Georgia
| A Obstacles to Access | 19 25 |
| B Limits on Content | 26 35 |
| C Violations of User Rights | 25 40 |
Internet freedom in Georgia declined during the coverage period. The government took increasingly restrictive measures against civil society organizations and media outlets that operate online, digital media workers encountered more threats and physical assaults, and the growing legal and extralegal pressure on users contributed to self-censorship. Georgians continued to enjoy strong access to internet service, website blocking remained limited, and there were few arrests for online speech that is protected by international human rights standards, though some people were arrested for such speech after the coverage period.
- The Law on the Protection of Family Values and Minors was adopted by Parliament in September 2024 and came into effect in December of that year. Among other provisions that discriminated against LGBT+ people, the law prohibited the “popularization” of same-sex relationships and the portrayal of people as nonbinary or transgender in media content and advertisements (B3, B4, and B6).1
- The Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, which took effect in August 2024, required civil society organizations and media outlets, including those that operate online, to register in a government database as foreign agents if they received more than 20 percent of their funding from abroad. In April 2025, the president signed a new law, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which introduced a maximum criminal sentence of five years in prison for those who fail to register or provide the required information; the 2024 law had prescribed only administrative fines for noncompliance. Also in April 2025, Parliament passed amendments to the Law on Grants, obliging civil society and media outlets to obtain government approval before accepting any grants from foreign donors (B6 and B8).2
- Ahead of the October 2024 elections, officers from the Investigative Service of the Ministry of Finance conducted raids on the homes of Sopo Gelava and Eto Buziashvili, two researchers at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab who had analyzed online influence operations involving Georgia, Russia, and other countries; the officers seized their computers and other devices. The raids were reportedly part of an investigation into supposed money laundering and tax evasion (B6 and C7).3
- In February 2025, Parliament and the president swiftly enacted amendments to the code of administrative offenses that stipulated punishments of up to 60 days in administrative detention for insulting law enforcement officials and up to 45 days for insulting government officials.4 In June 2025, after the coverage period, people began facing detentions for online speech under these amendments (C2 and C3).5
- Justice for Journalists reported 298 attacks and threats against media workers at both traditional and online outlets in 2024, compared with 73 in 2023.6 In November 2024, for example, Davit Tsagareli, a journalist working for the Georgian service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), was attacked by a special forces officer while he was live-streaming coverage of protests and wearing an RFE/RL jacket and a press badge (C7).7
- 1Nini Gabritchidze, “Georgian Dream’s Oppressive Anti-LGBT Law Comes into Effect,” Civil.ge, December 2, 2024, https://civil.ge/archives/640509; Felix Light, “Georgian parliament approves law curbing LGBT rights,” Reuters, September 17, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/georgian-parliament-approves-law-c…; United Nations Office of the Hich Commissioner, “Georgia: call to rescind new anti-LGBTIQ+ law,” September 17, 2024, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/09/georgia-call-rescind-ne….
- 2International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “Georgia: The Foreign Agents Registration Act,” April 9, 2025, https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/ICNL_Brief-on-Georgia-FARA_fv.p…; Committee to Protect Journalists, “Georgia parliament very close to making harsher ‘foreign agent’ bill a law,” March 20, 2025, https://cpj.org/2025/03/georgia-parliament-very-close-to-making-harsher…; Mikheil Gvadzabia, “Georgian Dream imposes grant restrictions on civil society and media organisations,” OC-Media, April 17, 2025, https://oc-media.org/georgian-dream-imposes-grant-restrictions-on-civil…; “'Foreign Agent' Law Goes Into Effect In Georgia, Despite Constitutional Challenges,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty, August 1, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-foreign-agent-law-begins/33059498.html.
- 3Atlantic Council, “Statement on the home raids of two Atlantic Council staff in Georgia,” October 24, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/announcements/statement-on-the-hom…; “Financial Police Search Houses of Atlantic Council Employees,” Civil.ge, October 24, 2024, https://civil.ge/archives/629994.
- 4Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “URGENT OPINION ON THE AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW ON ASSEMBLIES AND DEMONSTRATIONS, THE CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENCES AND THE CRIMINAL CODE OF GEORGIA (AS ADOPTED ON 6 FEBRUARY 2025,” March 6, 2025, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/2/587466.pdf.
- 5“Journalists and Activists in Georgia Face Punishment for Alleged Offenses Against Officials,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, June 12, 2025, https://www.occrp.org/en/news/journalists-and-activists-in-georgia-face….
- 6Justice for Journalists, “ATTACKS ON MEDIA WORKERS IN GEORGIA IN 2023-2024,” February 21, 2025, https://jfj.fund/attacks-on-media-workers-in-georgia-in-2023-2024-2/.
- 7Tea Topuria, “At Georgian Protests, Journalists Say They're Being Targeted And Beaten,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty, November 20, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/georgian-protests-journalists-targeted-beaten-/…
Georgia holds regular elections and hosts lively media and civil society sectors. However, oligarchic influence affects the country’s political affairs, and opposition figures have faced physical violence amid government crackdowns on freedom of assembly. Corruption in government persists, and media freedom is undermined by violence and intimidation of journalists. Executive and legislative interference in the courts remains a substantial problem, as does a lack of transparency and professionalism surrounding judicial proceedings. These negative patterns have all grown worse in recent years.
The territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are not covered in this report. Certain territories that are assessed separately in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report are also excluded from the relevant country reports in Freedom on the Net, as conditions in such territories differ significantly from those in the relevant countries. Freedom in the World reports assess the level of political rights and civil liberties in a given geographical area, regardless of whether they are affected by the state, nonstate actors, or foreign powers. Related, disputed, or occupied territories are sometimes assessed separately from the relevant countries if they meet certain criteria, including distinct conditions for political rights and civil liberties and boundaries that are sufficiently stable to allow year-on-year comparisons. For more information, see the report methodology and FAQ.
This report has been abridged for Freedom on the Net 2025 due to ongoing budget constraints. Please consider making a donation to support future editions of this vital resource.
For additional background information, see last year’s full report.
| Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? | 5.005 6.006 |
| Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? | 2.002 3.003 |
| Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? | 6.006 6.006 |
| Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? | 4.004 6.006 |
| Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? | 2.002 4.004 |
| Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? | 5.005 6.006 |
| Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? | 4.004 4.004 |
| Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? | 3.003 4.004 |
| Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? | 3.003 4.004 |
Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 3 due to increased pressure for self-censorship among LGBT+ people, journalists, and civil society organizations.1
- 1International Press Institute, “Georgia: Family Values Bill imposes censorship on media,” September 30, 2024, https://ipi.media/georgia-family-values-bill-imposes-censorship-on-media; World Organizatoin Against Torture, “Georgia: ‘Foreign Agents’ Laws Threaten Civil Society and Breach Human Rights Commitments, Joint UPR Submission Warns,” July 23, 2025, https://www.omct.org/en/resources/statements/georgia-foreign-agents-law…; “Study Speaks of Unprecedented Media Repression in 2024 Amid Foreign Agents Law,” Civil.ge, March 26, 2025,https://civil.ge/archives/671972; IREX, “Vibrant Information Barometer 2024: Georgia,” 2024, https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/VIBE_2024_Georgia.pdf.
| Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? | 2.002 4.004 |
| Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? | 1.001 3.003 |
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because a series of laws that took effect during the coverage period made it increasingly difficult for online media outlets and civil society organizations to operate.1
- 1International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “Georgia: The Foreign Agents Registration Act,” April 9, 2025, https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/ICNL_Brief-on-Georgia-FARA_fv.p…; Committee to Protect Journalists, “Georgia parliament very close to making harsher ‘foreign agent’ bill a law,” March 20, 2025, https://cpj.org/2025/03/georgia-parliament-very-close-to-making-harsher…; Mikheil Gvadzabia, “Georgian Dream imposes grant restrictions on civil society and media organisations,” OC-Media, April 17, 2025, https://oc-media.org/georgian-dream-imposes-grant-restrictions-on-civil…; “'Foreign Agent' Law Goes Into Effect In Georgia, Despite Constitutional Challenges,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty, August 1, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-foreign-agent-law-begins/33059498.html.
| Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? | 3.003 4.004 |
| Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? | 5.005 6.006 |
| Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? | 3.003 6.006 |
| Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? | 2.002 4.004 |
Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because of February 2025 amendments to the code of administrative offenses that stipulated punishments of up to 60 days in administrative detention for insulting law enforcement officials and up to 45 days for insulting government officials.
| Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? | 5.005 6.006 |
| Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? | 3.003 4.004 |
| Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? | 3.003 6.006 |
| Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? | 4.004 6.006 |
| Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? | 3.003 5.005 |
Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 3 because of increased online harassment and physical attacks against digital media workers during the coverage period.1
- 1Justice for Journalists, “ATTACKS ON MEDIA WORKERS IN GEORGIA IN 2023-2024,” February 21, 2025, https://jfj.fund/attacks-on-media-workers-in-georgia-in-2023-2024-2/; Katherine Dunn, “Death threats and a dangerous law: How Georgian news media came under fire ahead of a critical election,” Reuters Institute, October 23, 2024, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/news/death-threats-and-dange….
| Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? | 2.002 3.003 |
Country Facts
-
Population
3,713,000 -
Global Freedom Score
55 100 partly free -
Internet Freedom Score
70 100 free -
Freedom in the World Status
Partly Free -
Networks Restricted
No -
Websites Blocked
No -
Pro-government Commentators
Yes -
Users Arrested
No