The territory’s chief executive is selected under electoral laws approved by the National People’s Congress (NPC) of China in 2021, which diminished the role of voters and gave mainland authorities near-total control over the process. The chief executive serves a five-year term and can seek reelection. The Election Committee (EC), which was expanded under the 2021 laws and mostly consists of individuals backed by Beijing, is formally responsible for choosing the chief executive. Former Security Secretary and Chief Secretary for Administration John Lee was the only candidate vetted to succeed outgoing Chief Executive Carrie Lam in 2022; he won 1,416 votes in the 1,500-member EC that May and took office that July.

Under the 2021 rules, the number of EC members was increased from 1,200 to 1,500. Of the 300 additional representatives, 190 are delegates of either the NPC or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), China’s top government advisory body. The remaining 110 represented “Hong Kong members of relevant national organizations.” The number of eligible voters who select EC members was cut from some 200,000 “functional constituency” voters—representatives of elite business and social sectors, many with close Beijing ties—to around 4,800. Most individual votes were replaced with organizational votes; unions and other groups may cast only one vote on behalf of their members.

EC candidates must pass national security vetting by the Candidate Eligibility Review Committee (CERC), whose members are appointed by the chief executive. Nearly all of the 967 EC seats contested in September 2021 were filled by candidates considered to be aligned with the Beijing-backed authorities. The remaining 533 seats were occupied by individuals nominated directly from designated organizations and by ex officio members. In September 2025, a slate of 28 vetted candidates competed for 21 EC seats in six subsector by-elections, while 72 others were elected unopposed.

The next chief executive election was scheduled to take place in 2027.

The electoral system imposed by Beijing in 2021 significantly altered the LegCo’s composition. The number of seats increased from 70 to 90, with 40 elected by the EC, 30 by the functional constituencies, and just 20 elected directly by Hong Kong voters in five geographical constituencies. This reduced the proportion of seats open for direct election from 50 percent to 22 percent. Members serve four-year terms.

In December 2025, the LegCo held its second cycle of elections under the 2021 system, and the new seat allocations—combined with the CERC’s national security vetting of candidates—ensured that the process was again monopolized by pro-Beijing figures. Despite the government’s effort to boost participation, voter turnout was reported at 31.9 percent, and 3.1 percent of the ballots were deemed to be invalid—the highest rate since the territory was handed over from the United Kingdom to China in 1997.

District council elections held in December 2023 were similarly affected by a significant decline in the number of directly elected seats and the new CERC vetting requirements. Voter turnout was just 27.5 percent, a record low for those contests.

Under the 2021 electoral framework, far fewer EC, LegCo, and district council seats are directly elected. In addition, the CERC is empowered to vet and preapprove candidates based on national security background checks meant to ascertain whether they are Chinese “patriots,” effectively ensuring loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime in Beijing. The CERC’s determinations cannot be appealed.

Although Hong Kong formally maintains a multiparty system, prodemocracy opposition parties have been banned or forced to dissolve in recent years, and the 2021 electoral system effectively excludes opposition-aligned candidates from office. As a result, the remaining parties generally belong to the pro-Beijing establishment camp and display little independence from the government.

The banning of the proindependence Hong Kong National Party in 2018 marked the first blanket prohibition of a political party since the territory’s 1997 handover. Civic Passion, a localist party that was critical of Beijing, disbanded in 2021 after its chairman was ejected from the LegCo for being deemed insufficiently patriotic. In 2023, the prodemocracy Civic Party announced its dissolution. The Democratic Party, Hong Kong’s oldest and largest prodemocracy faction, announced plans to dissolve in April 2025 and confirmed the decision in December, citing financial constraints and warnings from authorities. Another party from the prodemocracy camp, the League of Social Democrats, announced that it was disbanding in June.

Prodemocracy opposition legislators, who have historically enjoyed substantial minority representation alongside their pro-Beijing counterparts, are now absent from the LegCo and district councils. The expansive criminalization of political dissent and opposition political activity—under both the NSL of 2020 and a 2024 national security ordinance linked to Article 23 of the Basic Law—allows for arbitrary enforcement and makes genuine opposition representation effectively impossible. In 2024, for example, a group of 45 prodemocracy politicians and activists received prison sentences for participating in unofficial opposition primary elections in 2020. The 2021 electoral reforms also closed remaining avenues for the opposition to win political office.

The unelected leadership in Beijing exerts a powerful influence on politics in Hong Kong through a variety of channels and methods, including the NPC’s ability to issue interpretations of the Basic Law, the co-optation of Hong Kong business leaders through their mainland assets and membership in the NPC or CPPCC, and lobbying or harassment of EC members and other political figures to ensure favorable electoral outcomes. The Liaison Office, which represents the mainland government in Hong Kong, coordinates nominations and campaigns for the pro-Beijing camp in LegCo elections.

The NSL, imposed without local consultation, gave Beijing vastly expanded powers in Hong Kong, in part by establishing a centrally controlled security apparatus in the territory and by allowing defendants in some NSL cases to be transferred to the mainland for prosecution and punishment. The 2024 ordinance under Article 23 prescribes harsh punishments for vaguely defined national security offenses, providing the authorities with another tool to intimidate and imprison any political figures who are deemed disloyal to the CCP regime.

While there are no formal obstacles preventing women or members of ethnic minority groups from voting or running for office, their participation is limited in practice, and tighter electoral and legal restrictions in recent years have reduced the political rights and autonomy of all Hong Kongers. There is no ethnic minority representation in Hong Kong’s government. Of the 21 official members of the Executive Council, a body that advises the chief executive, 7 were women as of 2025, and female legislators occupied only 17 of the LegCo’s 90 seats. Women’s representation at the local level is also low. The LegCo’s September 2025 decision to reject a bill offering some recognition to same-sex partnerships prompted accusations that the reformed political system did not reflect public opinion or the interests of LGBT+ citizens.

Hong Kong’s executive and legislative officeholders are not freely elected and have little genuine ability to set and implement government policy on their own, given the overriding authority of the CCP regime in Beijing. The Basic Law restricts the LegCo’s lawmaking powers, prohibiting legislators from introducing bills that would affect public spending, governmental operations, or political structure. The LegCo presently offers no meaningful checks on executive authority and instead typically functions as a rubber-stamp institution, passing most bills with near unanimity.

Hong Kong is regarded as having generally low corruption rates, and some high-ranking officials have been successfully prosecuted for graft-related offenses in the past. However, residents perceive the government to be lagging in the fight against corruption, and authorities have at times used anticorruption laws to punish political dissent. In November 2025, a fire at a high-rise apartment complex killed more than 160 people and exposed poor government oversight and corruption in the construction industry.

Hong Kong has no freedom-of-information law, nor does it have any specific legislation relating to the management of government records and archives. An administrative Code of Access to Information is intended to ensure open access to government records but includes broad exemptions.

Government contracts are awarded through a public and competitive tendering system, with oversight from entities like the Audit Commission. However, a scandal over government bottled-water procurement in 2025 revealed shortcomings in the process, as two mainland Chinese companies with prior safety violations were able to secure contracts.

While the government still conducts public consultations on a variety of issues, the frequency and duration of such exercises has decreased sharply in recent years. Separately, consultations between Hong Kong officials and the central government’s Liaison Office are opaque, and there is no transparency regarding central government processes that directly affect Hong Kong.

The Basic Law has historically acted as a bulwark for press freedom, and the mainland’s internet censorship regime does not yet apply in Hong Kong. Residents have long had access to a variety of print, broadcast, and digital news sources. However, press freedom has deteriorated amid sustained political and economic pressure on independent media by the Hong Kong and mainland governments. The output of Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK), the territory’s public broadcaster, has been under the government’s effective control since 2021.

Independent outlets have closed or left the territory in recent years, while journalists have been prosecuted and convicted for violating security laws. Prodemocracy media owner Jimmy Lai, whose outlets Apple Daily and Next Magazine were forced to close after his arrest in 2020, was convicted in December 2025 on charges of foreign collusion and sedition. He remained in detention, with sentencing set for early 2026.

Foreign journalists also faced constraints on their work during the year. The Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club reported that 65 percent of its members admitted to self-censoring, and 33 percent said they had considered leaving the territory due to press freedom concerns. Journalists from the US-based news services Bloomberg and the Associated Press had their work visas denied without explanation, adding to a recent pattern.

In May 2025, three independent local publishers reported that they had been excluded from participating in the annual Hong Kong Book Fair. While event organizers provided no explanation, the publishers had previously received warnings for offering politically sensitive books.

While religious freedom has been generally respected in Hong Kong in the past, religious figures and groups that support the government’s opponents have been harassed by the authorities and pro-Beijing actors. Adherents of the Falun Gong spiritual movement have been able to practice in public. However, they have faced counterdemonstrations and intimidation by members of the Hong Kong Youth Care Association, which has ties to the CCP.

Local churches have been affected by Beijing’s policy of “Sinicization,” with the government restricting the scope for religious freedom and more directly influencing the conduct of religious groups. Religious schools are obligated to teach NSL-related lessons, and some churches have self-censored or eschewed pastors and sermons with political views. In recent years, the territory’s Roman Catholic diocese has stopped holding masses to commemorate the victims of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.

University professors were historically able to write and lecture freely, and political debate on campuses was lively. However, an ongoing crackdown on free speech on campus, academic freedom, and student activism has continued to intensify.

The NSL has been aggressively used to suppress discussion on topics such as Hong Kong independence and the 2019 protest movement at all levels of education. In 2021, the Education Bureau instructed public universities to bring curriculums in line with the NSL and “prevent and suppress” on-campus acts that could violate its provisions. University students are reportedly less willing to discuss politically sensitive matters. In 2025, Hong Kong’s eight publicly funded universities signed an agreement with the University Grants Committee to follow guidance from Beijing and align themselves with remarks by CCP leader Xi Jinping.

In July 2025, Lingnan University severed ties with its students’ union, calling it an external organization and denying it any authorization to operate on campus. Three student unions representing colleges at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) suspended their operations in late December. The moves followed similar developments at other universities since the 2019 protests, as institutions distanced themselves from student organizations that were perceived as sympathetic to the movement.

Academics increasingly self-censor for fear of violating the NSL, and some have chosen or were forced to leave Hong Kong. They also faced continued criticism from state media in 2025: Ta Kung Pao criticized CUHK’s Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies for a poll showing a fall in public support for the chief executive, and two honorary academics at the university were accused of being “anti-China,” prompting the university to revoke their titles and offer assurances that future hires would adhere to local laws.

Hong Kong has a tradition of free personal expression and private discussion, but local and mainland security agencies have been suspected of monitoring the communications of prodemocracy activists for a number of years. These agencies are now mandated to do so under the NSL, which permits warrantless surveillance and wiretapping. The law also called for mainland authorities to establish security agencies in the territory under their own jurisdiction, and people charged with NSL offenses can be detained and tried on the mainland. The NSL’s enactment has prompted many social media users to self-censor, close their accounts, or delete content that could run afoul of the law.

Security measures adopted under Article 23 of the Basic Law in 2024 further restricted online and offline expression. Among other provisions, the ordinance contained broad definitions for “national security” and “state interests,” expanded the definition of espionage, and prescribed long prison sentences for several offenses, including collaboration with “external” entities. Criminal cases filed under the 2024 ordinance have targeted activity ranging from social media posts that promoted an overseas-based prodemocracy group to the writing of allegedly seditious graffiti in a restroom.

The Basic Law guarantees freedom of assembly, but the Public Order Ordinance requires organizers to give police seven days’ notice before protests and to obtain official assent. Organizers seeking to hold rallies have reportedly faced pressure to rescind public event applications.

Authorities have used various measures to effectively ban the annual June 4 vigil commemorating the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in recent years, first invoking COVID-19-related restrictions from 2020 to 2022 and later granting permission for pro-Beijing organizations to hold events that occupied Victoria Park, where the vigils had been held. Other civic groups have also faced increasing barriers when attempting to organize events and gatherings in Hong Kong. In 2025, for example, multiple venues declined to host the Hong Kong Journalists Association’s annual soccer tournament and fundraising dinner, as well as Pink Dot, the territory’s largest LGBT+ event.

Historically, Hong Kong hosted a vibrant NGO sector, including a number of groups focused on human rights in mainland China. However, the introduction of the NSL in 2020 dramatically affected the sector, leading to the disbandment and closure of dozens of different organizations over the subsequent years. In February 2025, the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute suspended much of its activity and warned of possible closure after its chief executive faced investigations by national security police. In June, the China Labour Bulletin announced its dissolution after more than three decades dedicated to supporting labor movements in China; the NGO cited financial problems for the decision.

Trade unions have shown independence in the past, but antiunion discrimination protections are weak, collective bargaining rights are unrecognized, and labor organizations’ activities have been impacted by the 2020 NSL and the Article 23 ordinance of 2024. The 2021 dissolution of the prodemocracy Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions left the pro-Beijing Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions in a more dominant position. As of the end of 2024, the Hong Kong Labour Rights Monitor reported that at least 219 unions had dissolved since the NSL was imposed.

In June 2025, the LegCo adopted amendments to the Trade Unions Ordinance that introduced national security provisions, including official vetting of any foreign funding and new powers allowing the government registrar to block registrations or mergers of unions on security grounds. Anyone convicted of national security offenses would be barred from serving as a union officer.

The Hong Kong judiciary has been undermined by the NSL and Article 23. The NSL was imposed on Hong Kong through a Basic Law provision that allows the NPC to list national laws that must be applied locally, bypassing both the LegCo and Hong Kong’s courts. The NPC has historically reserved the right to make final interpretations of the Basic Law, limiting the independence of the Court of Final Appeal (CFA).

Judges, including CFA members, are selected by the territory’s chief executive with the support of the advisory Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission. Under the NSL, the chief executive is empowered to designate a pool of judges to try cases related to that law. They are selected for a one-year term but can face removal should they make statements that “endanger national security.” The chief executive’s criteria for selecting the pool and the identities of assigned judges are not publicly available.

The resignation of foreign judges has further eroded confidence in the independence of Hong Kong’s judiciary. In April 2025, Robert French of Australia became the sixth foreign jurist to step down from the CFA since 2024; six others were still serving at year’s end.

In a rare ruling against the government on a politically sensitive case, the CFA in March 2025 overturned the 2023 convictions of three Tiananmen Square vigil organizers for failing to comply with a national security police data request, finding that the redaction of key evidence had resulted in an unfair trial.

Although the courts have historically upheld due process rights and adjudicated civil and criminal matters fairly and efficiently, due process in criminal cases that purportedly involve national security has eroded in recent years. Under the NSL, individuals charged with national security offenses are tried by judges selected by the chief executive, and Beijing wields influence over the appointment of prosecutors. Under a 2022 edict from Beijing, the Hong Kong chief executive may bar foreign lawyers from national security trials.

Trials involving offenses against public order or state secrets may be closed to the public. Beijing’s Office for Safeguarding National Security in Hong Kong can assert jurisdiction over some cases and have them tried on the mainland. Defendants facing NSL-related charges face an especially high threshold for bail; Amnesty International reported in June 2025 that bail was denied in nearly 90 percent of cases.

The NSL also gave police powerful new legal tools, including enhanced investigatory power to search premises and electronic devices, freeze or confiscate assets, and demand information from groups and individuals. Prosecutors may challenge High Court decisions in national security cases where defendants were acquitted, opening the possibility that those defendants could be retried. In practice, according to the Amnesty International analysis, the conviction rate for those charged with offenses linked to national security is about 87 percent. Article 23 of the Basic Law further augments local authorities’ powers. Authorities can seize assets and conduct searches without a warrant. They can also detain suspects for up to 16 days without filing charges. If a magistrate agrees, police may prohibit detainees from consulting a lawyer in the first 48 hours after their arrest. Local courts may no longer review decisions made by the territory’s National Security Committee.

Police are forbidden by law from employing torture, disappearance, or other forms of abuse. The 2019 protest movement featured frequent episodes of police violence, which have generally gone unaddressed. There were also credible allegations that detained protesters were tortured in 2019, and nonstate actors committed violent attacks against protesters, activists, and bystanders at protest locations. However, both protests and associated violence have grown increasingly rare since 2020, as prodemocracy groups have disbanded and the government has relied on restrictive laws and imprisonment to contain dissent.

Score Change: The score improved from 2 to 3 because past episodes of excessive force or extralegal violence, including abductions to the mainland and mass assaults on protesters, have generally not recurred in recent years as authorities shifted to other means of control.

Hong Kong has four antidiscrimination ordinances concerning sex, disability, family status, and race. Citizens are generally treated equally under the law, though people of South Asian or African origin or descent can encounter language barriers and de facto discrimination in education and employment. Foreign delivery workers face racial discrimination. Women are also subject to some employment discrimination.

Antidiscrimination laws do not specifically protect LGBT+ people. In 2023, the CFA ruled that transgender residents could update their identity documents without being mandated to undergo surgery.

Hong Kong residents generally enjoy freedom of movement, though authorities periodically deny entry to visiting political activists and reporters, raising suspicions of Beijing-imposed restrictions. Some Hong Kong activists and politicians have also faced difficulty traveling to the mainland.

Hong Kong police have reportedly compiled a watchlist of people to arrest under the NSL should they attempt to leave via border checkpoints or the airport. In July 2025, police announced monetary bounties for the arrest of 19 overseas-based activists facing national security charges; they were accused of organizing or participating in a dissident shadow legislature known as the Hong Kong Parliament. In August, authorities canceled the passports of 12 of the activists and banned financial and business transactions with 16 of them. Four of the 19 had already faced previous arrest warrants.

While property rights are largely respected, collusion among powerful business entities with political connections is perceived as an impediment to fair competition.

Small business activity has been impacted by the NSL. In 2024, Voice of America reported that a number of independent bookstores closed after the NSL was imposed, while other bookstores are monitored by the authorities. Restaurants and entertainment venues were warned in 2025 that they and affiliated individuals should refrain from any activities deemed to endanger national security, with the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department threatening license revocations.

Hong Kong residents are legally protected from rape and domestic abuse, and police generally respond appropriately to reports of such crimes.

Men and women enjoy equal rights in personal status matters such as marriage and divorce. There is no legal recognition of same-sex marriage or civil union in Hong Kong. In 2023, the CFA ruled that the territory’s government was obligated to provide “an alternative legal framework” for recognizing same-sex unions by 2025. In 2024, the court issued rulings giving LGBT+ people who were married abroad equal rights to inheritance and subsidized housing. However, the LegCo voted in September 2025 to reject a bill that would have provided recognition—mainly for the purpose of shared medical decisions—to same-sex couples who registered their partnerships overseas.

While most Hong Kong residents enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation, certain marginalized groups face substantial risks of exploitation and abuse. Many of Hong Kong’s migrant household workers remain vulnerable to a wide range of exploitative practices such as physical abuse, humiliation, and forced labor. Some migrant workers’ travel documents and mobile phones are seized by their employers. Since they may face deportation if dismissed, many are reluctant to bring complaints against employers.

Hong Kong is a significant site for human trafficking but lacks comprehensive antitrafficking legislation.