Indonesia

Partly Free
49
100
A Obstacles to Access 14 25
B Limits on Content 18 35
C Violations of User Rights 17 40
Last Year's Score & Status
51 100 Partly Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free)

header1 Overview

Internet freedom in Indonesia declined due to an increase in disinformation and pro-government propaganda, as well as technical attacks targeting activists, journalists, and civil society. The government again restricted internet access during the coverage period; in August and September 2019, connectivity was limited amid protests in Papua and West Papua provinces. However, a court later ruled in support of civil society groups, declaring the restrictions unlawful. Meanwhile, critics of the government, journalists, and ordinary users continued to face criminal charges and harassment in retaliation for their online activity.

Indonesia has made impressive democratic gains since the fall of an authoritarian regime in 1998, establishing significant pluralism in politics and the media and undergoing multiple, peaceful transfers of power between parties. However, the country continues to struggle with challenges including systemic corruption, discrimination and violence against some marginalized groups, tensions related to the independence movement in the Papua region, and the politicized use of defamation and blasphemy laws.

header2 Key Developments, June 1, 2019 – May 31, 2020

  • In August and September 2019, the government repeatedly restricted internet connectivity amid major protests in the Papua region. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) sued the government in November over the action, with the Jakarta State Administrative Court siding with the groups in June 2020 and declaring the restrictions unlawful (see A3 and B8).
  • In January 2020, Reuters revealed that the military was operating and funding a network of 10 online news sites that publish pro-government propaganda and criticize government critics. Research also revealed the use of cybertroop teams and bot networks spreading disinformation, including around the 2019 protests in Papua and West Papua (see B5).
  • Criminal charges were filed against journalists, activists, and ordinary members of the public. In March 2020, Mohamad Sadli, the editor in chief of liputanpersada.com, was sentenced to two years in prison over a critical opinion piece about a local government project (see C3).
  • Intimidation and doxing of people for online activity continued. Human rights lawyer Veronica Koman, reportedly received physical threats and had her personal information released for comments she posted about protests in the Papua region (see C7).
  • More activists reported having their social media accounts hacked in 2020. In August 2020, after the coverage period, independent news outlets that criticized the government’s COVID-19 response reported facing distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and hacks that removed critical stories (see C8).

A Obstacles to Access

While smartphone use is widespread, connectivity is restricted by the country’s geography, consisting of 17,000 islands. Such disparities in access were underscored amid the COVID-19 pandemic, as students, workers, and other entities struggled to participate in online learning and work activities due to limited connectivity and electricity. Authorities continued to impose restrictions on connectivity during the coverage period, including amid protests in Papua and West Papua. Meanwhile, the impact of the 2018 restructuring of the Indonesia Telecommunication Regulatory Body (BRTI), which gave the agency greater authority, remained undetermined.

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 4.004 6.006

Internet penetration is steadily increasing, driven largely by rapid growth in the number of mobile subscriptions. The low number of fixed-line subscribers stems from the lack of infrastructure, which limits coverage and keeps the price of monthly subscriptions high.

The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Inclusive Internet Index 2020 report ranks Indonesia 55 out of 100 countries surveyed in terms of availability, as determined by quality and breadth of available infrastructure.1 In 2020, the social media management platform HootSuite placed Indonesia’s internet penetration rate at 64 percent, or approximately 175.4 million people.2 Mobile phones remain the most popular means of access, with over 338 million subscriptions in 2020, an increase of 4.6 percent over 2019.3

The first internet exchange point, the Indonesia Internet Exchange, was created by the Indonesian Internet Service Provider Association (APJII) to allow internet service providers (ISPs) to interconnect domestically. An independent internet exchange point, Open IXP, was launched in 2005.4

Government projects are underway to improve the internet infrastructure in Indonesia, especially in rural areas. 5 Although the main Palapa Ring project—a three-part network of broadband backbone infrastructure extending thousands of kilometers across the country—was completed in October 2019, funding constraints have limited the development of further infrastructure necessary to support the project.6 In order to more effectively provide high-speed internet across the country and attract telecommunication operators interested in renting the ring’s capacity, The Ministry of Communication and Information (MCIT) and service providers need to develop base transceiver stations (BTS), and the government needs to integrate the three parts of the Ring to overcome an interconnection issue while leveraging its strategy to gain the interests of more telecommunication operators to rent the capacity of Palapa Ring.7

To further expedite the provision of access to high-speed internet, the Telecommunication and Information Accessibility Agency (BAKTI) of the MCIT plans to rent five satellites.8 The Nusantara Satu satellite launched in February 2019 and commenced operations that April.9 The four other satellites are expected to launch between 2020 and 2023, but funding constraints, including financial challenges during COVID-19, may limit that goal.10 In addition to renting satellites, the government also began developing its own satellite, Satelit Indonesia Raya (SATRIA), in May 2019.

The impact of low internet penetration rates and poor infrastructure was exacerbated amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The limited availability of electricity and connectivity in more than 21,000 villages, or a quarter of all villages, in Indonesia has hindered online home learning activities for students in those areas.11

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 1.001 3.003

A persistent geographic digital divide continued in Indonesia during the coverage period.

Despite increasing penetration rates and improved infrastructure, connectivity remains highly concentrated in the western part of the archipelago, particularly on the more urbanized island of Java. The disparity is evident in the information and communication technology (ICT) development index issued by the National Bureau of Statistics, in which five eastern provinces received the lowest rankings in 2017.1

According to official 2018 statistics, 70 percent of internet users are in urban areas.2 In 2018, the APJII survey reported that internet users in Sulawesi, Papua, and Maluku accounted for just 10.9 percent of the country’s total. The MCIT has committed to allocating resources from the Universal Service Obligation Fund, which taxes ISPs in order to build internet infrastructure in rural and other underserved areas, to subsidize internet access in eastern Indonesia.3

Internet infrastructure projects could lessen the geographical digital divide (see A1). While the Palapa Ring project is intended to expand access,4 the persistent lack of connectivity in rural areas has prompted calls to build BTS and other internet infrastructure.5

Disparities in access also result from increased costs. Affordable prepaid packages in underserved areas, such as Papua, Nusa Tenggara, and the Maluku Islands,6 are less available than in more populous areas like Java, where the service provider Telkomsel has less of a monopoly. During the COVID-19 pandemic, students,7 parents,8 and lecturers9 from both underserved and populous areas of Indonesia experienced difficulty affording data plans to support online learning and working.

There is a slight gender divide in internet use.10 In 2017, according to the most recent data, women comprised 48.6 percent of internet users, up from 47.5 percent in 2016; 51.4 percent of internet users were men.

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 3.003 6.006

The government ordered restrictions on connectivity and the blocking of social media and communication platforms during the coverage period. In October 2019, the Minister of Communications and Information announced that the government would continue to restrict social media during times of emergency.1

During protests in the Papua region in August 2019, which led to violence and the killing of several protesters, the internet was throttled for at least seven hours on August 19, 2019 and again beginning on August 21.2 The MCIT reported that restrictions would continue “until the situation in Papua returned to being conducive and normal;”3 restrictions were partially lifted on September 4, although many areas still experienced connectivity restrictions. The internet was reportedly restored in all areas by the end of September.4

In November 2019, several NGOs collaborating as The Press Freedom Defender Team sued the government over the restrictions.5 In June 2020, after the coverage period, the Jakarta State Administrative Court ruled that the government’s restrictions in Papua and West Papua violated the law.6 The court also ruled that the Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) law should only be used to restrict online information or documents that are “unlawful,” and does not provide authority to terminate access in its entirety.

Since 2018, internet connectivity has been restricted during religious events in order to, among other things, “avoid and/or ward off hoaxes and negative content” online.7 In March 2018, connectivity was restricted for 24 hours in Bali as the island observed a Hindu holiday known as Nyepi, the “day of silence.” Authorities requested that major mobile service providers switch off internet service for the day, but outcry led the MCIT to intervene, and the service suspension was ultimately applied only to mobile connections provided by major telecommunications companies; fixed-line connections remained active.8 The Nyepi restrictions recurred in March 2019 and March 2020.9 Only entities that provide public services, such as hospitals and the police, were exempt from the suspension.10

Following the presidential and parliamentary elections in April 2019, during the previous coverage period, the government ordered ISPs to limit access to social media and communication platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and WhatsApp, between May 22 and May 24, ostensibly to prevent the spread of disinformation as postelection violence roiled the country.11

Most BTS and other components of the telecommunications infrastructure in Indonesia are built by private providers. Therefore, the distribution of BTS largely reflects the market dominance of the major players, led by Telkomsel, a subsidiary of PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia Tbk—a majority state-owned company that dominates the telecommunications market and is heavily involved in infrastructure development. Internet infrastructure in Indonesia is otherwise decentralized, with several connections to the global internet.12

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 4.004 6.006

Internet and mobile services are generally provided by large telecommunications companies, some of which are partially state owned. However, in recent years, opportunities for other entities to enter the market have grown.

In 2018, of the 740 telecommunications service licenses issued by the MCIT, 411 were ISP licenses.1 APJII has criticized the high costs associated with obtaining an ISP license under the Law on Post and Telecommunication.2

The fixed-line market remains at an early stage of development, with only 12 percent Indonesia’s 83,218 villages served by fixed broadband.3 The lack of existing infrastructure requires ISPs to invest heavily in development, so only major companies are able to compete. As a result, Telkom Indonesia has dominated this market.4

As the mobile market approaches saturation, four providers serve roughly 90 percent of subscribers.5 As of 2019, market leader Telkomsel, Telkom Indonesia’s mobile subsidiary, reported 168 million subscribers.6 Its closest rival, Indosat Ooredo, reported 86 million subscribers as of 2016.7 Telkom Indonesia and Indosat Ooredoo are 51 percent and 14 percent state owned, respectively.8

The Palapa Ring project (see A1 and A2) aims to bring more ISPs to rural areas, and the MCIT also promised to offer low rental tariffs for providers to utilize the Ring,9 but BTS and satellite funding issues and limited operator interest in renting Ring capacity could limit its effectiveness at increasing ISPs (see A1).

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 2.002 4.004

Concerns have been raised about the independence of regulatory bodies, including the BRTI.1

The Directorate General of Posts and Informatics Operations (PPI) and the Directorate General of Informatics Application (Aptika) oversee internet services under the MCIT. The PPI is responsible for regulating posts, telecommunications, and broadcasting. Its mandate includes supervising private telecommunications providers, regulating the allocation of frequencies for telecommunications and data communications, satellite orbits, and issuing ISP licenses. The MCIT restructured Aptika in 2018, reorganizing departments responsible for regulation, granting domain names for government websites, digital economy functions, and blocking and content removal.2

In 2003, a more independent regulator, the BRTI, was established to ensure fair competition among telecommunications providers, resolve industry conflicts, and develop standards for service quality. Since 2016, following the MCIT restructuring, MCIT officials have acted as both chair and vice chair of the BRTI.3 Otherwise, the composition of the BRTI in 2018 was fairly balanced, with a membership comprised of three government officials and six civil society representatives.4

As a result of the 2018 restructuring, BRTI’s authority was expanded to regulate not only infrastructure, but also issues relating to online platforms. Moreover, while BRTI previously lacked executive power and could only make recommendations—resulting in its failure to intervene in relevant fraud and corruption cases5 and limited effectiveness6—it now has the power to issue decisions and resolutions.7 This new authority has already had an effect; since being given more power, the BRTI has more stringently enforced SIM card registration requirements (see C4).

B Limits on Content

Authorities continued to block or force the removal of “negative content” online, flouting principles such as transparency and democratic oversight. After being blocked for four years by Telkom Group, Netflix was unblocked in July 2020 upon agreeing to comply with some content-related regulations. Content manipulation and disinformation continued to proliferate, often spread by paid commentators known as “buzzers” or bots. Worrisome reporting revealed that the military manages and funds a network of online news sites spreading pro-government content. Meanwhile, authorities undermined digital activism when they restricted connectivity amid protests in Papua and West Papua.

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content? 3.003 6.006

Online content is frequently blocked for violating laws or social norms. Blocked content has included LGBT+ sites, pornography, gambling, fraud, false information, hate speech, material deemed immoral, and criticism of Islam.

As of December 2019, the MCIT reported that a total of 1,203,948 websites containing “negative content” (which the government broadly defines as including pornography, defamation and slander, immorality, child abuse and violence, gambling, extortion, fraud, hoaxes and false information, and terrorism, among others) were blocked.1 Pornography remains the most commonly blocked category of content, with over 1,025,000 sites blocked in 2019.2 In other categories, 166,853 websites were blocked for gambling, 1,143 for copyright violation, and an estimated 1,500 for “terrorism”-related content.3 Another 841 websites were also blocked for offering fraudulent financial services.4 Authorities also target “hate speech,”5 though police have sometimes interpreted the term to include hostile expression against public officials as well as attacks on minority groups.6

Communications, social media, and streaming platforms have been blocked for negative content. In July 2018, the MCIT confirmed blocking eight domain name system (DNS) servers of the popular video-sharing platform TikTok due to “pornography, immorality, religious harassment, and others.”7 The platform was unblocked a week later after company leaders met with child protection officials and pledged to collaborate on removing negative content.8 In 2017, the MCIT blocked the LGBT+ dating app Grindr, and in January 2018, it blocked another gay dating app known as Blued.9

Between 2016 and July 2020, Netflix was inaccessible to Telkom Group’s customers, despite the absence of a formal blocking notification from the MCIT.10 The ministry did not intervene when Telkom first blocked Netflix in early 2016, agreeing with the company’s position that Netflix was operating illegally due to its lack of proper licensing, and that it was exposing users to violence and pornographic content prohibited by law. Netflix has remained available via other ISPs. In December 2019, new communication and information minister Johnny G. Plate stated that the MCIT could not intervene in Telkom’s decision to block Netflix because Telkom is a private company and it is a business to business issue.11 In January 2020, the Indonesian Consumers Protection Foundation urged the MCIT to force Netflix to remove negative content from its platform or be blocked.12 In July 2020, after the coverage period, Telkom unblocked Netflix after the platform agreed to fulfill some regulations, particularly regarding content and takedown requests.13

In December 2018, the MCIT unblocked Tumblr after the platform agreed to remove “adult content” from its platform (see B2).14 In March 2018, eight of Tumblr’s DNS servers were blocked for not complying with an antipornography law (see C2).15

In March 2020, people discovered that the online subtitling service subscene.com was reportedly blocked.16 The MCIT did not immediately publicize a reasoning for the block.

The MCIT has confirmed that it blocks websites it perceives to spread “false news,”17 after claiming that it discovered hundreds of online “hoaxes” that proliferated during the previous coverage period, including misinformation surrounding the candidates for the April 2019 elections.18 For example, one blocked website, kpkonline.com, took its domain name from the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and allegedly shared false information.19 The MCIT has said it increased its measures to block hoaxes amid the COVID-19 pandemic.20

Two websites originally registered as election monitors, jurdil2019.org and jurdil2019.net, were blocked by ISPs in April 2019 at the request of the Election Oversight Body for allegedly lacking neutrality and reporting election results too quickly.21

Political content has also been subject to blocking. Academic and civil society researchers have found that numerous blogs and other sites carrying criticism of the government or Islam are blocked.22 Online news outlets and websites with information about the provinces of Papua and West Papua, where military forces have been accused of violently suppressing an independence movement, have been blocked in recent years.23

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content? 2.002 4.004

The government routinely requires platforms and content hosts to remove what it considers “negative” content posted by users. For example in August 2019, YouTube reportedly blocked a satirical video from being seen by Indonesian-based users about Papua on the request of Indonesian government.1

The MCIT issues requests to social media platforms to remove information the government refers to as hoaxes. During the COVID-19 outbreak, this included false information that Jokowi and former Jakarta governor Ahok were infected with the virus.2 The MCIT stated that it has also coordinated with digital platforms and the police to remove hoaxes related to COVID-19 (see C3).3 In 2018, the MCIT filed 8,903 requests with Facebook and Instagram to remove fraudulent content, while complaining that platforms do not comply quickly enough or adequately filter false information.4

The MCIT has demanded that some apps be removed entirely from app stores, or that certain pieces of content be blocked. In January 2020, the ministry announced that it had blocked 1,085 fintech-specific apps from the Google Playstore in 2019, and 1,356 similar apps from other app stores.5 The MCIT stated that in 2018 it blocked 2,334 pieces of content in 11 live chat apps, namely Bigo, Bigo Live, Cheez, Go Live, Gogo Live, Kwai Go, Live Me, Nonolive, Smule, TikTok, and Vigo, for negative content, that included vulgar clothing and dancing, tattoos, and pornography.6 In January 2019, chat app Bigo Live and the MCIT signed a joint agreement to use artificial intelligence (AI) to remove pornographic content;7 Bigo Live reported that it blocked 200,000 pieces of negative content between January 2017 and February 2019. In 2018, in response to an MCIT request, Google reportedly agreed to remove 73 apps with LGBT+ themes from its online store.8 Some of the platforms had previously been blocked by the MCIT.9

Platforms that do not remove banned content risk being blocked entirely. For example, Tumblr was blocked in March 2018 (see B1); it was subsequently unblocked in December after removing ”adult content.”10

Ordinary users have also removed content under pressure by the MCIT. In August 2019, local content creator Kimi Hime removed YouTube and Instagram content deemed obscene by the MCIT ahead of an expected meeting with agency officials.11

The growing pressure on companies to police content has resulted in censorship of political and social material, although the extent is difficult to assess. In February 2019, the Instagram account @alpantuni, which posted comics of LGBT+ Muslim people, became unavailable for several days; whether Instagram had complied with an MCIT removal request or the account was deactivated by the account owner remained unclear.12 In one documented example from 2016, the LINE messaging app removed emojis depicting LGBT+ themes from its Indonesian store at the MCIT’s request.13

Reuters reported that between 2018 and mid-2020 the Chinese company ByteDance censored content on its news aggregator BaBe app that expressed “negative” information about the Chinese government. According to some sources, moderators were directed to delete any content that mentioned “Tiananmen Square,” “Mao Zedong,” or tension between China and Indonesia.14

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 1.001 4.004

Laws and procedures regulating the government’s ability to restrict online content are largely not grounded in democratic principles.

Several government agencies are able to restrict online content under the ITE Law, provided that it is in the public interest and intended to maintain public order, without adequate transparency, oversight, and appeals processes (see C2).1 A separate statute provides a legal framework to block content considered pornographic,2 while a 2014 decree issued under the ITE Law expanded official powers to allow the blocking of negative content.3

Amendments to the ITE Law passed in 2016 further strengthened the legal foundation for blocking content.4 Under Article 40, the MCIT may now directly prevent access to online content, or order ISPs to do so.5 In 2017, a presidential decree established a new National Cyber and Encryption Agency (BSSN), which previously operated under the Ministry of Politics, Law, and Security, but now falls under the president.6 The agency also has the authority to filter and monitor online content.7

Moreover, Article 26 of the ITE Law has implications for content removal by intermediaries. Article 26 established a “right to be forgotten” for Indonesian citizens, largely modelled on a 2014 decision by the EU Court of Justice. Electronic system providers, including search engines such as Google, can be required to delete irrelevant information about an individual on request, but only when supported by a court order. Further details were expected in subsequent regulations, as there are concerns that Article 26 could hamper the public’s right to information.8

The precursor of the ITE Law, MCIT Regulation No. 19 of 2014 on Control of Websites Containing Negative Content, set technical guidelines for blocking web content. However, it does not establish transparency and accountability in blocking procedures, which drew criticism from several civil society entities.9 This regulation had not yet been revised in accordance with the amended ITE Law by July 2020.10

Several initiatives introduced during the coverage period could impact governmental regulation of online content. In March 2020, the MCIT announced it was drafting a regulation under the ITE Law that would fine platforms, such as Facebook or Google, for false information on their platforms (see C2).11 Separately, in August 2019, a member of the Indonesia Broadcasting Commission (KPI) expressed the agency’s intention to monitor online content, including on streaming platforms like YouTube.12 As of the end of the coverage period, the law had been introduced and then retracted.13 Additionally, in May 2020, two private TV stations, iNews and RCTI, filed a judicial review of the Broadcasting Law to the Constitutional Court, alleging discriminatory treatment and requesting that the Court reformulate the law to incorporate competitor streaming platforms such as Netflix and YouTube.14

In January 2018, the MCIT launched “Cyber Drone 9,” a crawler system driven by AI tools that is designed to proactively detect content violations. It replaced the Trust+ system, which relied on a passive database.15 A specialized task force monitors the new system and reviews the material it flags for blocking; the blocking itself is still carried out by ISPs. Each ISP may employ its own software for blocking and thus may blacklist additional sites at its own discretion. This has increased the likelihood of arbitrary, inconsistent blocking, creating uncertainty for users seeking redress when content is wrongfully blocked.

In July 2020, the MCIT stated that it planned to purchase more sophisticated technology to block more categories of negative content and websites.16 This followed a January 2020 announcement that the MCIT is coordinating with 16 ministries and governmental institutions to “optimize” its response to negative content online.17

The government’s decision to block major social media platforms and websites is usually only announced through the MCIT’s official press briefings. The briefings do not include which platforms and websites are blocked, but provide the total number restricted. Four multi-stakeholder panels established by the MCIT to respond to public complaints about arbitrary and nontransparent blocking completed their terms in 2015 and were not renewed.18 The government’s decision to restrict access to social media and communication platforms following the 2019 elections was criticized by local civil society groups (see A3). For example, the Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network urged the government to be more transparent and narrow the scope of its decisions, as opposed to arbitrarily determining that such restrictions are justified based on vaguely defined “national security” concerns.19

Concerns among civil society members have grown regarding the role of social media platforms in governing and removing online content.20 In February 2019, some media organizations proposed a bill that aims to address false information, hate speech, and violent propaganda on social media through a self-regulatory mechanism.21

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 2.002 4.004

The government’s broad definition of negative content to be blocked or removed, coupled with increasing prosecutions for online activity, contribute to an environment of self-censorship among journalists and ordinary users alike.1 Increased online harassment, as well as technical attacks against journalists, activists, and online news outlets also contribute to this environment (see C7 and C8).

The government has increasingly targeted users who shared misinformation online, even if they did so unwittingly, which contributed further to self-censorship online (see C3).2 Authorities have also increasingly targeted online discourse that is critical of the government by labelling it hate speech, which could potentially limit the willingness of journalists and users to criticize the government online.3

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 1.001 4.004

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to revelations that the military manages and funds a network of online news outlets spreading pro-government propaganda, as well as separate research uncovering the use of cybertroop teams and bots to spread manipulated information around protests and other moments of political tension.

Coordinated manipulation of online content by the government, its allies, and other political actors has distorted the information landscape. Manipulated content and disinformation, which has spread online since the 2014 presidential election, continues to proliferate, particularly during moments of political tension or emergencies such as elections, protests, and the COVID-19 pandemic.1

In January 2020, Reuters journalists discovered that the military was operating and funding a network of 10 online news sites that publish pro-government propaganda and criticize government critics and human rights advocates.2 Among their efforts was mobilizing support for the government’s response to the 2019 protests in the Papua region, including the state’s use of violence (see A3 and B8). In another example, Kitorangpapuanews.com, one of the sites associated with the network, accused a human rights investigator of creating a false report for a civil society group documenting the shooting of civilians amid clashes between police and Papuan separatists.3 Another story published fake quotes from a Papuan actor criticizing a Papuan journalist and activist.

Also during the coverage period, researchers at the BBC and Australian Strategic Policy Institute discovered a network of bots carrying out a campaign of pro-government propaganda in Papua across multiple social media platforms and websites. Researchers were able to trace the automated accounts back to InsightID, a Jakarta-based media company.4

Indonesia is known to have paid commenters called “buzzers.” A national think tank Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) reported the government budgeted 90 billion rupiahs ($6 million) to hire buzzers to promote the government’s policies.5 A report from the Oxford Internet Institute released in September 2019 identified Indonesia as having cybertroop teams who manipulate information on Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp on behalf of political parties and private contractors.6 The report found evidence that such teams work to support preferred messaging, attack their opposition, and create division. The founder of Drone Emprit,7 a social network analytics company, also stated that buzzers contribute largely to trending topics on political issues, such as hashtags used during a popular student demonstration in September 2019.8

Around the April 2019 general elections, political actors exploited prevailing divisions and delegitimized the electoral process for political gain.9 Both presidential candidates reportedly hired online campaign strategists who mobilized buzzers and automated accounts to spread political propaganda.10 One buzzer led a team with 250 fake accounts on major social media platforms, including Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube, and Twitter. Spam accounts on Twitter manipulated and amplified hashtags that benefited presidential candidates. For example, 25 percent of tweets with the hashtag #JokowiLagi (Jokowi Again) between March 10 and April 10 were from automated tools.11

Disinformation continued to proliferate after election day as well, as social media posts questioned the legitimacy of the vote.12 Allegations of election fraud that spread online fueled protests in May, which contributed to real-world violence that was used as a justification by authorities to restrict social media and communication platforms (see A3).13

The manipulation of online content in 2017 and 2018 centered largely around exploiting religious and ethnic tensions. The Muslim Cyber Army (MCA)14 used automated, fraudulent, or hacked accounts to spread socially divisive messages and disinformation to undermine the government. Saracen,15 a smaller network known for spreading fake news that exacerbates religious and ethnic divisions, was largely motivated by financial gain. Such content is often disguised to resemble news articles or manipulated to make the target appear to be attacking Islam.16

In response to the increase in manipulated content online, over 20 local media outlets and journalist associations launched a fact-checking initiative—Cekfakta—in May 2018.17 The website allows users to fact-check information circulated online and through social media, including messaging apps and group chats.

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 2.002 3.003

Users do not face significant economic and regulatory barriers to publishing content online. However, financial sustainability concerns and registration requirements aimed at combatting fake news have created some constraints.

Journalists from the provinces of Papua and West Papua often face economic constraints.1 Toward the end of 2018, the news site West Papua Media announced that it was suspending operations because the outlet was unable to financially support the digital security of its journalists.2 The outlet has since commenced a crowdfunding campaign to raise money to resume operations.

In an attempt to combat fake news online, the Press Council, an independent body, created a barcode in 2017 designed to help readers identify reliable media outlets. To participate, outlets register with the council and undergo further online verification3 before being issued a bar code, which users can scan to view registration details. The initiative received mixed reactions from journalists.4 Some feared it could be used to marginalize unregistered outlets and noted that it benefited established institutions while potentially marginalizing newer competitors. Within weeks of the program’s introduction, 74 websites had been issued a bar code.5

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity? 3.003 4.004

While Indonesia’s online information landscape remains diverse, concentrated ownership has restricted the variety of content in national and local media.

In 2019, approximately 47,000 media outlets operated online.1 However, the concentration of media ownership has undermined the diversity of viewpoints available to consumers. The owners of some major media outlets are actively involved in politics, contributing to increasingly partisan online news. At the local level, many online outlets have become extensions of certain political parties, hampering their credibility.

Social media platforms such as WhatsApp, Facebook, and Instagram are now key sources of news, which has significantly eroded the market position of mainstream media.2 Indonesia also enjoys a thriving blogosphere. Members of the growing urban middle class are fervent users of social media and communication apps, and local blog and website hosting services are either free or inexpensive.

Tools to circumvent online censorship are largely accessible, and Indonesians are a global leader in the use of virtual private network (VPN) services.3 However, one test in 2017 found that three tools offering VPN services or anonymous browsing were subject to blocking.4

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 4.004 6.006

Platforms and websites used for mobilization were largely available during most of the coverage period. However, authorities restricted connectivity in August and September 2019 amid protests in Papua and West Papua, undermining users’ ability to organize and mobilize online (see C3). Online threats and harassment of protesters or others using the internet to organize also limits digital activism (see C7).

Despite restrictions on connectivity in Papua and West Papua, users across Indonesia amplified protesters’ messages online.1 A popular petition called for the government to restore internet access,2 while others crowdfunded in support of the demonstrations.3 The initiator of a crowdfunding effort, the musician and activist Ananda Badudu, was arrested in September 2019 for providing support to student demonstrations against a proposed criminal code known by its acronym, RKUHP. A petition to support his release obtained more than 50,000 signatures, and Badu was released after being questioned for five hours.4

Change.org is particularly popular in Indonesia, with more than 13 million users in 2019.5 In 2019 online petitions on Change.org mainly focused on issues related to democracy and anticorruption demands.6 Over 230,000 people signed a petition calling for President Joko Widodo to reject the RKUHP (see C2).7 Another online petition created in 2019 collected over 100,000 signatures rejecting the KPI’s intention to monitor content on digital platforms (see B3).8

During the previous coverage period, the authorities blocked social media platforms in May 2019, following the elections, limiting Indonesians’ ability to mobilize online. In 2019, a national coalition of musicians launched a successful online petition against a restrictive bill to regulate the music industry.9 Introduced in February 2019, the bill would have prohibited music that is deemed pornographic, blasphemous, or includes “negative influences from foreign cultures or those that demean human dignity.” The bill sparked criticism from thousands of Indonesian musicians for its potential to limit free expression, and the online petition against the bill garnered almost 270,000 signatures.10 Following protests, the parliament eventually dropped the bill.11

C Violations of User Rights

Prosecutions under the ITE Law continued, and several individuals were convicted and received prison sentences. Harassment and intimidation for people’s online activities continued, notably including cases of journalists being doxed. Journalists, activists, and civil society faced increasing technical attacks. Moreover, the government announced a worrisome plan to roll out biometric SIM card registration in 2021, undermining people’s ability to use the internet anonymously.

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 2.002 6.006

Freedom of expression, including online, is nominally protected in the constitution and other laws, but the right is frequently curtailed in practice. The Law on Human Rights, which was adopted shortly after the 1998 transition to democracy, guarantees freedom of expression and other fundamental rights, protections that were strengthened by the Second Amendment of the constitution passed in 2000. The Third Amendment guarantees freedom of opinion.1 The constitution also includes the right to obtain information and communicate freely.2 These rights are further protected by various laws and regulations.3 Indonesia ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2005.4

However, the amended constitution included language allowing the state to limit rights based on political, security, moral, and religious considerations.5 This wording provides policymakers with ample room for interpretation.6 The limited respect for the legal framework guaranteeing freedom of expression is exemplified by the frequency of prosecutions for online activity, as well as disruptions to internet connectivity and social media platforms.

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities? 1.001 4.004

A number of laws impose criminal and civil liability for online activities. Provisions of the 2008 ITE Law have been used repeatedly to prosecute Indonesians for online expression. The law’s penalties for criminal defamation, hate speech, and inciting violence online are harsh compared with those established by the penal code for similar offline offenses.1 In 2016, amendments to the ITE Law introduced a number of important changes.2 Article 27(3) formally expanded the scope of defamation to include content published unintentionally or by third parties, for instance through the tagging of Facebook posts with another user’s name. Private chat messages can also be considered violations, as only one recipient is necessary for the offense of “transmitting” defamatory content.

The article also includes a broad clause covering “all acts other than distributing and transmitting” that make the content accessible to others, which made more users vulnerable to prosecution. The maximum penalties for online defamation were lowered from six years in prison to four, and from a fine of 1 billion rupiahs ($64,000) to 750 million rupiahs ($48,000), but these penalties remained harsher than most offline defamation sentences and fell short of advocates’ demands for decriminalization of the offense.3 Separately, in March 2020, the MCIT announced it was drafting a regulation under the ITE Law that would levy fines of 1 billion rupiahs to users who create and distribute false information (see B3).4

During the coverage period, the parliament designated several bills as formal legislative priorities that could restrict internet freedom and online expression,5 including the RKUHP and an amended broadcasting bill (see B3). In September 2019, the RKUHP was finalized by a parliamentary task force. The controversial changes, which were widely criticized by civil society,6 the press,7 and ordinary users (see B8),8 would criminalize broad categories of online speech and curtail online press freedom.9 These include criminalizing insulting public authorities and institutions; writing, promoting, or broadcasting information about contraceptives or abortion; spreading or associating with communism; distributing false or inaccurate information; and defamation. The bill would also expand the 1965 Blasphemy Law to include six broad provisions of religion-related speech.10 The bill remained pending as of July 2020.11

In April 2020, the National Police issued a directive to provide guidelines aimed at limiting online hoaxes and fraudulent medical equipment sales during the COVID-19 pandemic, and allowing for charges under the criminal code. The directive also instructs police to target online activities that insult the president and government authorities under the ITE Law.12

Other laws infringe on user rights, and legal experts assert that they conflict with the constitution.13 The antipornography law introduced in 2008 contains a definition of pornography that can be loosely interpreted to ban many forms of artistic and cultural expression.14 The 2011 State Intelligence Law prescribes penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment and large fines for revealing or disseminating vaguely defined “state secrets.”15 Civil society groups challenged that law in the Constitutional Court, which rejected their petition in 2012.16 This legal framework provides authorities with a range of powers to penalize internet users, although they are not all regularly invoked in practice.

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities? 2.002 6.006

Users frequently face civil and criminal penalties for legitimate online activities. Revisions to the ITE Law passed in 2016 were designed to decrease the use of pretrial detention in online defamation cases. However, lengthy pretrial detentions continue to be documented, particularly in cases involving powerful complainants.

Safenet recorded at least 50 new cases under the ITE Law involving online expression from June 2019 to April 2020.1 As most cases are tried at the district court level, experts believe that the real number of prosecutions could be higher.

Online journalists were charged, detained, and convicted for their reporting during the coverage period. In March 2020, Mohamad Sadli, the editor in chief of liputanpersada.com, was convicted of hate speech and defamation and sentenced to two years in prison for a critical opinion piece about a local government road construction project.2 Muhammad Asrul, a journalist with Berita.news, was detained for 36 days starting in January 2020 after being arrested for alleged hate speech under Article 28 of the ITE Law for three news articles he produced about a corruption allegation involving the son of the Palopo mayor.3

In August 2020, after the coverage period, blogger and journalist Diantara Putra Sumedi was convicted of defamation and sentenced to three months in prison after being found guilty of violating Article 28 of the ITE Law.4 The charges stemmed from a story Diantara published on the blogging platform Banjar Hits about a land dispute between a palm oil company and the indigenous Dayak community. A source quoted in the article accused Diantara of exaggerating his comments.5

In April 2020, Saiful Mahdi was sentenced to three months in prison and fined after being found guilty under ITE Law Article 27(3) for criticizing on WhatsApp a recruitment process at Syiah Kuala University.6

In January 2020, freedom of religion and belief activist Sudarto was arrested for allegedly spreading hateful information. The arrest stemmed from Facebook posts alleging restrictions on Christmas services in West Sumatra. The case was still pending as of February 2020.7

A number of internet users were charged or detained due to posts discussing the protests in Papua and West Papua. Journalist and filmmaker Dandhy Dwi Laksono was temporarily detained and charged in September for tweets about Papua that allegedly violated the ITE law and spread information intended to incite hatred.8 That same month, human rights lawyer Veronica Koman was named a suspect for spreading “fake news,” incitement, and inflicting race-based and ethnic hatred for sharing information about the protest (see C7).9

Police have also cracked down on the circulation of disinformation, prosecuting not only the creators of the content but also those who unwittingly share it. From January to June 2020, the MCIT reported 104 people to the police for spreading false information about COVID-19. At least 17 of the suspects were detained, and an unknown number were convicted under various provisions of the ITE Law, the penal code, and the Elimination of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination Law.10

In April 2020, activist Ravio Patra was arrested and briefly detained for allegedly “broadcasting messages to instigate violence and/or spread hatred.” Civil society groups stated they believed he was framed by someone who hijacked his WhatsApp account to spread those messages (see C8).11

This wave of cases follows numerous controversial judicial proceedings during the previous coverage period. In March 2019 a user was issued a 10-month prison sentence and heavy fine for allegedly sending four WhatsApp messages critical of a textile company, although the accused held the messages were sent from a number that she no longer had access to.12 In January 2019, Papuan independence activist Augustinus Yolemal was sentenced to one year in prison after being convicted of “disseminating hostility against the state ideology” for posting a Facebook video of him and his son singing slogans calling for Papuan independence.13 In June 2018, journalist Muhammad Yusuf died in detention while awaiting trial for hate speech after he reported critically on a land dispute between farmers and a palm oil company owned by an influential local businessperson in South Kalimantan (see C7).14

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 3.003 4.004

There are some restrictions on anonymous communication, although it is not formally prohibited by law. Users can use encrypted services, although some MCIT statements and other regulations have revealed the government’s desire to gain backdoor access to encrypted communication and personal data.

Mobile phone users have nominally been required to register their phone numbers with the government by text message when they buy a phone since the MCIT introduced the requirement in 2005. This rule was widely ignored for years, but in 2017, the MCIT introduced a new regulation requiring SIM card users to register by submitting their national identity numbers and their family card registration numbers, thereby limiting anonymity.1 As of late February 2018, failure to comply with this requirement could lead to the temporary blocking of data services to the unregistered SIM cards. If users fail to register within 15 days of the block’s initiation, the SIM cards can be permanently blocked from any telecommunications services. In 2020, the government announced its plan to roll out the use of biometric data for SIM card registration in 2021.2

In June 2019, the MCIT announced its plan to require social media users to include their phone numbers when signing up for an account. Rudiantara, then minister of communications and information technology, reportedly corresponded with a large social media platform about this plan.3 Also in June, the MCIT reported that it was considering the regulation of VPN use through licenses.4 As of the end of the coverage period, there had been no further information about these plans.

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

Government surveillance of online activities limits the right to privacy. Although this right is constitutionally guaranteed, there is no specific law stipulating its protection. Article 40 of Law No. 46/1999 on Post and Telecommunication prohibits the interception of information transmitted through any form of telecommunications.1 However, there are at least 10 other laws, including the ITE Law and 7 executive regulations, that allow certain government or law enforcement agencies to conduct surveillance, including electronically.2 These include the Commission Eradication Commission (KPK),3 the National Narcoticgots Board, and the National Intelligence Service, among others. The laws do not clearly provide for the scope of interception, despite the fact that the Constitutional Court issued a decision in 2010 requiring that detailed interception procedures be regulated by law.4 The legal framework also fails to provide for judicial or parliamentary oversight of surveillance activity and remedies for those who allege abuse.

The 2016 amendments to the ITE Law revised some provisions governing interception in response to the Constitutional Court decision. The amendments introduced penalties for interception conducted outside the context of law enforcement, but indicated that further details concerning interception procedures would be addressed in future regulations.5

During the coverage period, the government announced its interest in passing legislation on surveillance and cybersecurity. The Surveillance Bill would authorize the use of wiretapping and various additional mechanisms to conduct monitoring. The Indonesian National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) and civil society groups requested that parliament draft the law based on a human rights perspective.6 The Cybersecurity and Defense Bill, which was drafted and announced to the public in August 2019, includes concerning provisions that give the BSSN broad powers to mitigate online risks and respond to cyber threats, including by cutting data flows (see A3).7 Civil society expressed outcry regarding both process and content, and the bill was tabled in July 2019. 8

In May 2018, the parliament adopted amendments to the 2003 Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism Law (CT Law) that give the authorities sweeping surveillance powers in the fight against terrorism, which is broadly defined under the legislation. Article 31 permits security officials to “intercept any conversation by telephone or other means of communication suspected of being used to prepare, plan, and commit a criminal act of terrorism.” Human Rights Watch and local civil society groups warned that the language could be interpreted to facilitate disproportionate surveillance that violates privacy rights.9

Authorities monitor social media platforms. In preparation for the 2019 elections, the MCIT created a “war room” in October 2018 that employed 70 engineers tasked with monitoring social media platforms in real time.10 The MCIT reported that it would “take action” if it found users violating the ITE Law. Previously, in January 2018, the BSSN reportedly began responding to cyber threats, which included a social media program (see B3).11

The use of spyware and other sophisticated surveillance tools has been linked to authorities. The Toronto-based group Citizen Lab reported in late 2015 that a number of government groups were “likely” using sophisticated FinFisher spyware, which collects data such as Skype audio, key logs, and screenshots.12 Swiss and British companies have also received licenses to export interception technology, particularly IMSI-catchers, to Indonesia.13 Additionally, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported in October 2018 that Indonesian authorities purchased surveillance products from the Israeli-US company Verint to track LGBT+ rights activists and religious minorities.14

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, Indonesia rolled out the contact-tracing app PeduliLindungi (Care Protect), which pulls location data from Bluetooth proximity tracking.15 Civil society groups urged the government to ensure the app is aligned with personal data protection principles and to expedite the enactment of a personal data protection law.16

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are service providers and other technology companies required to aid the government in monitoring the communications of their users? 4.004 6.006

Various regulations require companies to store user data in Indonesia. While a 2012 regulation mandated data localization rules, a revised version reduces the types of data that are required to be stored in the country.

A government regulation issued in 2000 requires telecommunications providers to retain records of customer usage for at least three months.1 Some companies have complied with law enforcement agencies’ requests for data.

Regulation No. 82 of 2012 Concerning Electronic System and Transaction Operation2 required electronic system providers that offer “public services” to build local data centers.3 A revised version of the law, Regulation No. 71 passed in October 2019,4 recategorized different types of data, meaning that only some forms of data would be subjected to data localization requirements.5 This would include information related to government administration, defense, and security, such as users’ national identification numbers and data from intelligence agencies.6 As of March 2020, the government was drafting a ministerial regulation on data centers to implement the change.7

Despite not mandating full data localization, some international companies are moving toward storing user data domestically. The MCIT requested that Google develop a data center integrated with the government’s system to ensure users’ data is located in Indonesia. Due to the potential of cloud computing business in Indonesia, Google and Amazon are reportedly ready to develop data centers in Jakarta.8

The October 2019 regulation also requires all digital platforms that operate in Indonesia to register their companies before October 2020.9

A 2016 MCIT regulation10 stated that personal data must be encrypted if it is stored in an electronic system. However, a 2016 MCIT circular stated that over-the-top providers must allow legal interception for law enforcement purposes, raising concerns about the security of encryption.11

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in retribution for their online activities? 2.002 5.005

Online journalists and users regularly face harassment and intimidation in retaliation for their online activities.

A number of journalists and activists have been subjected to intimidation, such as doxing and other forms of harassment (see C8) for publishing online content or participating in online discussions on social and political issues.1 A Detikcom journalist was doxed and received death threats via WhatsApp after publishing a news article in May 2020 that reported on President Jokowi’s plan to inaugurate a mall in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.2

Activists and journalists reporting on and talking about the protests and violence in Papua and West Papua faced intimidation. Human rights lawyer Veronica Koman, who is based in Australia, was reportedly harassed online, received threats of sexual violence and death, and had personal information released online following comments she posted about Papua.3 Authorities reportedly also considered blocking her bank account and allegedly began the process of revoking her passport.4 Other journalists were also doxed over their reporting on Papua, including Victor Mambo,5 a journalist with news site Jubi, and independent journalist Febriana Firdaus. Dandhy Dwi Laksono was also harassed on Twitter due to his comments about Papua (see C3).6

Two online journalists from Makassar Today and Inikata.com were beaten by police while they were covering the student protests in September 2019 against proposed changes to Indonesia’s corruption and criminal laws.7

Internet users in academic communities have also been targeted for their online activity. In May 2020, student organizers and participants at Gadjah Mada University (UGM) who attempted to facilitate an online discussion about presidential impeachment amid the COVID-19 pandemic received death threats, leading to the cancellation of the event.8 In June 2020, organizer and journalist Tantowi Anwari, a speaker at a University of Lampung online discussion titled “Racial Discrimination against Papua, #PapuansLivesMatter,” was doxed and subjected to online threats and harassment (see C8).9

In July 2018, during the previous coverage period, journalist Muhammad Yusuf of the local news site Kemajuan Rakyat, who was charged with defamation, died in detention (see C3).10 The National Commission on Human Rights concluded that his death was a result of the detention facility’s overcrowding and failure to provide proper healthcare and treatment to Yusuf after authorities were informed by his wife about his medical condition.11

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 1.001 3.003

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to an increase in technical attacks against activists, journalists, and civil society groups during the coverage period.

Journalists, activists, civil society groups, and news outlets have been subjected to technical attacks in recent years. The websites of government entities and private companies also face hacks and data breaches.

Civil society groups argued that the WhatsApp account of activist Ravio Patra, who was detained for several days in April 2020 (see C3), was hijacked to spread hateful messages. Patra claimed he lost access to his WhatsApp account for the five-hour period in which messages were shared from the account; activists corroborated the claim, and sources at Facebook confirmed that Patra’s account was compromised.1 In May 2020, Koran Tempo chief editor Budi Setyarso reported that his Instagram account was hacked during his participation in an online discussion about the harassment and intimidation that led to the cancellation of UGM’s event on presidential impeachment (see C7).2

In June 2020, the organizers of a University of Lampung online discussion about racial discrimination in Papua (see C7) stated that their food delivery service accounts were hacked to place large orders and transfer the balance in their digital wallet to another account; their social media accounts were also made inaccessible.3 In August 2020, University of Indonesia professor Dr. Pandu Riono, who criticized Indonesia's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, stated that hackers posted photos to his Twitter feed of him and a woman they claimed to be his mistress.4

Websites are also subjected to technical attacks. In August 2020, after the coverage period, several media outlets that had hosted articles criticizing the government for mishandling the COVID-19 pandemic reported digital attacks, including DDoS attacks, digital defacement, and hacked servers.5 The news outlet Tempo, for example, reported digital vandalism of its website, while news site tirto.id claimed the erasure of seven articles from its website; two of the pieces discussed COVID-19-related actions by the state intelligence agency. Previous incidents include a February 2019 hack of the website of the collaborative fact-checking initiative Cekfakta after a debate between presidential candidates.6 The hackers defaced the site’s homepage and redirected traffic. In 2017, Suara Papua, a West Papua-based news site that has previously been blocked by the government, was subjected to a large-scale attack by automated accounts that overwhelmed the server and disabled the website.7

The BSSN reported more than 88 million cyberattacks between January and mid-April 2020.8 Data breaches are also frequent.9 For example, in May 2020 a Twitter account that had previously reported several breaches announced that the data of 2.3 million Indonesians had been exposed from the website of the General Elections Commission.10 In 2017, Indonesia experienced 205 million cyberattacks, including through the ransomware WannaCry, which was used to attack two major hospitals in Jakarta.11 The BSSN stated that 43 percent of cybersecurity attacks are directed at small- and medium-size enterprises.12

On Indonesia

See all data, scores & information on this country or territory.

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  • Global Freedom Score

    61 100 partly free
  • Internet Freedom Score

    49 100 partly free
  • Freedom in the World Status

    Partly Free
  • Networks Restricted

    Yes
  • Websites Blocked

    Yes
  • Pro-government Commentators

    Yes
  • Users Arrested

    Yes