Cuba
| A Obstacles to Access | 5 25 |
| B Limits on Content | 10 35 |
| C Violations of User Rights | 6 40 |
Internet freedom in Cuba improved slightly during the coverage period, though the environment remained highly restricted as authorities persisted with efforts to censor and punish online dissent. The quality of internet connections continued to be poor amid a severe energy crisis,1 and a significant price hike for mobile internet service deepened affordability challenges. Government censorship included the blocking of independent news sites, the imprisonment of internet users, and other forms of harassment.
- In May 2025, the state-run Telecommunications Company of Cuba SA (ETECSA)—the country’s only mobile service provider—abruptly imposed limits on ordinary data plans as well as higher prices for any additional data that far surpassed the monthly minimum wage.2 In June, after the coverage period, ETECSA responded to significant criticism of the price hike by announcing that students could obtain extra data at a lower cost (A2).3
- The Social Communication Law (LCS), which included vague restrictions on content and could be used to apply additional criminal penalties for online speech, took effect in October 2024. Its implementation coincided with further intimidation, interrogations, and stigmatization of independent digital journalists. Some reporters announced their resignations or went into exile due to the repression (B3, B6, B7, and C7).4
- As part of the implementation of the LCS, in November 2024 the government showcased “social communication inspectors” whose duties would include monitoring online content to ensure compliance with the law (B3, B6, and C5).5
- Authorities imposed severe criminal penalties in connection with online activities. In January 2025, for instance, Félix Daniel Pérez Ruiz was sentenced to five years in prison for creating a Facebook post that criticized the government and encouraged a public demonstration.6 Opposition figure José Manuel Barreiro Rouco received a two-and-a-half-year prison sentence in September 2024 for sharing memes about Cuban leaders in a private WhatsApp group (C3).7
- 1“El 43% de Cuba estará en apagón de forma simultánea este miércoles [43% of Cuba Will Face Simultaneous Blackouts this Wednesday],” SWI swissinfo.ch, March 12, 2025, https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/el-43-%25-de-cuba-estar%C3%A1-en-apag%C3%B….
- 2Sociedad Interamericana de Presna, “La SIP alerta sobre impacto negativo de nuevas tarifas en el acceso a internet en Cuba [The IAPA Warns of the Negative Impact of New Rates on Internet Access in Cuba],” June 06, 2025, https://www.sipiapa.org/la-sip-alerta-impacto-negativo-nuevas-tarifas-e…; Andrea Rodriguez, “Estudiantes cubanos protagonizan inusual protesta por aumento de tarifas de internet [Cuban Students Stage Unusual Protest over Internet Rate Hikes],” Los Angeles Times, June 06, 2025, https://www.latimes.com/espanol/internacional/articulo/2025-06-06/estud….
- 3Nelson Acosta, “Cuba Partially Rolls Back Internet Rate Hike as Anger Grows,” Reuters, June 03, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/cuba-partially-rolls-back-intern….
- 4Katherine Pennacchio, “New Wave of Repression Hits Independent Press amid Arrival of Cuba’s New Communications Law,” LatAm Journalism Review, October 22, 2024, https://latamjournalismreview.org/articles/new-wave-of-repression-hits-….
- 5“Régimen cubano crea la figura de ‘inspectores de la comunicación social’ [Cuban Regime Creates the Position of ‘Social Communication Inspectors’],” ADN Cuba, November 25, 2024, https://adncuba.com/es/tendencias/regimen-cubano-crea-la-figura-de-insp…; “Régimen cubano acredita inspectores para ‘controlar y fiscalizar’ la comunicación social [The Cuban Regime Accredits Inspectors to ‘Control and Oversee Social Communication’],” CiberCuba, November 26, 2024, https://www.cibercuba.com/noticias/2024-11-26-u1-e135253-s27061-nid2927….
- 6“Sentences of 5 and 4 Years in Prison for Two Young Cubans for Facebook Posts,” CiberCuba, January 14, 2025, https://en.cibercuba.com/noticias/2025-01-14-u1-e192519-s27061-nid29546….
- 7“Dos años y medio de prisión por compartir memes en un grupo familiar [Two and a Half Years in Prison for Sharing Memes in a Family Group],” ADN Cuba, September 19, 2024, https://adncuba.com/es/derechos-humanos/dos-anos-y-medio-de-prision-por….
Cuba’s one-party communist state outlaws political pluralism, bans independent media, suppresses dissent, and severely restricts basic civil liberties. The government continues to dominate the economy despite a series of reforms that permitted private-sector activity and foreign investment. The regime’s undemocratic character has not changed since a generational transition in political leadership that started in 2018 and included the introduction of a new constitution and the gradual passage of complementary new legislation.
This report has been abridged for Freedom on the Net 2025 due to ongoing budget constraints. Please consider making a donation to support future editions of this vital resource.
For additional background information, see last year’s full report.
| Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? | 2.002 6.006 |
| Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? | 0.000 3.003 |
| Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? | 3.003 6.006 |
| Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? | 0.000 6.006 |
| Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? | 0.000 4.004 |
| Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? | 3.003 6.006 |
Score Change: The score improved from 2 to 3 because, unlike in years past, social media platforms were not blocked during the coverage period, though some messaging applications showed signs of blocking.1
- 1Diktyon, “Censura de Internet en Cuba: Informe número 7 [Internet Censorship in Cuba: Report No. 7],” February 9, 2025, https://github.com/diktyoncuba/public/blob/main/Informes/Informe-7_Oct-…; Diktyon, “Censura de Internet en Cuba: Informe número 6 [Internet Censorship in Cuba: Report No. 6],” October 13, 2024, https://github.com/diktyoncuba/public/blob/main/Informes/Informe-6_Jul-….
| Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? | 1.001 4.004 |
| Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? | 0.000 4.004 |
| Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? | 1.001 4.004 |
| Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? | 1.001 4.004 |
| Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? | 0.000 3.003 |
| Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? | 1.001 4.004 |
| Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? | 3.003 6.006 |
| Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? | 0.000 6.006 |
| Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? | 0.000 4.004 |
| Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? | 1.001 6.006 |
| Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? | 1.001 4.004 |
| Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? | 1.001 6.006 |
| Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? | 0.000 6.006 |
| Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? | 2.002 5.005 |
| Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? | 1.001 3.003 |
Country Facts
-
Population
11,210,000 -
Global Freedom Score
10 100 not free -
Internet Freedom Score
21 100 not free -
Freedom in the World Status
Not Free -
Networks Restricted
Yes -
Websites Blocked
Yes -
Pro-government Commentators
Yes -
Users Arrested
Yes