precedent against the removal of online content.3

Online content is sometimes removed in connection with funas—denunciations that individuals make against others, either to accuse them of a moral wrong or the imputation of a crime, often in social media posts.4 Individuals frequently initiate legal actions in response to funas that target them, seeking the removal of allegedly defamatory content (see C3). Weighing the right to freedom of expression with the right to the honor (see C1), Chilean courts have sometimes determined that funas are an abusive manifestation of online expression, and have ordered the author of the funa to remove the defamatory content.5

More widespread efforts to restrict online content have occurred in the past, particularly during the 2019 social unrest, which saw massive and at times violent protests against the government and societal inequality. During that period, individuals reported receiving direct and indirect pressure to remove content after expressing their opinion about the events. A study published in 2020 documented at least 283 cases where individuals reported some sort of restriction on their social media accounts, including deactivated accounts and the removal of certain posts, typically after they had documented rights abuses and other developments related to the unrest.6 This contributed to notable self-censorship, especially among journalists, during this period and its aftermath (see B4).

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 4.004 4.004

Restrictions on digital content are generally transparent and proportionate. Existing restrictions, such as copyright-based claims, typically do not result in overly broad limitations.

In Chile, the courts are the only bodies empowered to decide on content restrictions, and orders to remove content must receive judicial authorization.1 Article 19.12 of the constitution prohibits prior censorship when exercising the right to freedom of expression (see C1).2 However, in September 2023, some legal experts raised concerns after telecommunications companies said that they would also comply with a Supreme Court decision ordering Mundo Pacífico to block 23 illegal gambling sites (see B1), citing the fact that the other ISPs had not received individual court orders to do so. The head of the Chilean Telecommunications Association (Chile Telcos) acknowledged that there was a “regulatory vacuum” surrounding the issue of illegal online betting.3

Online content restrictions based on copyright claims are derived from the law on intellectual property, which explicitly shields online intermediaries from liability for copyright-infringing content published by third parties.4 The law requires a court order for intermediaries to remove infringing content and includes an appeals mechanism, establishing a judicial notice and takedown system.5 It contains certain exceptions to copyright restrictions, including for libraries.6

Some analysts have raised concerns about the lack of transparency surrounding platforms’ content-moderation decisions and recommender algorithms, noting that moderators for Latin America are often based outside the region, and as a result, lack useful local context in their decision-making.7

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 3.003 4.004

Online self-censorship is not known to be a widespread issue for most people. However, some individuals, especially journalists, may be more likely to self-censor speech on politically sensitive topics online due to the risk of harassment or other reprisals.

Journalists in Chile may be encouraged to practice self-censorship due to several factors, including a desire to avoid digital harassment, which particularly affects women (see C7). According to press freedom organization Reporters Without Borders (RSF), which ranked Chile 52 out of 180 countries in its 2024 World Press Freedom Index, journalists often face legal intimidation in an effort to silence their reporting (see C3).1 In recent years, there is also evidence that investigative journalists have been targeted by state surveillance due to their critical reporting (see C5), which could also facilitate online self-censorship.

At times, President Boric has been criticized for fostering friction with the media. In October 2023, the National Press Association (ANP)2 and the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA)3 condemned comments made by Boric in which he singled out three news outlets for their alleged “eagerness” to report bad news in the country. In April 2024, during the National Business Meeting (ENADE), President Boric claimed in a speech that the press provides “enviable coverage” to certain members of the business community.4 These incidents, while not overtly threatening, represent a “soft” pressure toward journalists that could affect how they report on the government online.

Self-censorship emerged as a significant concern during the 2019 social unrest. The state’s heavy-handed response to the outbreak, which included incidents of police brutality and intimidation against the press,5 created significant concerns for freedom of expression (see B2). During the unrest and in the years after, this hostile environment has discouraged some individuals from publicly expressing political opinions, fearing potential repercussions for their employers or losing opportunities for appointment to public positions.6

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 4.004 4.004

There is little evidence that online information sources in Chile are controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors, or that such actors exert significant control over the online information space.

While false and misleading information has spread online during electoral periods, it has typically had a relatively limited impact in Chile. A study conducted by the Chile Disinformation Observatory found that, in the lead up to the second constitutional plebiscite in December 2023, more than 81 percent of indexed cases of disinformation, analyzed from both offline and online sources, were meant to modify existing narratives.1 During the 2022 plebiscite, opponents of the draft constitution used social networks to spread false and misleading claims about what the proposal would do—such as the notion that it would eliminate the right to private property—to provoke opposition to it, though the public remained skeptical of many of these claims.2

Additionally, research has indicated that “bots,” or automated social media accounts, were deployed during both the 2017 and 2021 presidential elections to artificially amplify online support for certain candidates and attack their opponents.3 A study analyzing posts on Twitter (now called X) during the 2021 election, for instance, found that suspected bots mentioning right-wing candidate José Antonio Kast were universally positive toward him, while those that mentioned left-wing candidate (and eventual winner) Gabriel Boric were overwhelmingly negative.4

While some journalists may feel compelled to practice self-censorship on politically sensitive issues (see B4), the government does not issue directives to digital media outlets. However, the government’s move in June 2023 to establish an Advisory Commission Against Disinformation prompted criticism. The Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) said it was cause for concern when governments involve themselves directly “in the analysis of information, expression, media, or journalism,”5 while opposition legislators alleged that the commission sought to “establish what the official truths are.”6 Some analysts said that the establishment of the new body effectively overstated the effect of disinformation on individuals’ behavior and political outcomes, and that false claims instead tend to have a “broad, but shallow” reach on social media.7

The multistakeholder advisory commission completed its mandate during the coverage period.8 Among several recommendations, it urged Chile to adopt a code of practice on disinformation similar to the European Commission.9 There was no indication that the advisory commission was used to spread biased or progovernment narratives during the coverage period.

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 3.003 3.003

There are few economic or regulatory restrictions that affect users' ability to post content online. The state does not take actions that aim to limit the ability of digital media to accept advertising or investments, either from national or foreign sources.

In Chile, dominant media outlets, such as the conglomerate Grupo El Mercurio, tend to receive significant shares of state advertising funds, though such recipients are not necessarily aligned with the editorial line of the government. Commentators have raised concerns that the state’s use of advertising agencies, which exercise discretionary power over the use of funds, makes it difficult to precisely know how public advertising is allocated.1 A 2019 investigation by the Chilean Fiscal Expenditure Observatory called for greater transparency into the advertising expenditures of public entities, as well as steps to improve competition in the awarding of these funds.2

The overall share of digital advertising has grown significantly in recent years. As of 2023, for the first time, digital media accounted for more than half of all advertising expenditures in Chile—increasing from 48.3 percent in 2022 to 51.1 percent.3 Much of this growth was initially driven by changes since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic; in 2020, advertising in digital media grew by more than 12 percentage points compared to the previous year.4

There is no evidence that regulations or the national tax system represent obstacles to the participation, establishment, or management of social media platforms or digital media. Since June 2020, foreign digital platforms that are not domiciled in Chile, such as Google, Netflix, and Meta, have been subject to a value-added tax (VAT).

Chile emerged as a global pioneer after it adopted legislation, Law No. 20,453, upholding the principle of net neutrality in August 2010.5 As such, ISPs in Chile uphold transparency and fairness when managing network traffic and bandwidth availability.

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 4.004 4.004

The online information landscape is generally robust and diverse, though politically polarized. Chilean users can access local, regional, and international news sources, which provide access to a variety of opinions.

Many online sites were created to represent specific interests and communities. For example, various religious denominations,1 feminists,2 and LGBT+ Chileans3 have all created online spaces dedicated to their communities, with some sites providing news specifically catered to the interests of these individuals.

While there is a certain amount of false information online, the diversity of sources in Chile helps to maintain balance in the information landscape and counteract the impact of false and misleading claims. According to the Reuters Institute’s 2024 Digital News Report, online platforms remained the most popular overall source for news in Chile, with 77 percent of respondents indicating that they consume news online, compared to 57 percent for television and just 14 percent for print media.4 However, studies have shown low levels of trust in the media overall and disillusionment with the news. The Reuters Institute’s report found that just 32 percent of respondents had trust in the news overall, though they expressed notably higher levels of trust in specific outlets, such as Cooperativa and CNN Chile.5 A separate report published in 2024 by the Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaíso found that evaluations of certain outlets were correlated with an individual’s political views, underscoring polarization of the media landscape.6

Platforms and other actors have introduced some efforts to improve the reliability of the online information sphere. For example, ahead of the 2023 constitutional plebiscite, Google launched the “Transparencia Chile” (Transparency Chile) initiative, which sought to provide verified information about electoral advertisements on its platforms, including details about the financing of such ads.7 Additionally, fact-checking initiatives such as Fast Check, which was established during the 2019 social unrest,8 have helped to counteract the spread of false information online.

In the past, particularly during the 2019 unrest, false information proliferated online, undermining the ability to discern reliable information. In October 2019, claims that the Baquedano metro station was being used as an alleged torture center went viral, including among politicians on social media.9 The news caused public shock due to the history of kidnappings and torture in Chile under the military dictatorship.

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 6.006 6.006

There are no conditions that pose serious obstacles to organizing, mobilizing, or campaigning online in Chile. Social media has long been used as a tool for political and social mobilization, particularly among younger people.1

In general, communities can organize online without any risk of persecution, censorship, or limitation of access to tools or websites. For instance, one prominent online movement that remained active during the coverage period is #ConMiPlataNO (Not With My Money), which launched a digital petition and social media campaign to oppose the Boric government’s proposed pension reforms.2

Online organizing was widely used during the 2019 social protests. A government report published later that year claimed that young people had posted more than 4 million retweets between October 18 and 25 encouraging participation in the protests.3

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 5.005 6.006

Chile’s current constitution, which was initially adopted in 1980 during the military dictatorship and has since been amended, contains protections for freedom of expression. Article 19.12 guarantees the right to express opinions and inform “in any form and by any means” without prior censorship, as well as the right to establish and operate newspapers, magazines, and periodicals. The constitution also upholds judicial independence, and this autonomy is generally respected in practice. Article 19.4 contains protections for the private life and honor of individuals and their families, including personal-data protection.1 At times, this right has come into conflict with free expression standards during legal actions related to online content removal and criminal complaints (see B2 and C3).

Chile has also adopted laws that guarantee freedom of opinion and the exercise of journalism (Law 19,733),2 freedom to access public information (Law 20,285),3 and the protection of personal data (Law 19,628) (see C6),4 among others. While there are no laws that explicitly protect freedom of expression online, the constitution and the laws set forth have typically been interpreted by the judiciary to extend these rights to the digital environment.

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

The Chilean penal code contains several concerning provisions that could be used to criminalize online activities, including statutes criminalizing slander and insult.

Article 412 establishes slander, defined as “the imputation of a specific but false crime,” as a criminal offense.1 The penalty includes imprisonment ranging from 61 days to three years,2 and a fine, depending on the infraction.3 Article 416 criminalizes insult, defined as “any expression uttered or action carried out to dishonor, discredit, or in contempt of another.” The following article establishes certain criteria for “serious insults,” with penalties including imprisonment from 61 days to three years, and a fine.4 These acts are considered criminal even when they are carried out through “allegory, caricatures, emblems or allusions.”

Some Chilean academics have argued that criminal slander and insult laws, ostensibly meant to protect the right to honor, discourage free expression in Chile and promote self-censorship (see B4).5 In June 2024, after the coverage period, the Constitutional Court rejected a request, filed in connection with the case against Resumen journalist Felipe Soto Cortés (see C3), that sought to declare articles 416 through 419 of the penal code inapplicable due to unconstitutionality. The court rejected the complaint because the case that prompted it had already been resolved.6

In June 2022, authorities enacted a law establishing penalties for certain computer crimes (Law 21,459), such as illegal access to a computer system or the illegal interception of computer data.7

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

Journalists, bloggers, and social media users are not frequently penalized for their online activities. Legal actions brought against journalists under criminal insult and slander articles remain an ongoing concern (see C2), though these cases do not usually result in severe criminal penalties.

In March 2024, former deputy Andrea Molina filed a complaint against journalist Josefa Barraza, director of El Ciudadano, a digital and print outlet. Molina accused Barraza of “serious insults” after the outlet published an article related to a massive corruption scandal, which Molina claimed “would affect her reputation.”1 In June 2024, after the coverage period, the Seventh Guarantee Court of Santiago dismissed the case against Barraza.2

In November 2023, a Santiago court upheld a decision to declare a complaint filed by the mayor of Recoleta, Daniel Jadue, against La Tercera journalists Leslie Ayala and José Santa María to be inadmissible. Jadue had filed the complaint for “serious insults with public dissemination” after the outlet had reported that he was considering resigning amid a corruption probe, which Jadue claimed was not true. The court rejected the complaint because, while certain details in the reporting may have been inaccurate, it was based on fundamentally true information. The ruling also noted that Jadue, as a public servant, must tolerate a greater degree of public criticism.3

During the previous coverage period, in May 2023, Victor Herrero, editor of the digital media Interferencia, was convicted on criminal charges and sentenced to pay a fine of 126,000 pesos ($145), as well as legal costs. In 2022, Interferencia had published an article claiming that police Lt. Col. Christian Beltrán had lost his position due to his alleged involvement in illegal logging activities, which the police claimed was not true.4

In January 2023, a Concepción court sentenced Felipe Soto Cortés, the former director of the digital media Resumen, to 61 days in prison (which was commuted to one year of probation) and a fine of 680,000 pesos ($781) after he was found guilty of “serious insults.”5 The conviction was due to a July 2022 article which reported that Fisheries and Aquaculture Unit director Rodrigo Daroch had illicitly accepted money. The decision was strongly condemned by the IAPA.6

Ordinary social media users regularly file legal actions in response to funas that contain allegedly defamatory content; to resolve these cases, judges sometimes order individuals to remove the offending online content (see B2).

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 4.004 4.004

The Chilean government does not prohibit or restrict anonymous online communications or encryption. During the coverage period, legislation was enacted that recognized protections for the right to use encryption.

The Cybersecurity Framework Law (Law 21,663), which was approved by the National Congress in December 2023 and officially published in April 2024,1 includes the “principle of computer security” as one of its guiding precepts. As such, Article 3.6 states that “every person has the right to adopt the technical computer security techniques that they consider necessary, including encryption.”2 Several digital rights organizations, including the Internet Freedom Foundation and the Internet Society, applauded the government’s decision to protect the right to encryption.3

There are no obligations for social media users or bloggers to register with the government, nor is it mandatory for individuals to use their real name to interact online.4

Telecommunications companies are obliged to collect basic information about their prepaid and postpaid subscribers, though it is not mandatory to register prepaid SIM cards in any government database.5 This obligation is derived from SUBTEL’s Decree 18, published in 2014, which requires that providers “save and maintain at the disposal of the subscriber and competent authorities, a complete and faithful copy of the signed contract” and that they “consider mechanisms that allow the identity of the parties to be known without a doubt.”6

A bill introduced to the Chamber of Deputies in 20227 would have required mandatory prepaid SIM card registration, including real-name identification, and would have established an official SIM registry.8 The proposal has since made little progress.9

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 4.004 6.006

Chile’s constitution guarantees the right to privacy and honor of the person and their family, including the protection of personal data,1 which was incorporated in 2018.2 While state actors generally respect these guarantees, episodes of surveillance targeting journalists in recent years have raised concerns about the government’s surveillance practices.

The constitution contains protections for the inviolability of all forms of private communications, stating that private communications may only be “intercepted, opened, or recorded in the cases and ways determined by law.”3 Because the article only references communications in general, its scope can be extended to modern forms of electronic communication.

Judicial authorization is required for the interception of communications. Article 222 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Law 19,696) states that interception may be ordered “when there are well-founded suspicions based on specific facts” that a person has engaged in criminal activities, with the interception period not to exceed 60 days, though this may be extended by a judge.4 Telecommunications service providers are required by law to comply with judicial orders to intercept private communications (see C6).

Chilean law also punishes individuals who violate private communications without necessary authorization. Article 161-A of the penal code punishes, with imprisonment and a fine, anyone who captures, intercepts, records, or reproduces private communications without the authorization of the affected party.5

An ongoing surveillance scandal has raised concerns about the state’s surveillance practices. According to a complaint filed by the State Defense Council, former judge Juan Antonio Poblete Méndez and the former head of army intelligence, Schafik Gonzalo Nazal Lázaro,6 allegedly colluded to authorize and conduct illegal wiretapping against four military officials and investigative journalist Mauricio Weibel.7 (Weibel had reported on fraud and embezzlement in the military between 2015 and 2019.8) As of August 2024, after the coverage period, Poblete Méndez was under house arrest, Nazal Lázaro was detained,9 and the investigation into the alleged surveillance operation was ongoing.

Law enforcement and other authorities are known to conduct digital monitoring, including of open-source social media platforms. In 2022, the Chilean Investigative Police (PDI) said that it would deploy a so-called digital police strategy to prevent and investigate certain offenses, particularly related to organized crime.10 That year, the PDI also shared that a “virtual patrol” had allowed it to identify and prosecute a case involving child sexual abuse imagery.11 Monitoring has also been deployed in matters unrelated to criminal investigations. In March 2022, it was reported that President Boric's communications team would track social media conversations to identify the public mood on current issues and inform its communication strategy.12

Prior investigations have documented the state’s likely purchase of certain surveillance technologies, though it remains unclear to what extent they are used. A 2020 investigation by The Citizen Lab reported that the PDI was a likely client of Circles, a surveillance firm allegedly able to monitor mobile phones without hacking devices themselves.13 Previously, a 2016 report by Derechos Digitales revealed that Chile had purchased licenses to use Hacking Team’s Galileo (or Da Vinci) spyware, which the PDI claimed was used within legal parameters under judicial authorization.14

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 4.004 6.006

Chile’s legal framework contains safeguards for personal data protection, and a new data-protection law remained under consideration during the coverage period. Certain laws compel telecommunications companies to comply with requests for user data, though their data-protection practices have generally improved in recent years.

SUBTEL requires that telecommunications companies comply with court orders to intercept private communications, though it mandates that “interventions are carried out in such a way as to protect the privacy and security of the communications whose interception and recording was not authorized.”1 Under Article 222 of the Criminal Procedure Code, ISPs must retain their subscribers’ Internet Protocol (IP) connection records for at least one year.2 Additionally, the Cybersecurity Framework Law explicitly excludes IP addresses from its definition of personal data, enabling access to this information following cybersecurity incidents.3

In August 2024, after the coverage period, the National Congress passed an updated data-protection framework, the Personal Data Protection Act.4 The law, which will not enter into force until two years after it is officially published, establishes a new Personal Data Protection Agency, which will be empowered to enforce the law through severe fines for noncompliance. It also aligns Chile’s data-protection standards with the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), establishing several key rights for data holders, including the right to rectify data or object to its processing, among others.5 In the meantime, a data-protection law enacted in 1999 remains in effect.6 At the time, the law was considered to be a pioneering for the region, but has since been criticized as “obsolete.” Analysts have also criticized authorities for failing to establish an independent data-protection agency to enforce the legal framework, an issue the new framework aims to address.7

Controversies involving the treatment of personal data have occurred in the past. In May 2018, SUBTEL ordered telecommunications companies to provide certain personal data, including mobile phone number and region, of all mobile subscribers—amounting to approximately 15 million people. SUBTEL said that this data would be provided to market research company CADEM to help create a customer satisfaction survey.8 Chile Telcos, the telecommunications association, objected to this request, arguing that it was contrary to existing data-protection legislation and disproportionate to SUBTEL’s stated objectives. In April 2021, SUBTEL’s order was upheld by the Council for Transparency (CPLT), which decided that SUBTEL had the legal authority to request the information.9 Derechos Digitales criticized the CPLT’s decision and said that it underscored the need for an independent data protection authority.10

In October 2022, Derechos Digitales noted that, while providers have made strides to publish transparency reports, the need to issue notifications to users about requests for their personal data remained a particular area for improvement.11

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 4.004 5.005

Individuals in Chile do not typically experience physical violence from either state or nonstate actors in connection with their online activities, though such incidents have occurred in the past.1 Online harassment, especially targeting women, remains an ongoing concern.

A 2018 study by Datos Protegidos underscored the particular risk to women and LGBT+ people posed by online bullying and harassment, doxing, and the nonconsensual sharing of intimate images.2 A survey of 531 women conducted by the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Amaranta in 2020 found that 73.8 percent of respondents had suffered some form of online violence, with the most common forms being verbal violence, harassment and/or stalking, and the unsolicited sharing of intimate images.3

Women journalists and politicians remain under threat from these forms of harassment and online abuse. During the coverage period, Valeria Cárcamo, a political commentator and member of the leftist Revolución Democrática (Democratic Revolution) party, reported that she experienced an escalation of online hate after Gabriel Alemparte, the vice president of the Partido Demócratas (Democratic Party), appeared on a political television show in January 2024 and openly questioned whether Cárcamo had been the victim of sexual assault.4

A bill that would strengthen protections against violence for journalists and communications workers remained under consideration during the coverage period.5

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 2.002 3.003

While cyberattacks have at times targeted public institutions and the private sector, politically motivated cyberattacks targeting the media, political opposition, or civil society are rare. The government’s Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) provides coordination for “cybersecurity incidents with a significant impact.”1

In October 2023, internet and digital services provider GTD was the victim of a reported ransomware attack, affecting part of the company’s Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) platform.2 The cyberattack affected normal operations for GTD’s clients in both the private and public sector for at least several weeks, including disruptions to the digital platforms of 72 municipalities, making it difficult for them to pay salaries in some cases.3

The following month, in November, the investigative outlet CIPER was the victim of an apparent hack, temporarily disrupting the normal functioning of its website.4 After the incident, CIPER said that it experienced “technical problems,” but the hack had only disrupted material hosted on WordPress.5 Although the cyberattack occurred shortly after the outlet published audio recordings related to a high-profile corruption case, there was otherwise no information available about the motive for the attack or who was responsible.

In April 2024, the government published the Cybersecurity Framework Law,6 a years-long legislative project originally presented in 2022 under President Sebastian Piñera.7 The law, which had not entered into force by the end of the coverage period, establishes Latin America’s first National Cybersecurity Agency (ANCI), an independent cybersecurity regulator with sanctioning authority.8 It also creates cybersecurity incident reporting obligations for the public and private institutions covered under the law. 

Note: After the publication of this report, the investigative outlet CIPER contacted Freedom House to clarify that the outlet did not consider the November 2023 outage to be a cyberattack, but rather "technical problems" caused by "high demand from readers." While described in this report, the outage did not impact Chile’s score.

 

On Chile

See all data, scores & information on this country or territory.

See More

Country Facts

  • Population

    19,600,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    95 100 free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    87 100 free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    No

  • Pro-government Commentators

    No

  • Users Arrested

    No