Internet freedom in Indonesia declined during the coverage period, due to a new regulation that imposes takedown and registration requirements on a broad range of technology companies. Internet access in Papua was again disrupted, with some disruptions coinciding with events related to Papuan independence. Meanwhile, critics of the government, journalists, and ordinary users continued to face criminal charges and harassment in retaliation for their online activity. Journalists, news outlets, and think tanks faced more technical attacks for their online reporting.
Indonesia has made impressive democratic gains since the fall of an authoritarian regime in 1998, establishing significant pluralism in politics and the media and undergoing multiple, peaceful transfers of power between parties. However, the country continues to struggle with challenges including systemic corruption; discrimination and violence against some marginalized groups; tensions related to the independence movement in the Papua region; and the politicized use of defamation and blasphemy laws. Authorities have responded to recent mass protests against the controversial 2020 omnibus law with violence and repression.
- A broken sea cable in Papua led to internet disruptions beginning in April 2021, though disruptions were reported there on three separate occasions, coinciding with events that related to the Papuan independence movement (see A1 and A3).
- In June 2020, the Jakarta State Administrative Court ruled that the government’s previous restrictions on internet access in Papua and West Papua violated the law. In their ruling, they further stated that the Election Information and Transactions (ITE) Law does not provide the government the authority to terminate internet access in its entirety (see A3).
- The government released Ministerial Regulation Number 5/2020 on Private Electronic System Operators (MR 5/2020) in November 2020, which requires a broad range of technology companies to register with the MCIT, remove content based on requests from both state and nonstate entities, and provide law enforcement officials “direct access” to their systems and users’ personal data (see B2, B6, and C6).
- Online journalists and individual users continued to face offline violence as well as online harassment, in the form of doxing and death threats, for their online activity (see C7).
- Technical attacks against civil servants, journalists, and civil society groups occurred during the coverage period. In August 2020, several media outlets, including Tempo, Tirto.id, and Centre for Indonesia’s Strategic Development Initiatives were hacked after posting articles criticizing the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic (see C8).
|Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections?||3.003 6.006|
Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 3 to correct for a methodology error in one of the sources used to calculate internet penetration rates. This score change does not necessarily reflect changes in infrastructural limits to internet access.
Internet penetration in Indonesia has steadily increased, driven largely by rapid growth in the number of mobile subscriptions. The country’s low number of fixed-line subscribers stems from the lack of infrastructure, which limits coverage and keeps the price of monthly subscriptions high.
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Inclusive Internet Index 2021 report ranked Indonesia 66 out of 120 countries surveyed in terms of availability, as determined by quality and breadth of available infrastructure.1 In 2021, the social media management platform HootSuite and Indonesian Internet Service Provider Association (APJII) confirmed that Indonesia’s internet penetration rate was 73.7 percent.2 Mobile phones remain the most popular means for people to access the internet, with over 345.3 million subscriptions in 2021, an increase of 1.2 percent since 2020.3
Government projects are underway to improve the internet infrastructure in Indonesia, especially in rural areas. 4 Although the main Palapa Ring project—a three-part network of broadband backbone infrastructure extending thousands of kilometers across the country—was completed in October 2019, funding constraints have limited the development of further base transceiver stations (BTS) necessary to support the project.5
To further expedite the provision of high-speed internet to the public, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) has formed public-private partnerships in February 2021 to support the development of BTS in villages.6 The Telecommunication and Information Accessibility Agency (BAKTI) of the MCIT also has plans to rent and develop satellites.7
People in Indonesia were more severely impacted by low internet penetration rates and poor infrastructure during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021. The limited availability of electricity and connectivity in more than 21,000 villages has hindered online home learning activities for students in rural areas.8
Beginning in April 2021, internet users in Jayapura, the capital of Papua, reported experiencing issues accessing the internet. A month later in May, the Minister of communication and information and the CEO of PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia Tbk (Telkom Indonesia) announced that a broken cable—the Sulawesi Maluku Papua Cable System (SMPCS)—had led to disruption issues in three Papua regencies: Jayapura, Keerom, and Sari. In June 2021, users reported that the internet connection in Jayapura was partially restored.9
- 1. “Availability Rankings,” The Inclusive Internet Index 2020, February 2020, https://theinclusiveinternet.eiu.com/explore/countries/ID/performance/i….
- 2. Simon Kemp, “Digital 2021: Indonesia,” DataReportal, February 11, 2021, https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2021-indonesia.
- 3. Simon Kemp, “Digital 2020: Indonesia,” DataReportal, February 18, 2020, https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-indonesia.
- 4. Norman Harsono, “Nearly Complete Palapa Ring Key to Boosting Digital Economy,” Jakarta Post, January 28, 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/01/28/nearly-complete-palapa-r….
- 5. “Indonesia Completes Fiber-Optic Network to Bring Internet to Remote East,” Reuters, October 14, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-infrastructure/indonesia-c…; Fahmi Ahmad Burhan, “Kominfo Pessimistic RI Independence Signal This Year Even Though There Is a Palapa Ring,” katada.co.id, February 6, 2020, https://katadata.co.id/berita/2020/02/06/kominfo-pesimistis-ri-merdeka-…; Agus Tri Haryanto, “Indonesia Is Not Free for 2020 Signals Because the Government Is Not in Line,” detikinet, March 13, 2020, https://inet.detik.com/telecommunication/d-4937033/indonesia-tak-merdek….; Akbar Evandio, “Additional Palapa Ring Development Meets Obstacles,” Bisnis.com, March 26, 2020, https://teknologi.bisnis.com/read/20200326/101/1218155/pembangunan-pala…; Leo Dwi Jatmiko, “Palapa Ring Project: Bakti Aims for New Tenants,” Bisni.com, December 30, 2019, https://teknologi.bisnis.com/read/20191230/101/1185573/proyek-palapa-ri….
- 6. “Five Umbrella Contract Packages, Accelerate the Equity of 4G BTS in the 3T Region,” Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, February 27, 2021, https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/32966/siaran-pers-no-62hmkomin…; Agustin Setyo Wardani, “Government Uses PNBP and 2021 State Budget to Build ICT Infrastructure in the 3T Region,” Liputan 6, November 4, 2020, https://www.liputan6.com/tekno/read/4400102/pemerintah-pakai-pnbp-dan-a….
- 7. Monica Wareza, “There Is This Satellite; Remote Areas of the Republic of Indonesia Will Immediately Leave the 2G Internet,” CNBC Indonesia, February 24, 2019, https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20190224171304-4-57321/ada-satelit-i….; “Nusantara Satu Satellite Helps Reduce Gaps in Internet Access,” Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, February 22, 2019, https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/16606/satelit-nusantara-satu-b…; “Rudiantara Praises Ma’ruf on ‘Sky Toll’ to Help New Unicorns,” CNN Indonesia, January 3, 2019, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/teknologi/20190301193419-185-373901/rudian…; Agus Tri Haryanto, “BAKTI: First Rent, Then Work on a Multifunctional Satellite,” detikinit, January 25, 2019; Fahmi Ahmad Burhan, “Kominfo Pessimistic RI Independence Signal This Year Even Though There Is a Palapa Ring,” katada.co.id, February 6, 2020, https://katadata.co.id/berita/2020/02/06/kominfo-pesimistis-ri-merdeka-…; Akbar Evandio, “Financial Closing Process Satri Satellite Back Floating,” Bisnis.com, May 15, 2020,
- 8. “Minister of Finance Says 20 Thousand Villages Haven’t Been Touched by the Internet,” Pasardana, February 19, 2021, https://pasardana.id/learning/menkeu-sebut-20-ribu-desa-belum-tersentuh…; Binsar Marulitua, “21 Thousand Villages Are Still Underdeveloped, Lack of Access to Electricity and Internet Is the Cause,” TrubusNews, June 14, 2020, https://news.trubus.id/baca/37144/21-ribu-desa-masih-berkategori-tertin…; “The Ministry of Education and Culture Is Still Thinking About Students Who Do Not Have Electricity,” CNN Indonesia, February 5, 2020, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20200502140926-20-499407/kemdikbu…; Syarief Oebaidillah, “PGRI Asks the Government to Fix Electricity and Internet Structure,” Media Indonesia, May 21, 2020, https://mediaindonesia.com/read/detail/314940-pgri-minta-pemerintah-ben….
- 9. “Dead Internet in Jayapura Hinders Press Freedom and Fulfillment of the Right to Information,” Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, May 24, 2021, https://aji.or.id/read/press-release/1223/matinya-internet-di-jayapura-…; Leo Dwi Jatmiko, “SKKL Breaks, Internet Connection Has Not Returned To Normal in Papua,” teknologi, June 8, 2021, https://teknologi.bisnis.com/read/20210608/101/1402558/skkl-putus-konek…; Moh Khory Alfarizi, “Internet Connections Begins to Restore, Papuans: Welcome to 4G,” tekno.co, June 8, 2021, https://tekno.tempo.co/read/1470306/koneksi-internet-mulai-pulih-warga-…
|Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons?||1.001 3.003|
A persistent geographic digital divide continued in Indonesia during the coverage period.
Despite increasing penetration rates and improved infrastructure, connectivity remains highly concentrated in the western part of the archipelago, particularly on the more urbanized island of Java. The disparity is evident in the information and communication technology (ICT) development index issued by the National Bureau of Statistics, in which the country’s five eastern provinces received the lowest rankings in 2019.1
In 2020, an APJII survey found that internet users in the rural areas of Sulawesi, Papua, and Maluku accounted for just 10 percent of the country’s total internet users.2 The MCIT has committed to allocating resources from the Universal Service Obligation Fund, which taxes internet service providers (ISPs) in order to build internet infrastructure in rural and other underserved areas and subsidize internet access in eastern Indonesia.3
Some of the government’s internet infrastructure projects seek to lessen the geographical digital divide (see A1). However, though the Palapa Ring project intended to expand access, for example,4 the persistent lack of connectivity in rural areas despite the project’s completion has prompted calls for the implementation of BTS and other internet infrastructure.5
Disparities in access also result from the high costs of internet subscription plans. Affordable prepaid packages are less available in underserved areas, such as Papua, Nusa Tenggara, and the Maluku Islands, than they are in more populous areas like Java, where the service provider Telkomsel has less of a monopoly. 6 During the COVID-19 pandemic, students, parents, and lecturers from both underserved and populous areas of Indonesia had trouble affording data plans to support online learning and working. 7
There is a slight gender divide in internet use.8 According to the National Bureau of Statistics, in 2019, 46.87 percent of internet users were women, a slight increase from 46.83 in 2018 and 46.48 in 2017.9
- 1. “Official News Statistics - Development of Information and Communication Technology Development Index (IP-ICT),” Central Statistics Bureau, https://www.bps.go.id/publication/2020/12/02/be999725b7aeee62d84c6660/s….
- 2. “Laporan Survei Internet APJII 2019-2020,” APJII, Accessed July 3, 2021, https://apjii.or.id/survei.
- 3. “Government Increases USO Allocation for Village Connectivity,” Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, February 20, 2021, https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/32821/pemerintah-tambah-alokas…; “The Minister of Communication and Information Wants USO Funds to Subsidize Internet Tariffs,” Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, July 31, 2015, https://kominfo.go.id/index.php/content/detail/5252/Menkominfo-Ingin-Da…. The Universal Service Obligation Fund is made up of a small percentage of the total annual revenues of ICT companies operating in Indonesia. The fund is managed by a Commission on Badan Penyedia dan Pengelola Pembiayaan Telekomunikasi (BP3TI) [Telecommunication and Informatics Financing Provider and Management Center]. “The Ministry of Communication and Informatics Manage USO Funds of Rp 2.5 T,” Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, May 28, 2018, https://kominfo.go.id/content/detail/13182/kemen-kominfo-kelola-dana-us….
- 4. “Palapa Ring Connect Indonesia with the Same Tariff Scheme,” Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, January 19, 2019, https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/15972/palapa-ring-hubungkan-in….
- 5. “Towards a More Digitized Indonesia,” EU-Indonesia Business Network, November 26, 2019, https://www.eibn.org/news/15/towards-a-more-digitized-indonesia.
- 6. Maria Yuniar Ardhiati, “Telecommunication Business Monopoly Occurs Outside Java-Bali,” Katadata, June 20, 2016, https://katadata.co.id/opini/2016/06/20/monopoli-terjadi-di-luar-jawa-b….
- 7. Sholahudin, “When Elementary to High School Students Study Online at a Coffee Shop,” okezone, July 22, 2020, https://www.okezone.com/tren/read/2020/07/22/620/2250159/ketika-siswa-s….; Rahel Narda Catherine, “The Chancellor’s Forum Asked the Government to Bear Internet Costs Related to Online College,” detiknews, July 4, 2020, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5079908/forum-rektor-minta-pemerintah-t…; Nur Azizah Rizki Astuti, “Expensive Internet Quota, This Is the Ministry of Education and Culture’s Step to Reduce Online Tuition Fees,” detiknews, July 9, 2020, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5086928/kuota-internet-mahal-ini-langka….; “Preparation for New Normal Implementation: KPAI Convey Input and Considerations to the President,” KPAI, June 8, 2020, https://www.kpai.go.id/berita/persiapan-penerapan-new-normal-kpai-sampa…; Devira Prastiwi, “6 KPAI Responses Regarding Student Online Learning During the Covid-19 Pandemic,” Liputan 6, June 26, 2020, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/4288968/6-tanggapan-kpai-terkait-pem….
- 8. Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association (APJII), “Results of the Indonesian Internet User Penetration and Behavior Study,” APJII, 2018, https://www.apjii.or.id/content/read/39/410/Hasil-Survei-Penetrasi-dan-….
- 9. https://www.bps.go.id/publication/2020/12/02/be999725b7aeee62d84c6660/s…
|Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity?||4.004 6.006|
Score Change: The score improved from 3 to 4 because the government imposed fewer restrictions to internet access compared to the previous year.
Internet connectivity has been restricted during religious events in order to “avoid and/or ward off hoaxes and negative content” online.1 In 2021, the government restricted smartphone data packages and video streaming in Bali during the Hindu festival known as Nyepi, the “day of silence.” Fixed-line connections, however, were not restricted. 2 The government had also suspended mobile connections during Nyepi from 2018 to 2020.3 In those years, only entities that provide public services, such as hospitals and the police, were exempt from the suspension.4
Connectivity was unreliable in the Papua region at several times during the coverage period. Users reportedly experienced issues accessing the internet during the one-year anniversary of the Papuan independence protests in August 2020, during a United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council Meeting in October 2020 that discussed Papua, and during a December 2020 celebration of West Papuan independence from the Dutch colonies.5 Moreover, cell phone signals were reportedly turned off in Nduga and Maybrat in July 2020, coinciding with the intensification of a conflict occurring in those regencies. The Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SAFEnet) and some other members of civil society suspected the disruptions may have been deliberate and ordered by government authorities, although neither state officials nor telecommunications providers have confirmed this.
The government has ordered restrictions on connectivity and the blocking of social media and communications platforms in previous coverage periods. During protests in the Papua region in August 2019, which led to violence and the killing of several protesters, the internet was throttled for at least seven hours on August 19, and again beginning on August 21.6 The MCIT reported that restrictions would continue “until the situation in Papua returned to being conducive and normal;”7 restrictions were partially lifted on September 4, although many areas still experienced connectivity restrictions for a month thereafter. The internet was reportedly restored in all areas by the end of September.8
In November 2019, several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) collaborating as The Press Freedom Defender Team sued the government over the August and September restrictions.9 In June 2020, the Jakarta State Administrative Court ruled that the government’s restrictions in Papua and West Papua violated the law.10 The court also ruled that the Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) law should only be used to restrict online information or documents that are “unlawful,” and it does not provide authority to terminate access in its entirety.
Following the presidential and parliamentary elections in April 2019, the government ordered ISPs to limit access to social media and communication platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and WhatsApp, between May 22 and May 24, ostensibly to prevent the spread of disinformation, as postelection violence roiled the country.11
Most BTS and other components of ICT infrastructure in Indonesia are built by private providers. Therefore, the distribution of BTS largely reflects the market dominance of the major players, led by Telkomsel, a subsidiary of Telkom Indonesia—a majority state-owned company that dominates the telecommunications market and is heavily involved in infrastructure development. Internet infrastructure in Indonesia is otherwise decentralized, with several connections to the global internet.12
The first internet exchange point, the Indonesia Internet Exchange, was created by APJII to allow internet service providers (ISPs) to interconnect domestically. An independent internet exchange point, Open IXP, was launched in 2005.13
- 1. “Cellular Operators Fully Support Nyepi Without Internet in Bali,” Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, June 3, 2019, https://kominfo.go.id/content/detail/16920/operator-seluler-dukung-penu….
- 2. https://www.baliprov.go.id/web/pemprov-bali-tegaskan-saat-nyepi-jaringa…; https://denpasar.kompas.com/read/2021/03/08/122355978/nyepi-2021-di-mas…
- 3. “Smartphone Data Packages in Bali Are Confirmed to Die During Nyepi,” Kumparan, March 13, 2018, https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/paket-data-smartphone-di-bali-dipasti…; Kate Lamb, “Bali Switches Off Internet Services for 24 Hours for New Year 'Quiet Reflection,’” The Guardian, March 15, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/15/bali-switches-off-interne….; https://bali.tribunnews.com/2021/03/06/11-poin-terkait-nyepi-tahun-2021…; “Bali Internet Shutdown for Nyepi to Go Ahead, ‘Vital’ Services Exempted,” Coconuts Bali, March 18, 2020, https://coconuts.co/bali/news/bali-internet-shutdown-for-nyepi-to-go-ah…; Associated Press, “No Flights or Internet During Bali's Sacred Day of Silence,” ABC News, March 6, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com/Lifestyle/wireStory/flights-internet-balis-sacre….
- 4. “Cellular Operators Fully Support Nyepi Without Internet in Bali,” Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, June 3, 2019, https://kominfo.go.id/content/detail/16920/operator-seluler-dukung-penu….
- 5. International Coalition for Papua, “Safenet suspects internet disruptions in West Papua are deliberate,” May 9, 2021. https://www.humanrightspapua.org/news/33-2021/800-safenet-suspects-inte….; Private communication with civil society organization, July 2021.
- 6. “Internet Disrupted in Papua, Indonesia Amid Protests and Calls for Independence,” Netblocks, August 21, 2019, https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-papua-indonesia-ami…; Kate Lamb, “West Papua: Thousands Take to Streets After Week of Violence,” The Guardian, August 26, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/26/west-papua-thousands-expe….
- 7. “Blocking of Data Services in Papua and West Papua,” Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, August 28, 2019, https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/20821/siaran-pers-no-155hmkomi….
- 8. “Government Opens Internet Access in Wamena,” CNN Indonesia, September 28, 2019, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/teknologi/20190928171033-185-434996/pemeri….
- 9. “The Press Freedom Team Sues Indonesia Government Over Internet Shutdown in Papua,” Safenet, November 21, 2019, https://safenet.or.id/2019/11/the-press-freedom-defender-team-sues-inte….
- 10. “PTUN Jakarta Rules Internet Blocking in Papua and West Papua ‘Violates the Law,’” BBC News Indonesia, June 3, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/majalah-52901391; “PTUN Jakarta Declares the Termination of Internet Access in Papua Unlawful,” Safenet, June 4, 2020, https://id.safenet.or.id/2020/06/rilis-pers-ptun-jakarta-menyatakan-pem…; Abdul Manan, “Jakarta State Administrative Court Rules Government Internet Shutdown in Jakarta Unlawful,” AJI (Alliance of Independent Journalists), June 4, 2020, https://aji.or.id/read/press-release/1078/jakarta-state-administrative-….
- 11. Manish Singh and Jon Russell, “Indonesia Restricts WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram Usage Following Deadly Riots,” TechCrunch, May 22, 2019, https://techcrunch.com/2019/05/22/indonesia-restricts-whatsapp-and-inst….
- 12. Dimas Jarot Bayu, “Slow Internet Even Though There Is a Palapa Ring, Jokowi Promises 4 Thousand New BTS,” Katadata, October 14, 2019, https://katadata.co.id/berita/2019/10/14/internet-lambat-meski-ada-pala…; Matthew Carrieri et al., “IGF 2013: An Overview of Indonesian Internet Infrastructure and Governance (Part 1 of 4),” Citizen Lab, October 25, 2013, https://citizenlab.org/2013/10/igf-2013-an-overview-of-indonesian-inter….
- 13. Robbie Mitchell, “IDSeries: An Open Exchange: History of Indonesia’s IXP,” APNIC, August 26, 2015, https://blog.apnic.net/2015/08/26/an-open-exchange-history-of-indonesia….
|Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers?||4.004 6.006|
Internet and mobile services are generally provided by large telecommunications companies, some of which are partially state owned. However, in recent years, opportunities for other entities to enter the market have grown.
In 2020, of the 2,458 telecommunications service licenses that issued by the MCIT, 512 were ISP licenses.1 APJII has criticized the high cost of obtaining an ISP license under the Law on Post and Telecommunication.2
The fixed-line market remains at an early stage of development, with only 12 percent Indonesia’s 83,218 villages served by fixed-line broadband.3 The lack of existing infrastructure requires ISPs to invest heavily in development, so only major companies are able to compete. As a result, Telkom Indonesia has dominated this market.4
As the mobile market approaches saturation, four providers serve roughly 90 percent of subscribers.5 As reported in 2020, market leader Telkomsel, Telkom Indonesia’s mobile subsidiary, had 171 million subscribers.6 Its closest rival, Indosat Ooredo, reported 59 million subscribers.7 Telkom Indonesia and Indosat Ooredoo are 51 percent and 14 percent owned by the state, respectively.8
- 1. ”List of Telecommunication Operator Permits,” Jasa Telekomunikasi, Accessed July 2021, https://sipppdihati.pelayananprimaditjenppi.go.id/informasi/data_penyel….
- 2. Twelve ISPs were closed down by the government in 2012 after failing to produce the fee. In March 2015, the Indonesian Constitutional Court upheld the law. Denny Mahardy, “PNBP Lawsuit Rejected by MK, APJII Feel No Problem,” Liputan 6, March 19, 2015, https://www.liputan6.com/tekno/read/2193865/gugatan-pnbp-ditolak-mk-apj….
- 3. “Indonesia Telecommunications Statistics 2019,” Badan Pusat Statistik, February 12, 2020, https://www.bps.go.id/publication/2020/12/02/be999725b7aeee62d84c6660/s…; “2019 Indonesia – Telecoms, Mobile and Broadband – Statistics and Analyses,” Budde.com, April 20, 2020, https://www.budde.com.au/Research/2019-Indonesia-Telecoms-Mobile-and-Br…; “Kominfo Annual Report 2018,” Kominfo, November 9, 2019, https://web.kominfo.go.id/sites/default/files/LAPORAN%20TAHUNAN%20KOMIN….
- 4. “Indonesia Telecommunications Statistics 2019,” Badan Pusat Statistik, February 12, 2020, https://www.bps.go.id/publication/2020/12/02/be999725b7aeee62d84c6660/s…; Dimas Jarot Bayu, “Slow Internet Even Though There Is a Palapa Ring, Jokowi Promises 4 Thousand New BTS,” Katadata, October 14, 2019, https://katadata.co.id/berita/2019/10/14/internet-lambat-meski-ada-pala…; “Smartfren Already Has a Fixed Telephone Principle Permit,” Indotelko, November 16, 2016, https://www.indotelko.com/read/1479258058/Smartfren-kantongi-izin-prins…; In 2016, a new license to offer fixed-line broadband service was given to Smartfren, which operates MyRepublic. Enricko Lukman, see “Indonesian Conglomerate Invests $3.5 Million in Singapore Startup ISP MyRepublic,” Tech In Asia, May 21, 2014, https://www.techinasia.com/indonesia-sinar-mas-invests-35-million-singa….
- 5. “Telecommunication Sector Indonesia: Saturated Mobile Phone Market,” Indonesia Investments, July 24, 2016, https://www.indonesia-investments.com/news/todays-headlines/telecommuni….
- 6. “Indonesia Telecommunications Statistics 2019,” Badan Pusat Statistik, February 12, 2020, https://www.bps.go.id/publication/2020/12/02/be999725b7aeee62d84c6660/s….
- 7. “Indonesia Telecommunications Statistics 2019,” Badan Pusat Statistik, February 12, 2020, https://www.bps.go.id/publication/2020/12/02/be999725b7aeee62d84c6660/s….
- 8. “IGF 2013: An Overview of Indonesian Internet Infrastructure and Governance (Part 1 of 4),” Citizen Lab, October 25, 2013, https://citizenlab.org/2013/10/igf-2013-an-overview-of-indonesian-inter…; Indosat rebranded as Indosat Ooredoo in 2015. Asia Pte. Ltd. holds 65 percent of shares, see, “Indosat Ooredoo History,” https://indosatooredoo.com/en/about-indosat/company-profile/history.
|Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner?||2.002 4.004|
Concerns have been raised about the independence of the MCIT as a regulatory body, following the decision to dissolve the Indonesian Telecommunication Regulatory Body (BRTI).
The BRTI, a more independent regulator, was established in 2003 to ensure fair competition among telecommunications providers, resolve industry conflicts, and develop standards for service quality. In 2018, BRTI’s authority was expanded to regulate not only infrastructure, but also issues relating to online platforms. In November 2020, the government decided to dissolve the BRTI to streamline the bureaucracy. 1 By October 2021, the MCIT is expected to assume BRTI’s full set of responsibilities.2
The Directorate General of Posts and Informatics Operations (PPI) and the Directorate General of Informatics Application (Aptika) oversee internet services regulation under the MCIT. The PPI is responsible for regulating posts, telecommunications, and broadcasting, and its mandate includes supervising private telecommunications providers, regulating the allocation of frequencies for telecommunications and data communications, and issuing ISP licenses. The MCIT restructured Aptika in 2018, reorganizing departments responsible for regulation, granting domain names for government websites, digital economy functions, and blocking and content removal.3
- 1. “Through The Presidential Decree, Jokowi Disbanded 10 Non-structural State Agencies And Instituions,” VOI, November 29, 2020, https://voi.id/en/berita/21306/lewat-perpres-jokowi-bubarkan-10-badan-d….
- 2. “Langkah Kominfo tindaklanjuti pembubaran BTP dan BRTI,” Antara News, November 29, 2020, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/1866756/langkah-kominfo-tindaklanjuti….
- 3. For information on the previous structure of MCI, particularly Aptika, see Ministry of Communications and Informatics, “Annual Report 2017,” July 2018, https://web.kominfo.go.id/sites/default/files/KOMINFO_Laptah%202017_Fin…. For information on the new structure, see “Regulation of the Minister of Communication and Information Technology Number 6 of 2018,” Kominfo, August 2018, https://jdih.kominfo.go.id/produk_hukum/view/id/611/t/peraturan+menteri…; For a summary of the new structure, see “The Ministry of Communication and Information Changes the Organizational Structure of the Directorate General of Aptika,” Antara News, September 3, 2018, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/744737/kemkominfo-ubah-struktur-organ….
|Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards?||3.003 6.006|
Websites are frequently blocked for hosting what the government defines as negative content, a broad term that is used to describe content that is pornographic or defamatory, as well as content that violates social norms or is deemed immoral. 1
In June 2021, the Financial Services Authority (OJK) stated that it had blocked 3,193 illegal financial technology lenders.2 As of March 2021, the MCIT had blocked Snack Video—a competitor to TikTok—Tik Tok Cash, and VTube because they were operating without OJK licensing. 3 The MCIT, in cooperation with the Commodity Futures Trading Regulatory Agency (BAPPEBTI), and domain name registrars blocked 68 illegal commodity-futures trading-sites in January 2021.4 Additionally, pornography remains the most commonly blocked category of content, with nearly 1,069,000 sites blocked in 2020.5
Between 2016 and July 2020, Netflix was inaccessible to Telkom customers, despite the absence of a formal blocking notification from the MCIT.8 The ministry did not intervene when Telkom first blocked Netflix in early 2016, agreeing with the Telkom’s position that Netflix was operating illegally because it lacked proper licensing and exposed users to violent and pornographic content. Netflix remained available via other ISPs. In January 2020, the Indonesian Consumers Protection Foundation urged the MCIT to force Netflix to remove negative content from its platform or otherwise block it.9 In July 2020, Telkom unblocked Netflix after the platform agreed to fulfill some regulations, particularly regarding content and takedown requests.10
Two websites originally registered as election monitors, jurdil2019.org and jurdil2019.net, were blocked by ISPs in April 2019 at the request of the Election Oversight Body for allegedly lacking neutrality and reporting election results too quickly.11 In July 2018, the MCIT confirmed blocking eight domain name system (DNS) servers of the popular video-sharing platform TikTok due to “pornography, immorality, religious harassment, and [other illegal content].”12 The platform was unblocked a week later after company leaders met with officials from the Indonesian Child Protection Commission (KPAI) and pledged to collaborate on removing negative content.13
Political content has also been subject to blocking. Academic and civil society researchers have found that numerous blogs and other sites carrying criticism of the government or Islam are blocked.14 Online news outlets and websites with information about the provinces of Papua and West Papua, where military forces have been accused of violently suppressing an independence movement, have been blocked in recent years.15
- 1. “Ragam Konten yang Bisa Diadukan Melalui aduankonten.id,” kominfo.go, August 16, 2017, https://kominfo.go.id/content/detail/10331/ragam-konten-yang-bisa-diadu….
- 2. “OJK Investment Alert Task Force Successfully Blocks 3,193 Illegal Online Loans,” Finansial Bisnis, Jule 11, 2021, https://finansial.bisnis.com/read/20210611/563/1404066/satgas-waspada-i….
- 3. “Kominfo Blocks Video Snack Sites and Applications,” Kumparan Tech, Accessed July 2021, https://kumparan.com/kumparantech/kominfo-blokir-situs-dan-aplikasi-sna….; “Kominfo Blocks TikTok Cash, Turns Out This Is The Reason!,” CNBC Indonesia, February 10, 2021, https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/tech/20210210144545-37-222467/kominfo-blo….; “5 Fakta VTube, dari Diblokir Kominfo hingga Investasi Ilegal,” Kompas.com, February 18, 2021, https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2021/02/18/063100665/5-fakta-vtube-dar….
- 4. “Protect the community, CoFTRA blocks 68 illegal sites throughout January 2021, Investasi Kontan, February 13, 2021, https://investasi.kontan.co.id/news/lindungi-masyarakat-bappebti-blokir….
- 5. Pratiwi Agustini, “Takedown Akun MiChat dan Takedown Hoaks Vaksinasi Coivd-19 Terbaru,” kominfo.go, March 25, 2021, https://aptika.kominfo.go.id/2021/03/takedown-akun-michat-dan-takedown-….
- 6. “List of 'Victims' Blocking Kominfo Throughout 2018,” CNN Indonesia, December 26, 2018, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/teknologi/20181226001641-192-356335/daftar….
- 7. Isal Mawardi, “Kominfo Blocks 3 Applications Related to Prorn Content: Blued to Grindr,” Detik News, November 25, 2020, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5269068/kominfo-blokir-3-aplikasi-terka….
- 8. Initially, Netflix was reported inaccessible by Telkomsel users in January 2016. Fadly Yanuar Iriansyah, “Why Only Telkom and Telkomsel Block Netflix?” Tech In Asia, January 27, 2016, https://id.techinasia.com/talk/kenapa-hanya-telkom-dan-telkomsel-yang-m…. While there was no official notification of blocking from the MCIT, the Minister appreciated Telkomsel for blocking the platform. Eko Wahyudi, “Telkom Reveals the Cause for Not Yet Unblocking Netflix Until Now,” Tempo.com, February 24, 2020; https://bisnis.tempo.co/read/1311632/telkom-ungkap-penyebab-belum-buka-…; Yoga Hastyadi Widiartanto, “Netflix Blocked by Telkom, Minister of Communication and Information Issues Regulations,” Kompas, January 27, 2016, https://tekno.kompas.com/read/2016/01/27/20040007/Netflix.Diblokir.Telk…. Until January 2019, the platform continued to be inaccessible for Telkomsel users. Amal Nur Ngazis, “IndiHome Can Access Netflix, Telkom: Block Stay Applies,” Viva, January 21, 2019, https://www.viva.co.id/digital/digilife/1113717-indihome-bisa-akses-net….
- 9. Agus Tri Haryanto, “Kominfo Urged to Remove Negative Content on Netflix,” January 16, 2020, https://inet.detik.com/law-and-policy/d-4861980/kominfo-didesak-copot-k…; “Kominfo Looks at Negative Content on Netflix Using the ITE Law,” CNN Indonesia, January 19, 2020, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/teknologi/20200119153634-185-466754/kominf….
- 10. Bill Clinten, “Telkom IndiHome and Telkomsel Officially Unblock Netflix,” Kompas, July 7, 2020, https://tekno.kompas.com/read/2020/07/07/14190027/telkom-indihome-dan-t…; “Telkom Wants to Unblock Netflix on IndiHome and Telkomsel, These Are the Conditions,” Kumparan, June 6, 2020, https://kumparan.com/kumparantech/telkom-mau-buka-blokir-netflix-di-ind….
- 11. Abba Gabrillin, “Explanation of Kominfo About Blocking Two Sites ‘Jurdil2019,’” Kompas, April 21, 2019, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/04/21/13095521/penjelasan-kominfo…; “Bawaslu Called Jurdil 2019 Site Blocked Because It Is Not Neutral,” CNN Indonesia, April 23, 2019, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20190423025628-32-388674/bawaslu-….
- 12. Fatimah Kartini Bohang, “Tik Tok Is Blocked in Indonesia Because It Is Considered Negative for Children,” Kompas, March 7, 2018, https://tekno.kompas.com/read/2018/07/03/18503327/tik-tok-diblokir-di-i….
- 13. Jeko I.R., “Once Blocked, Tik Tok Can Finally Be Opened Again,” Liputan 6, July 10, 2018, https://www.liputan6.com/tekno/read/3584775/sempat-diblokir-tik-tok-akh….
- 14. The Net Monitor, “Indonesia 2017,” https://thenetmonitor.org/research/2017-global-internet-censorship/idn; Kay Yen Wong, Maria Xynou, Arturo Filastò, Khairil Yusof, and Tan Sze Ming, “The State of Internet Censorship in Indonesia,” Open Observatory of Network Interference, May 23, 2017, https://ooni.torproject.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/.
- 15. “Blocking Five Sites in Papua, Indonesia Is Judged as Silencing the Mayan Expressions of the Papuan People,” Suara Papua, April 18, 2017, http://suarapapua.com/2017/04/18/blokir-lima-situs-di-papua-indonesia-d…; Reja Hidayat, “We Never Get Notification About Blocking,” Tirto, November 23, 2016, https://tirto.id/kami-tidak-pernah-mendapat-pemberitahuan-soal-pembloki….
|Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards?||2.002 4.004|
The government routinely requires platforms and content hosts to remove negative content posted by users.
In April 2021, the MCIT requested that YouTube block 20 videos uploaded by Joseph Paul Zhang, who proclaimed he was the 26th prophet of Islam. The MCIT used Ministerial Regulation No. 5 as one of the legal references to justify the takedown (see B3).1 In December 2020, the MCIT also requested YouTube take down a parody song of Indonesia Raya national, considering the song to be an “insult” and hate speech towards Indonesia. The two minors who made the video were later arrested (see C3).2 In August 2019, YouTube reportedly restricted a satirical video about Papua on the request of the Indonesian government.3
In September 2020, the MCIT removed 233 pieces of content on digital platforms relaying false information on regional elections in December.4 As of April 2021, 20,453 pieces of content related to terrorism and radicalism on social media platforms had been taken down. 5 The government also requested that social media platforms take down 1,094 pieces of misinformation related to COVID-19 in April 2021. 6 For example, the MCIT requested the removal of social media posts that falsely claimed that President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) had contracted the coronavirus and that he gave land ownership and money to the Chinese government in exchange for a COVID-19 vaccine.7 In August 2020, MCIT reported that of the 1,921 hoaxes related to COVID-19 were found on various social media platforms, 1,665 were taken down.8
The MCIT has demanded that some apps be removed entirely from app stores, or that certain pieces of content be blocked. In March 2021, the illegal Snack Video app was removed from Google’s app store on the request of the MCIT (see B1).9 In January 2020, the ministry announced that it had blocked 1,085 fintech-specific apps from the Google app store in 2019, and 1,356 similar apps from other app stores.10
In February 2021, the Criminal Investigation Department (Bareskrim) of the Indonesian Police (Polri) launched a Virtual Police program to monitor social media and chat apps for hoaxes and incitement. As of April 2021, the program has reportedly sent warnings to remove content to 200 social media accounts that post hate speech content and potentially infringe on Article 28(2) of ITE Law.11 A civil society organization, Kontras, reported that the Virtual Police mostly directed their warnings towards users that actively criticize the government, and users immediately deleted their content that was flagged.12
Platforms that do not remove banned content risk being blocked entirely. For example, Tumblr was blocked in March 2018; it was subsequently unblocked in December after removing “adult content.”13
Ordinary users have also removed content under pressure from the MCIT. In August 2019, local content creator Kimi Hime removed their YouTube and Instagram content deemed obscene by the MCIT ahead of an expected meeting with agency officials.14
In the second half of 2020, TikTok stated that it removed more than 89 million videos, of which around 3.8 million videos were from Indonesia.15 Reuters reported that between 2018 and mid-2020 the Chinese company ByteDance censored Indonesian content on its news aggregator BaBe app that expressed “negative” information about the Chinese government.16
- 1. “Sejak 2018, Kominfo Tangani 3.640 Ujaran Kebencian Berbasis SARA di Ruang Degital, kominfo.go, April 26, 2021, https://kominfo.go.id/content/detail/34136/siaran-pers-no-143hmkominfo0…; Shahidah Izzata Sabiila, “Jozeph Paul Zhang’s Full Profile: Real Name to His Whereabouts,” Detik News, April 19, 2021, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5537906/profil-lengkap-jozeph-paul-zhan….
- 2. “Disappeared from Youtube, Greater Indonesia Parody Video Takedown Kominfo,” Nasional Okezone, December 27, 2020, https://nasional.okezone.com/read/2020/12/27/337/2334499/hilang-dari-yo…; “Police Arrest Actors Uploading Parody Songs Indonesia Raya,” VOI, January 1, 2021, https://voi.id/en/news/24928/polisi-tangkap-pelaku-pengunggah-lagu-paro…; “Chronology of 2 Indonesian Boys Arrested for Parady of Greater Indonesia,” CNN Indonesia, January 1, 2021, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20210101160945-12-588514/kronolog….
- 3. Karina M. Tehusijarana, “Govt Gets YouTube to Block Satirical West Papua ‘Advertisement,” Jakarta Post, August 29, 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/08/29/govt-gets-youtube-to-blo….
- 4. “Preventing the Spread of Hoaxes, Ministor of Communication and Information Takes Down 233 Content During Pilkada,” iNews, December 7, 2020, https://www.inews.id/news/nasional/cegah-penyebaran-hoaks-menkominfo-ta… .
- 5. “Tangani 111 Isu Hoaks Vaksin Covid-19, Kominfo Libatkan Multistakeholders,” komnifno.go, April 12, 2021, https://aptika.kominfo.go.id/2021/04/kominfo-blokir-20-453-konten-teror…; Yulida Medistiara, “Terrorism Enters Social Media, 20 Thousand of Content Have Been Blocked,” Detik News, April 4, 2021, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5519483/terorisme-rambah-media-sosial-2….
- 6. https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/32876/siaran-pers-no-51hmkomin…; https://aptika.kominfo.go.id/2021/04/kominfo-takedown-1-094-konten-hoak….
- 7. https://aptika.kominfo.go.id/2020/08/hingga-10-agustus-kominfo-tangani-…; “Tuesday Morning, Kominfo Detects 187 Hoaxes Related to Corona Virus,” Tribune News, March 10, 2020, https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2020/03/10/selasa-pagi-kominfo-dete…; Mochamad Zhacky, “Police Ensure to Investigate Kominfo Report on Hoaxes Regarding Corona Virus,” detiknews, March 10, 2020, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4932314/polisi-pastikan-usut-laporan-ko…; Cindy Mutia Annur, “Corona Cases Increase, Kominfo Block 250 Hoaxes & Develop Chatbot,” Katadata, March 18, 2020, https://katadata.co.id/berita/2020/03/18/kasus-corona-bertambah-kominfo….
- 8. “Until 10 August Kominfo Handles 1,082 Covid-19 Hoaxes on Various Platforms,” kominfo.go, August 27, 2020, https://aptika.kominfo.go.id/2020/08/hingga-10-agustus-kominfo-tangani-….
- 9. Dita Tamara, “Vtube Disappears from playstore, Task Forece: We Ask for Blocking!,” Sonora.id, February 25, 2021, https://www.sonora.id/read/422574391/vtube-hilang-dari-playstore-satgas….
- 10. “The Ministry of Communication and Information Block Four Thousand Illegal Fintechs Throughout 2018-2019,” Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, January 10, 2020, https://kominfo.go.id/content/detail/23740/siaran-pers-no-06hmkominfo01….
- 11. Muhammad Rizky Pradila, “Firmly, Virtual Police Reprimand Hundreds of Social Media Accounts Regarding ITE Law Rules,” Pikiran Rakyat, April 16, 2021, https://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/nasional/pr-011782308/tegas-polisi-virtu….
- 12. “Virtual Police Data Update,” Kontras, April 22, 2021, https://kontras.org/2021/04/22/pemutakhiran-data-virtual-police/.
- 13. Jon Russell, “Indonesia Unblocks Tumblr Following its Ban on Adult Content,” Tech Crunch, December 27, 2018, https://techcrunch.com/2018/12/27/indonesia-unblocks-tumblr/.
- 14. “Kominfo Considers the Kimi Hime Case to Be Finished,” Antara News, August 2, 2019, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/989948/kominfo-anggap-kasus-kimi-hime….
- 15. Tiktok, “Tiktok Transparency Report,” February 24, 2021, https://www.tiktok.com/safety/resources/transparency-report-2020-2?lang…; https://katadata.co.id/yuliawati/digital/603df2a08b533/tiktok-hapus-89-…
- 16. Fanny Potkin, “Exclusive: ByteDance Censored Anti-China Content in Indonesia Until mid-2020, Sources Say,” Reuters, August 13, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tiktok-indonesia-exclusive/exclu….
|Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process?||1.001 4.004|
Regulations that grant the government the ability to restrict online content are largely not grounded in detailed democratic principles and procedures.
Amendments from 2016 to the ITE Law strengthened the legal foundation for blocking content and limiting internet access.1 Under Article 40 of the amended ITE Law passed in 2016, the MCIT can directly prevent access to online content, or order ISPs to do so.2 Article 26 of the amended law also established a “right to be forgotten” for Indonesian citizens, whereby electronic system providers, such as Google, are required to delete irrelevant information about an individual on request of the MCIT. The MCIT, however, needs to provide a court order. There are concerns that Article 26 could hamper the public’s right to information.3
A 2014 decree under the ITE Law expanded official powers to allow the blocking of negative content on websites.4 A separate statute provides a legal framework to block content considered pornographic.5 The precursor of the amended ITE Law, MCIT Regulation No. 19 of 2014 on Control of Websites Containing Negative Content, set technical guidelines for blocking web content. However, it does not establish transparency and accountability in blocking procedures, which drew criticism from several civil society entities.6
The Ministerial Regulation Number 5/ 2020 on Private Electronic System Operators (MR 5/2020) went into effect in November 2020 (see C6).7 MR 5/2020 requires private electronic system operators (ESOs)—defined as any foreign or domestic entity that operates electronic systems for Indonesian users—to ensure that their electronic system does not contain or facilitate prohibited content, broadly defined as any content that violates domestic law, creates community anxiety, or disturbs public order. After receiving a notice from the MCIT to remove prohibited content, ESOs have four hours in “urgent” situations, or 24 hours to comply. ESOs that fail to remove prohibited content will be fined or blocked (see B6).
While the above laws serve as general guidelines and principles to restrict internet access and online content, no regulations define the criteria for what is considered prohibited online content.8
The MCIT shares the total number of websites restricted through official press briefings but does not provide further details on which sites are blocked and why. Four multistakeholder panels, established by the MCIT to respond to public complaints about arbitrary and nontransparent blocking, completed their terms in 2015 and were not renewed.9
Besides the MCIT, several other government agencies restrict online content under the ITE Law, provided that it is in the public interest and intended to maintain public order.10 The National Cyber and Encryption Agency (BSSN), which was established in 2017 and is under the purview of the president, also has the authority to filter and monitor online content.11
In May 2020, two private television stations, iNews and RCTI, filed a judicial review of the Broadcasting Law to the Constitutional Court, requesting that the court reformulate the law to also regulate competitor streaming platforms, such as Netflix and YouTube.12 In January 2021, the court rejected the lawsuit.13 In March 2021, the parliament designated an amended broadcasting bill as part of its 2021 legislative priorities, to regulate the implementation of television streaming platforms. As of June 2021, the bill was still under discussion, though representatives in Parliament claimed they expect to finalize the bill by the end of the year.14
In July 2020, the MCIT stated that it planned to purchase more sophisticated technology to block more categories of negative content and websites.15 This followed a January 2020 announcement that the MCIT was coordinating with 16 ministries and governmental institutions to “optimize” its response to negative content online.16
In January 2018, the MCIT launched “Cyber Drone 9,” a crawler system driven by artificial intelligence (AI) tools that is designed to proactively detect content violations. A specialized task force monitors the new system and reviews the material it flags for blocking; the blocking itself is still carried out by ISPs. Each ISP may employ its own software for blocking and thus may deny additional sites at its own discretion.
- 1. “Revised ITE Law Could Hamper Freedom of Expression: Researcher,” The Jakarta Post, October 31, 2016, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/10/31/revised-ite-law-could-ham….
- 2. “Revised ITE Law could hamper freedom of expression: Researcher,” The Jakarta Post, October 31, 2016, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/10/31/revised-ite-law-could-ham….
- 3. “Electronic Information and Transactions Law Amended in Indonesia,” Baker McKenzie, November 8, 2016, https://web.archive.org/web/20170109171800/http://www.bakermckenzie.com…; “Kominfo Will Issue 'Right to Be Forgotten' Regulation,” CNN Indonesia, October, 31, 2018, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/teknologi/20181031200550-213-343043/kominf…; The Right to Deletion of Information in Indonesia, Jakarta: LBH Press, 2018, http://lbhpers.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/e-book-RTBF.pdf; Jens-Henrik Jeppesen, “EU Court: Privacy Rights Trump Free Expression and Access to Information,” Center for Democracy and Technology, May 14, 2014, https://cdt.org/blog/eu-court-privacy-rights-trump-free-expression-and-….
- 4. “Article 7(1), Regulation of the Minister of Communication and Information Technology Number 19 of 2014,“ Minister of Communication and Information Technology, July 17, 2014, https://jdih.kominfo.go.id/produk_hukum/view/id/215/t/peraturan+menteri….
- 5. Civil society and cultural groups challenged the law before the Constitutional Court in 2009 for its narrow and obscure definition of pornography and pornographic content, which includes LGBTQ+ content and folk traditions that expose the female form, such as the Jaipongan folk dance from West Java and Papuan traditional clothes; the Court upheld the law. Olivia Rondonuwu, “Indonesia’s Constitutional Court Defends Pornography Law,” Reuters, March 25, 2010, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-pornography/indonesias-con….
- 6. “Negative Content Censorship on the Internet Cannot Be Refuted,” Indotelko, November 22, 2014, https://www.indotelko.com//read/1416628939/Sensor-Konten-Negatif-di-int….
- 7. “Regulation of the Minister of Communications and Information Technology Number 5 of 2020,” kominfo.go, May 2021, https://jdih.kominfo.go.id/produk_hukum/view/id/759/t/peraturan+menteri….
- 8. "Evaluating Social Media Access Restrictions on May 22," Detik News, May 23, 2019, https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-4562045/mengevaluasi-pembatasan-akses-me…
- 9. For the decree that contains members of the four panels, see “List of Inventory of Decisions of the Minister of Comminfo,” JDIH, 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20171123224835/https://jdih.kominfo.go.id/p….
- 10. Oka Anantajaya, “Amendment to the Electronic Information and Transaction Law,” MKK Newsletter, February, 2017, http://www.mkklaw.net/newsletter/2017_02_newsletter_en.pdf.
- 11. Ihsanuddin, “Jokowi Signs the Presidential Decree, National Cyber Agency Directly Under the President,” Kompas, February 1, 2018, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/01/02/17103991/jokowi-teken-perpr…; “Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 53 Year 2017 Concerning National Cyber and Crypto Agency,” JDIH, May 23, 2017, https://jdih.bssn.go.id/arsip-hukum/presidential-regulation-of-the-repu…; “Presidential Decree Number 133 of 2017 Concerning Amendments to Presidential Regulation Number 53 of 2017 Concerning the National Cyber and Crypto Agency,” JDIH, December 16, 2017, https://jdih.bssn.go.id/arsip-hukum/peraturan-presiden-nomor-133-tahun-…. ; Badan Siber dan Sandi Negara (BSSN), “Duties of BSSN,” 2018, https://bssn.go.id/tugas-dan-fungsi-bssn/.
- 12. “Broadcasting Law Does Not Regulate Netflix-YouTube, iNews and RCTI Sues to MK,” Kumparan, May 30, 2020, https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/uu-penyiaran-tak-atur-netflix-youtube….
- 13. “MK Rejects Inews and RCTI Lawsuits, Youtubers and Netflix Are Not Affected by the Broadcasting Law,” Kompas, January 14, 2021, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/01/14/13460981/mk-tolak-gugatan-i…
- 14. “Welcoming ASO: House of Representatives Commission I Quickly Discusses Broadcasting Law Revision,” KPID Sulsel, June 11, 2021, https://kpid-sulsel.go.id/2021/06/11/sambut-aso-komisi-i-dpr-kebut-pemb…
- 15. Natisha Andarningtyas, “Kominfo Plans to Install Machines to Block Gambling Sites,” Antara News, July 13, 2020, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/1608038/kominfo-berencana-pasang-mesi….
- 16. Fahmi Ahmad Burhan, “Receiving 430 Thousand Complaints for Negative Content in 2019, Kominfo Rely on the Task Force,” Katadata, January 9, 2020, https://katadata.co.id/berita/2020/01/09/terima-430-ribu-aduan-konten-n….
|Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship?||2.002 4.004|
The government’s broad definition of negative content that can be blocked or removed and its intensifying pursuit of legal actions for online activity contribute to an environment of self-censorship among journalists and ordinary users alike.1 Increased online harassment, as well as technical attacks against journalists, activists, and online news outlets further this environment of caution (see C7 and C8). Civil society organizations have also raised concerns that the Virtual Police program will drive users to increasingly practice self-censorship (see B2).2
Authorities have also increasingly targeted online discourse that is critical of the government by labelling it hate speech, which could potentially limit the willingness of journalists and users to criticize the government online.3
- 1. “Damar Juniarto, Executive Director of SAFEnet: Indonesia Stands for One Freedom of Expression,” Koran Tempo, June 20, 2020, https://koran.tempo.co/read/tamu/454348/damar-juniarto-direktur-eksekut…; Muhammad Hendartyo, “Attack on Papuan Public Discourse Deemed Threat Against Democracy,” Tempo, June 12, 2020, https://en.tempo.co/read/1352640/attack-on-papuan-public-discourse-deem….
- 2. “Contrast: The Cyber Police To Be Activated By The Government Has The Potential To Mute Freedom Of Expression,” Kompas, December 28, 2020, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/12/28/14074121/kontras-polisi-sib…; "Expert: Virtual Police in Social Media, Residents Are More Afraid of Opinion Baca artikel CNN Indonesia," CNN Indonesia, February 25, 2021, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/teknologi/20210225165329-185-610933/pakar-…
- 3. Firman Imaduddin, “Hate Speechm,” Remotivi, February 9, 2018, http://www.remotivi.or.id/kupas/444/Ujaran-Kebencian; Abba Gabrillin, “During 2018, the Police Arrested 122 People Related to Hate Speech on Social Media,” Kompas, February 15, 2019, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/02/15/15471281/selama-2018-polisi…; Samantha Bradshaw and Philip N. Howard, “The Global Disinformation Order: 2019 Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation,” Oxford Internet Institute/University of Oxford, Computational Propaganda Research Project, September 26, 2019, https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/09/CyberT….
|Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest?||1.001 4.004|
Coordinated manipulation of online content by the government, its allies, and other political actors has distorted the information landscape. Manipulated content and disinformation, which has spread online since the 2014 presidential election, continues to proliferate, particularly during moments of political tension or emergencies, such as protests and the COVID-19 pandemic.1
Reports from the Oxford Internet Institute released in 2019 and 2020 identified Indonesia as having teams of paid commenters, called “buzzers,” as well as automated accounts manipulate information on social media on behalf of political parties and private contractors.2 The report found evidence that such teams work to support preferred messaging, attack their opposition, and create division. The founder of Drone Emprit,3 a social network analytics company, also stated that buzzers contribute largely to trending topics on political issues, such as hashtags used during a popular student demonstration in September 2019.4
National think tank Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) reported the government budgeted 90 billion rupiahs ($6.4 million) to hire buzzers to promote the government’s policies.5 During the initial spread of COVID-19 in March 2020, progovernment buzzers reportedly were mobilized to spread online content criticizing the plans of Anies Baswedan, the Jakarta Governor and an opposition figure, to lockdown the capital.6
In June 2020, three fake accounts, seemingly operated by bots, accused comedian Bintang Emon for using drugs after he criticized the court for sentencing an attacker of a member of the Corruption Eradication Commission to one year in prison.7 In October 2019, researchers at the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute discovered a network of bots originating in Jakarata that carried out a campaign of progovernment propaganda in Papua across multiple social media platforms and websites.8 Facebook and Twitter closed the accounts.9
Buzzers and bots have also been used to intervene in elections. During the April 2019 general elections, political actors exploited prevailing divisions and delegitimized the electoral process for political gain.10 Both presidential candidates reportedly hired online campaign strategists who mobilized buzzers and automated accounts to spread political propaganda.11
A network of online news sites has also been utilized by political actors to spread propaganda. In January 2020, Reuters journalists discovered that the military was operating and funding a network of 10 online news sites that publish progovernment propaganda and criticize government critics and human rights advocates.12 Among their tasks was to mobilize support for the government’s response to the 2019 protests in the Papua region, including for the state’s use of violence (see A3 and B8).
In response to the increase in manipulated content online, over 20 local media outlets and journalist associations launched a fact-checking initiative, Cekfakta, in May 2018.13 The website allows users to fact-check information circulated online and through social media, including messaging apps and group chats.
- 1. "Highlighting the Buzzer and the ITE Law, Busyro Calls the Situation Moving to Neo Authoritarianism," Kompas, February 20, 2021, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/02/20/21210071/soroti-buzzer-dan-…;
- 2. Samantha Bradshaw, Ualan Campbell-Smith, Amelie Henle, Antonella Perini, Sivanne Shalev, Hannah Bailey and Philip N. Howard, “Country Case Studies Industrialized Disinformation: 2020 Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation,” 2020, https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/127/2021/03/Case-…; Samantha Bradshaw and Philip N. Howard, “The Global Disinformation Order: 2019 Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation,” Oxford Internet Institute/University of Oxford, “Computational Propaganda Research Project,” September 26, 2019, https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/cybertroops2019/.
- 3. Vita Ayu Anggareni, “Drone Emprit Made by the Nation’s Children,” Good News from Indonesia, May 22, 2019, https://www.goodnewsfromindonesia.id/2019/05/22/drone-emprit-buatan-ana….
- 4. “Revealed! It Turns Out that the Trending Topics on Twitter Are ‘Engineered’ by Buzzers, Oops!” Warta Economi, October 10, 2019, https://www.wartaekonomi.co.id/read250943/terungkap-ternyata-trending-t…; Hasbullah, “Presidential Special Staff Denies Palace Buzzer,” Times of Indonesia, October 6, 2019; https://www.timesindonesia.co.id/read/news/232055/staf-khusus-presiden-…; Shinta Maharani, “UGM Lecturer in Yogyakarta: Student Demonstration Is Not for Jokowi,” Tempo, September 26, 2019; https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1252514/dosen-ugm-yogyakarta-demo-mahasi….
- 5. “Government Digital Activities: Reviewing Social Media and Influencer Budgets,” Indonesia Corruption Watch, September 1, 2020, https://antikorupsi.org/index.php/en/article/government-digital-activit…; “Measuring Reasons for the Jokowi Government to Budget IDR 90 Billion for Buzzers,” VOI, August 21, 2020 https://voi.id/berita/11723/menakar-alasan-pemerintahan-jokowi-anggarka…
- 6. Ary Hermawan, “Politics of Pandemics: How Online ‘Buzzers’ Infect Indonesia’s Democracy, Jeopardize Its Citizens,” The Jakarta Post, March 21, 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2020/03/21/covid-19-doesnt-care…; Eve Warburton, “Indonesia: Polarization, Democratic Distress, and the Coronavirus,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 28, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/28/indonesia-polarization-democra….
- 7. "Netizens stand with Bintang Emon as comedian faces attack over Novel Baswedan skit," Coconuts Jakarta, June 15, 2020, https://coconuts.co/jakarta/news/netizens-stand-with-bintang-emon-as-co…; "Bintang Emon Drug Use Accusations Emerge After Uploading Video Criticizing Novel Baswedan Case," Cyberthreat, June 15, 2020, https://cyberthreat.id/en/read/79/Bintang-Emon-Drug-Use-Accusations-Eme…; “Emon Star Assault Bot Account Suspended Twitter, Buzzer Attack?” Solopos, June 15, 2020, https://www.solopos.com/akun-bot-penyerbu-bintang-emon-disuspend-twitte…
- 8. Benjamin Strick and Famega Syavira, “Papua Unrest: Social Media Bots ‘Skewing the Narrative,’ ” BBC News, October 11, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49983667.
- 9. “Facebook and Twitter Close Indonesian Propaganda Accounts About Papua, Including Pro-Government Bot Accounts,” ABC News, March 6, 2020, https://www.abc.net.au/indonesian/2020-03-06/facebook-dan-twitter-tutup…
- 10. “The Hoax Footprint in Indonesia Has Increased Since the 2014 Presidential Election,” Kumparan, September 27, 2017, https://kumparan.com/@kumparannews/jejak-hoax-di-indonesia-yang-meningk….
- 11. Fanny Potkin and Agustinus Beo Da Costa, “In Indonesia, Facebook and Twitter Are 'Buzzer' Battlegrounds as Elections Loom,” Reuters, March 12, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-election-socialmedia-insig….
- 12. Tom Allard and Jack Stubbs, “Indonesian Army Wields Internet ‘News’ as a Weapon in Papua,” Reuters, January 7, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-military-websites-insight/….
- 13. Cekfakta website, https://cekfakta.com.
|Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online?||1.001 3.003|
Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because a November 2020 regulation imposes onerous obligations on private electronic service operators, namely that they must register with the MCIT, in order to operate and serve as a space for publication in the country.
Users do not face significant economic and regulatory barriers to publishing content online. However, financial sustainability concerns and registration requirements aimed at combatting “prohibited online content” have created constraints to publish.
The regulation MR 5/2020 requires all ESOs register their systems with the MCIT. If ESOs fail to register by the end of 2021, they will be blocked (see B3).1 The law also requires ESOs to appoint a local liaison. The regulation allows the government to revoke e-providers and cloud computing providers’ registration and licenses to operate, if they do not provide electronic information, data, and access to the government and law enforcement agencies for monitoring and law enforcement purposes (see C6).
Journalists from the provinces of Papua and West Papua often face economic constraints.2 Toward the end of 2018, the news site West Papua Media announced that it was suspending operations because the outlet was unable to financially support the digital security of its journalists.3 The news site resumed operations in November 2020 after launching crowdfunding campaigns, which continued during the coverage period.4
To combat fake news online, the Press Council, an independent body, created a barcode in 2017 designed to help readers identify reliable media outlets. From January to November 2020, the Council had verified 260 media outlets.5
- 1. “Regulation of the Minister of Communication and Information Technology Number 10 of 2021,” Kominfo, May 31, 2021, https://adminjdih.kominfo.go.id/produk_hukum/view/id/774/t/peraturan+me…; "Indonesia: Repeal Ministerial Regulation 5 to protect digital rights," Article19, May 31, 2021,https://www.article19.org/resources/indonesia-repeal-ministerial-regula… ; “PP 71/2019 (PSTE) Berlaku, Platform Akan Didenda Jika Membiarkan Konten Negatif,” Kominfo, November 6, 2019, https://aptika.kominfo.go.id/2019/11/pp-71-2019-pste-berlaku-platform-a…; Cindy Mutia Annur, “Tak Ingin Diblokir Facebook Hingga WhatsApp Wajib Daftar ke Kominfo,” Katadata, November 5, 2019, https://katadata.co.id/berita/2019/11/05/tak-ingin-diblokir-facebook-hi….
- 2. West Papuan journalists working online have described self-censoring to avoid persecution. International Press Institute, “Indonesia Urged to Address Press Freedom Violations in West Papua,” IFEX, December 15, 2016, https://www.ifex.org/indonesia/2016/12/15/press_west_papua/. Ad revenues that support media operations are frequently linked to powerful interests that could undermine independence. Pacific Freedom Forum, “Indonesia Urged to Fulfil Promises as Deadline Looms on Papua Press Blocks,” IFEX, February 13, 2017, https://www.ifex.org/indonesia/2017/02/13/papua_press_blocks/.
- 3. “WestPapuaMedia Has Suspended Publishing, But We Can Be Back in 2019 with Your Help,” West Papua Media, 2018, https://westpapuamedia.info.
- 4. "Limited restart with live monitoring for December 1," West Papua Media, November 21, 2020, https://westpapuamedia.info/2020/11/21/westpapuamedia-mulai-ulang-terba… ; "Donate to Support Media Freedom for West Papua," West Papua Media, accessed on July 12, 2021,https://westpapuamedia.info/donate/
- 5. Ahmad Djuahar, "Recording Media During The Breaks Pandemic Outstanding Covid-19," Dewanpers, November, 2020, https://dewanpers.or.id/assets/ebook/buletin/2101011634_e-Bulletin_ETIK…
|Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability?||3.003 4.004|
While Indonesia’s online information landscape remains diverse, concentrated ownership has restricted the variety of content in national and local media.
In 2019, approximately 47,000 media outlets operated online.1 However, the concentration of media ownership has undermined the diversity of viewpoints available to consumers. The owners of some major media outlets are actively involved in politics, contributing to increasingly partisan online news. At the local level, many online outlets have become extensions of certain political parties, hampering their credibility.
Social media platforms such as WhatsApp, Facebook, and Instagram are now key sources of news, which has significantly eroded the market position of mainstream media.2 Indonesia also enjoys a thriving blogosphere. Members of the growing urban middle class are fervent users of social media and communication apps, and local blog and website hosting services are either free or inexpensive.
Tools to circumvent online censorship are largely accessible, and Indonesians are a global leader in the use of virtual private network (VPN) services.3 However, one test in 2017 found that three tools offering VPN services or anonymous browsing were subject to blocking.4 These three tools continued to be blocked at the end of the coverage period.
- 1. “Of the 47 Thousand, Only 2,700 Online Media Have Been Verified by the Press Council,” Indonesian Cyber Media Association (AMSI), April 6, 2019, https://www.amsi.or.id/dari-47-ribu-baru-2-700-media-online-terverifika….
- 2. There are 150 million active social media users, of which 130 million of them access social media via mobile phone. “Digital 2019: Indonesia,” DataReportal, January 31, 2019, https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2019-indonesia. Moreover, according to APJII’s survey, 89 percent of users accessed chatting applications, while about 87 percent accessed social media, Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association (APJII), “Results of the 2017 Indonesian Internet User Penetration and Behavior Survey,” APJII, 2017, https://apjii.or.id/content/read/39/342/Hasil-Survei-Penetrasi-dan-Peri….
- 3. Rob Marvin, “Breaking Down VPN Usage Around the World,” PC Mag, September 21, 2018, https://www.pcmag.com/news/363869/breaking-down-vpn-usage-around-the-wo…; Nadine Freischlad, “Indonesia is World Leader in VPN Use, Study Finds,” Tech in Asia, March 29, 2016, https://www.techinasia.com/indonesia-world-leader-vpn-usage.
- 4. Kay Yen Wong, Maria Xynou, Arturo Filastò, Khairil Yusof, Tan Sze Ming, “The State of Internet Censorship in Indonesia,” Open Observatory of Network Interference, May 23, 2017, https://ooni.torproject.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/.
|Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues?||4.004 6.006|
Platforms and websites used for mobilization were largely available during the coverage period. However, online threats and harassment of protesters or others using the internet to organize limits digital activism (see C7). The government has also restricted internet connectivity to quell protests during previous coverage periods (see A3). Indonesians use online mobilization tools to call for the government to change its policies and practices.
Change.org is particularly popular in Indonesia, with more than 16 million users in 2020 signing petitions to mobilize on various political issues, including the controversial omnibus law, the COVID-19 pandemic, and climate change.1 During the coverage period, at least four petitions against the omnibus law yielded more than 2.3 million signatures each; 12 petitions convinced the government to change policies; and one petition against the government’s vaccination plan went viral on social media, garnered more than 8,400 signatures in one week, and convinced President Jokowi to make the vaccine free for everyone (initially, only 53 million people would get it for free).2 Other successful petitions include one initiated by a COVID-19 volunteer group, LaporCovid-19, demanding the dismissal of the minister of health for his alleged mismanagement of the government’s pandemic response; a petition that urging the termination of the national examination, which has failed to improve the country’s educational standards; a petition rejecting the plan of the minister of law and human rights plan to release prisoners convicted of graft to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in prisons; and a petition demanding Jokowi evaluate and remove members of his special staff for alleged abuse of power.3
Although protestors have been successful in using online mobilization tools to advocate for change, some still face online intimidation as a result of their digital activism. For example, several individuals who participated in or coordinated protests against the omnibus law were doxed (see C7.)
In 2019, despite restrictions on connectivity in Papua and West Papua, users across Indonesia were able to mobilize online. One popular petition called for the government to restore internet access in Papua.4 Social media users amplified protesters’ messages online,5 while others crowdfunded to support the demonstrations.6 The initiator of a crowdfunding effort was arrested in September 2019, but a petition in their support that obtained more than 50,000 signatures secured their release.7
- 1. “The Most Popular Issues of Democracy and Anti-Corruption on Change.org in 2019,” Change.org, January 16, 2020, https://www.change.org/l/id/change-org-infografis2019.
- 2. Lenny Tristia Tambum & Novy Lamanauw, “Jokowi Decides Covid-19 Vaccine is Free for All,” December 16, 2020. https://jakartaglobe.id/news/jokowi-decides-covid19-vaccine-is-free-for…
- 3. "A Portrait of the 2020 Indonesian Digital Movement on Change.org," Change.org, January 18, 2021, https://www.change.org/l/id/potret-gerakan-digital-indonesia-2020-di-ch…; “Digital Motion Portrait,” Change.org, accessed on July 12, 2021, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1U6LX01A74229rxkHl6XCKlPVQGIANidl/view
- 4. “Indonesian Police Kill Separatist in Papua,” Reuters, August 23, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-papua/indonesian-police-ki….
- 5. Eka Santhika, “Student Action, Tapping of Fingers, on Social Media Turns Into Action,” CNN Indonesia, September 27, 2019, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/teknologi/20190927144155-185-434679/aksi-m…; “Social Media Era Student Demonstrations: Funny Posters, Public Fundraising, to STM Children,” BBC News Indonesia, September 26, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/trensosial-49837790.
- 6. Riyan Rahmat Akbar, “Students Demonstrations, Protests on KPK Law Revision and Seven Pushes,” Tempo, October 2, 2019, https://grafis.tempo.co/read/1834/demonstrasi-mahasiswa-protes-revisi-u….
- 7. Ariska Puspita Anngraini, “Ananda Badudu’s Lunge, from Raising Student Actions Funds to Being Caught While Sleeping,” Kompas, September 27, 2019, https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2019/09/27/092841265/sepak-terjang-ana…; Ariska Puspita Anngraini, “The New Face of Democracy Behind Arrested Activist Support Petitions,” Kompas, September 27, 2019, https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2019/09/27/165646165/wajah-demokrasi-b…; Sorta Tobing, “Amanda Badudu Is Finally Released, This Is the Chronology of His Arrest,” Katadata, September 27, 2019, https://katadata.co.id/berita/2019/09/27/ananda-badudu-akhirnya-dibebas….
|Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence?||2.002 6.006|
Freedom of expression, including online, is nominally protected in the constitution and other laws, but the right is frequently curtailed in practice. The Law on Human Rights, which was adopted shortly after the 1998 transition to democracy, guarantees freedom of expression and other fundamental rights; these protections were strengthened by the Second Amendment of the constitution passed in 2000. The Third Amendment guarantees freedom of opinion.1 The constitution also includes the right to obtain information and communicate freely,2 rights that are further protected by various laws and regulations.3 Indonesia ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2005.4
However, the constitution includes language allowing the state to limit rights based on political, security, moral, and religious considerations.5 This wording provides policymakers with ample room for interpretation.6 The limited respect for the legal framework guaranteeing freedom of expression is exemplified by the frequency of prosecutions for online activity, as well as disruptions to internet connectivity and social media platforms.
- 1. Constitution of 1945,” Article 28E(3); “The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of 1945,” UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/education/edurights/media/docs/b1ba8608010ce0c489….
- 2. Constitution of 1945, Articles 28F and 28G(1); “The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of 1945,” UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/education/edurights/media/docs/b1ba8608010ce0c489….
- 3. Among others, “Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights,” “Law No. 14 of 2008 on Freedom of Information,” and “Law No. 40 of 1999 on the Press.”
- 4. The ICCPR was ratified through Law No. 12/2005. However, to date the government has yet to review and reform laws to comply with the covenant’s human rights standards. “Ratification of 18 International Human Rights Treaties,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https://indicators.ohchr.org/.
- 5. “In exercising his/her right and freedom, every person must submit to the restrictions stipulated in laws and regulations with the sole purpose to guarantee the recognition of and the respect for other persons’ rights and freedom and to fulfill fair demand in accordance with the considerations of morality, religious values, security, and public order in a democratic society.” Article 28(J) of 1945 Constitution, as amended in 2000; http://www.unesco.org/education/edurights/media/docs/b1ba8608010ce0c489….
- 6. In 2009, the Constitutional Court generally affirmed that human rights are subject to limits as long as the limits are provided for in the law. “Verdict Directory: Case Number 132,” Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 2009, https://mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_132PU…. Other court decisions failed to narrow the definition of the broad considerations that provide for the state to introduce restrictions. “Verdict Directory: Decision Number 7,” Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 2012, https://mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_7%20P…; “Verdict Directory: Decision Number 10-17-23,” Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 2009, https://mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_Putus….
|Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards?||1.001 4.004|
Several laws impose criminal and civil liability for online activities.
Provisions of the 2008 ITE Law have been used repeatedly to prosecute Indonesians for online expression. The law’s penalties for criminal defamation, hate speech, and inciting violence online are disproportionately harsh compared with those established by the penal code for similar offline offenses.1 Amendments from 2016 to the ITE Law further introduced a number of controversial changes.2 Article 27(3) formally expanded the scope of defamation to include content published unintentionally or by third parties, for instance through the tagging of Facebook posts with another user’s name. Private chat messages can also be considered violations, as the offense of “transmitting” defamatory content applies even when only one person receives the content. The article also broadly covers “all acts other than distributing and transmitting” that make the content accessible to others, which made more users vulnerable to prosecution. The maximum penalties for online defamation were lowered from six years in prison to four, and from a fine of 1 billion rupiahs ($71,000) to 750 million rupiahs ($52,970), but these penalties remained harsher than most offline defamation sentences and fell short of advocates’ demands for decriminalization of the offense.3
In June 2021, President Jokowi announced that he would revise articles of the ITE Law which related to prohibited online content and add an additional article addressing “false information that” troubles society.4 Civil society organizations expressed concerns that the criteria for what constitutes troubling “false information” was not clearly defined.5
Passing the Revision of the Criminal Code Bill (RKUHP) was named a legislative priority in the 2021 National Legislation Program (Prolegnas). The controversial proposed changes in the 2019 draft, which were widely criticized by civil society,6 the press,7 and ordinary users,8 would criminalize insulting public authorities and institutions; writing, promoting, or broadcasting information about contraceptives or abortion; spreading information about or associating with communism; distributing false or inaccurate information; and defamation. 9 The bill would also expand the 1965 Blasphemy Law to include six broad provisions of religion-related speech.10 The government planned to reevaluate the Prolegnas in July 2021, after which it would submit a final draft of the RKUHP to the public.11
In April 2020, the National Police issued a directive allowing the police to charge individuals under the criminal code for spreading COVID-19 misinformation online. The directive also instructed police to charge users for online activities that insult the president and government authorities under the ITE Law.12
Other laws infringe on user rights. The 2008 Antipornography Law loosely defines pornography to enable the ban of many forms of legitimate artistic and cultural expression.13 The 2011 State Intelligence Law prescribes penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment and large fines for revealing or disseminating “state secrets.”14 This legal framework provides authorities with a range of powers to penalize internet users, although they are not all regularly invoked in practice.
- 1. “Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana” [Indonesia Penal Code], available at International Labor Organization, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/73932/105722/F-171178887/…
- 2. “Response to the Revision of Information and Electronic Transaction Law (ITE Law): Five Crucial Issues in the ITE Law that Threaten Freedom of Expression in Indonesia,” Institute for Criminal Justice Reform, October 28, 2016, http://icjr.or.id/response-to-the-revision-of-information-and-electroni….
- 3. Human Rights Watch, “Turning Critics Into Criminals: The Human Rights Consequences of Criminal Defamation Law in Indonesia,” May 3, 2010, https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/05/03/turning-critics-criminals/human-r….
- 4. "The Journey of the ITE Law which is Finally Officially Revised by the Government," Kompas, June 9, 2021, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/06/09/08283531/perjalanan-uu-ite-… June 16,
- 5. "Article 45C in the Draft Revision of the ITE Law is considered to have multiple interpretations," Kompas, June 16, 2021, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/06/16/12584291/pasal-45c-pada-dra…
- 6. “About Us,” Aliansi Nasional, https://reformasikuhp.org/tentang-kami/.
- 7. “Bukan Ditunda, Dewan Pers Minta RKUHP Dicabut,” Liputan 6, November 3, 2019, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/4101726/bukan-ditunda-dewan-pers-min….
- 8. “Presiden Jokowi, Jangan Setujui RKUHP di Sidang Paripurna DPR,” Change.org, 2019, https://www.change.org/p/presiden-jokowi-jangan-setujui-rkuhp-di-sidang….
- 9. “Indonesia: Draft Criminal Code Disastrous for Rights,” Human Rights Watch, September 18, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/18/indonesia-draft-criminal-code-disas…; “RKUHP Explainer: All the Controversial Articles in Indonesia’s Criminal Code Overhaul,” Coconuts Jakarta, September 19, 2019, https://coconuts.co/bali/features/rkuhp-explainer-all-the-controversial….
- 10. Andreas Harsono, “Indonesia to Expand Abusive Blasphemy Law,” Human Rights Watch, October 31, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/31/indonesia-expand-abusive-blasphemy-….
- 11. “The Government and the House of Representatives are said to have agreed to submit the Draft Criminal Code Bill to the Priority National Legislation Program in July," Kompas, June 22, 2021, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/06/22/12492461/pemerintah-dan-dpr…
- 12. “Polri Terbitkan Aturan Khusus Soal Hoaks dan Penghinaan Presiden,” Media Indonesia, April 5, 2020, https://mediaindonesia.com/read/detail/301449-polri-terbitkan-aturan-kh…; “Indonesia Used Covid-19 to Silence Criticism of Government,” Reporters Without Borders, April 16, 2020, https://rsf.org/en/news/indonesia-used-covid-19-silence-criticism-gover…; Andita Rahma, “Coronavirus-Crackdown Aimed at Anti-President Smears, Hoaxes,” Tempo, April 6, 2020, https://en.tempo.co/read/1328272/coronavirus-crackdown-aimed-at-anti-pr….
- 13. In 2014, for example, an art installation in Yogyakarta was shut down for allegedly pornographic content. “Dianggap porno, patung akar setengah manusia dibongkar,” Merdeka, February 10, 2014, https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/dianggap-porno-patung-akar-setengah-m….
- 14. “THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA DRAFT LAW NUMBER 17 YEAR 2011 ON STATE INTELLIGENCE,” ICJ, 2011, https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Indonesia-intelligence-l….
|Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards?||2.002 6.006|
Users frequently face civil and criminal penalties for legitimate online activities.
Online journalists were charged, detained, and convicted for their reporting during the coverage period. In August 2020, blogger and journalist Diantara Putra Sumedi was sentenced to three months in prison after being found guilty of defamation and violating Article 28 of the ITE Law.1 The charges stemmed from a story Diantara published on the blogging platform Banjar Hits about a land dispute between a palm oil company and the Indigenous Dayak community.2
Muhammad Asrul, a journalist with Berita.news, was detained for 36 days beginning in January 2020 after being arrested for alleged hate speech under Article 28 of the ITE Law; he had written three news articles about corruption allegations involving the son of the Palopo mayor.3 His case was pending at the end of the coverage period.4 In March 2020, Mohamad Sadli, the chief editor of liputanpersada.com, was convicted of hate speech and defamation and sentenced to two years in prison for an opinion piece critical of a local government’s road construction project.5
Several cases against activists charged with spreading hate speech online were ongoing during the coverage period. In April 2020, activist Ravio Patra was arrested and briefly detained for allegedly “broadcasting messages to instigate violence and/or spread hatred,” though civil society groups believe he was framed by someone who hijacked his WhatsApp account to spread those messages (see C8).6 In January 2020, religious freedom activist Sudarto was arrested for Facebook posts alleging the government had restricted Christmas services in West Sumatra.7
Online users continued to be prosecuted for defamation. In April 2021, a labor union leader Stevanus Mimosa Kristianto was charged for defaming the reputation of Maybank Indonesia in a speech he delivered during a demonstration against the company in February 2019 that was later cited in an online news article. Kristianto was charged under Article 310(1) of the penal code, and Articles 27(3) and 45(1) of ITE Law.8 In December 2020, Kartika Putri initiated a lawsuit against Dr. Richard Lee, who regularly uploads reviews of skincare products on his YouTube channel, because Lee claimed a product that Kartika endorsed was harmful. By the end of the coverage period, they had failed to reach an agreement through mediation.9 In June 2021, Stella Monica was tried for defamation, after being accused by a Surabaya-based beauty clinic because she uploaded complaints about the clinic’s products online.10
An American citizen Kristen Gray was deported from Bali, Indonesia, after posting on Twitter that Bali was “LGBT friendly.” After being deported, in January 2021, Kristen wrote a public apology.11
Police have also cracked down on the circulation of disinformation. From January 2020 to March 2021, 113 individuals were being investigated for spreading false information about COVID-19.12 This wave of cases follows numerous controversial judicial proceedings during previous coverage periods. Journalist and filmmaker Dandhy Dwi Laksono was temporarily detained and charged in September 2019 for posts on Twitter about Papua that allegedly violated the ITE law and spread information intended to incite hatred.13 That same month, human rights lawyer Veronica Koman was named a suspect for spreading “fake news,” incitement, and inflicting race-based and ethnic hatred for sharing information about Papuan protests (see C7).14 In March 2019, a user was issued a 10-month prison sentence and heavy fine for allegedly sending four WhatsApp messages critical of a textile company, although the accused claimed the messages were sent from a number that she no longer had access to.15 In January 2019, Papuan independence activist Augustinus Yolemal was sentenced to one year in prison after being convicted of “disseminating hostility against the state ideology” for posting a video on Facebook of him and his son singing songs for Papuan independence.16
- 1. Erick Tanjung, “Di Hari Kermerdekaan, Jurnalis Diananta Putra Sumedi Resmi Bebas,” Suara.com, August 17, 2020, https://www.suara.com/news/2020/08/17/200540/di-hari-kermerdekaan-jurna….
- 2. “Indonesian Journalist Held Since Early May on Criminal Defamation Charge,” Committee to Protect Journalists, June 9, 2020, https://cpj.org/2020/06/indonesian-journalist-held-since-early-may-on-c….
- 3. “Komite Desak Polda Sulsel Lepaskan Jurnalis Muhammad Asrul,” tirto.id, February 16, 2020, https://tirto.id/eznL https://tirto.id/komite-desak-polda-sulsel-lepaskan-jurnalis-muhammad-a…; “Journalist Safety Committee Condemns the Criminalization of Journalists with the ITE Law,” SAFEnet, February 18, 2020, https://id.safenet.or.id/2020/02/rilis-pers-komite-keselamatan-jurnalis….
- 4. "Asrul Journalist Case Trial Reveals Important Facts, Including Wrong Domain Name," Berita News, June 9, 2021, https://berita.news/2021/06/09/sidang-kasus-wartawan-asrul-ungkap-sejum…
- 5. “Jurnalis di Buton Tengah yang Dituduh Cemarkan Nama Bupati Divonis 2 Tahun Penjara,” Kompas, March 27, 2020, https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/03/27/11364121/jurnalis-di-buton-…; “Release Sadil,” Change.org, 2020, https://www.change.org/p/bupati-buton-tengah-sulawesi-tenggara-bebaskan…; “Kasus Mohamad Sadli,” SAFEnet, February 1, 2020, https://id.safenet.or.id/2020/02/kasus-mohamad-sadli/.
- 6. Ahmad Faiz Ibnu Sani, “Ravio Patra Released from Custody, Says Indonesian Legal Aid,” Tempo, April 24, 2020, https://en.tempo.co/read/1335118/ravio-patra-released-from-custody-says….
- 7. “Komnas HAM Minta Proses Hukum terhadap Aktivis Sudarto Dihentikan,” Media Indonesia, January 8, 2020, https://mediaindonesia.com/read/detail/282141-komnas-ham-minta-proses-h…; “Constitutional Rights Defenders Network Condemns Sudarto's Arrest by the Regional Police of West Sumatra,” SAFEnet, January 8, 2020; https://id.safenet.or.id/2020/01/jaringan-pembela-hak-konstitusional-me…; “Kasus Sudarto,” SAFEnet, January 7, 2020, https://id.safenet.or.id/2020/01/kasus-sudarto/.
- 8. "INDONESIA: Labor Activist, after delivering a public speech, is criminally charged under Articles of Criminal Defamation," Asian Human Rights Commission, Junuary 22, 2021, http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-UAC-001-2021/; "Kris, Labor Union Orator who is entangled in the ITE Law," Banjarhits, May 20, 2021, https://www.banjarhits.com/2021/05/20/kris-orator-serikat-buruh-yang-te…
- 9. "The Chronology of Richard Lee and Kartika Putri's Skincare Feud," CNN Indonesia, February 2021, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/hiburan/20210206102314-234-603034/kronolog…; "Following up on his case with Kartika Putri, Doctor Richard Lee wants a peaceful path," Merdeka, June 25, 2021, https://www.merdeka.com/sumut/tindak-lanjut-kasusnya-dengan-kartika-put…
- 10. "Witness Reveals Stella Monica's Post about Lviors," Beritajatim, June 18, 2021, https://beritajatim.com/hukum-kriminal/saksi-ungkap-unggahan-stella-mon…; "Talking on Social Media, Beauty Clinic Consumers Charged with ITE Law," CNN Indonesia, April 22, 2021, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20210422154835-12-633489/curhat-d…
- 11. "American 'digital nomad' to be deported from Bali after LGBT and lifestyle tweets," Reuters, January 20, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-deported/american-digital-….
- 12. "Hoax COVID-19 and its spread," Antara News, March 10, 2021, https://www.antaranews.com/infografik/2036054/hoaks-covid-19-dan-sebara…
- 13. “Represi di Tanah Papua: Blokir Internet, Doxing, dan Hukum Aktivis,” tirto.id, December 31, 2019, https://tirto.id/represi-di-tanah-papua-blokir-internet-doxing-dan-huku…; "Filmmaker Dandhy Laksono Named 'Hate Speech' Suspect for Tweeting About Clashes in Papua,” Jakarta Post, September 27, 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/09/27/filmmaker-dandhy-laksono…; Stanley Widianto, “Indonesian Filmmaker Named Suspect After Sharing Posts on Papua,” Reuters, September 27, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-papua/indonesian-filmmaker….
- 14. “Threats Against and Judicial Harassment of Human Rights Lawyer Veronica Koman,” Front Line Defenders, August 14, 2020, https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/threats-against-and-judicial…; Kate Lamb, “Outcry as Indonesia Seeks to Arrest Renowned West Papua Rights Lawyer,” The Guardian, September 4, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/05/outcry-as-indonesia-seeks….
- 15. Ahmad Faiz Ibnu Sani, “Ravio Patra Released from Custody, Says Indonesian Legal Aid,” Tempo, April 24, 2020, https://en.tempo.co/read/1335118/ravio-patra-released-from-custody-says…; “Indonesia: Prison for WhatsApp Messages,” Human Rights Watch, March 8, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/08/indonesia-prison-whatsapp-messages#.
- 16. “Crackdown Escalates on Peaceful Assembly In West Papua,” Civicus, October 2, 2018, https://monitor.civicus.org/newsfeed/2018/10/02/crackdown-escalates-pea…; “Sentenced to One Year in Prison for Posting FB Video,” Amnesty International, January 30, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA2197602019ENGLISH.PDF.
|Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption?||3.003 4.004|
Anonymous communication is somewhat restricted, although not formally prohibited by law. Users have access to encrypted services, although some MCIT policies and other regulations have revealed the government’s desire to gain backdoor access to encrypted communication and personal data.
Since 2005, the MCIT has nominally required mobile phone users to register their phone numbers with the government by text message when they buy a phone. This rule was widely ignored for years, but in 2017, the MCIT introduced a new regulation requiring SIM card users to register by submitting their national identity numbers and their family card registration numbers, thereby limiting anonymity.1 As of late February 2018, failure to comply with this requirement could lead to the temporary blocking of data services to the unregistered SIM cards. If users fail to register within 15 days of the block’s initiation, the SIM cards can be permanently blocked from any telecommunications services. In 2020, the government announced its plan to roll out the use of biometric data for SIM card registration in 2021.2 There were no updates on the rollout of this plan during the coverage period.
In June 2019, the MCIT announced plans to require social media users to include their phone numbers when signing up for an account, a plan that then minister of communications and information technology Rudiantara reportedly had cooperated with a large social media platform to implement.3 That same month, the MCIT reportedly considered regulating VPN use through licenses.4 As of the end of the coverage period, no further information about these plans had been reported.
- 1. MCI regulation no. 14/2017 on the amendment of the Ministry of Communication and Information Regulation no. 12/2016 on registration of telecommunication service subscribers, https://web.kominfo.go.id/sites/default/files/users/4761/1505109064-PM_…. In Indonesia, each citizen is registered both through a national identity number and as a family unit through family card registration numbers. These are basic civic data to access most public services provided by the government.
- 2. “Perbuahan Atas Peraturan Menteri Komunikasi Dan Informatika,” https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20200210133711-8-136654/brtikolabora…; “Cegah Kasus Ilham Bintang Terulang, Registrasi SIM Card Bakal Pakai Biometrik,” Kompas, January 22, 2020, https://tekno.kompas.com/read/2020/01/22/18052477/cegah-kasus-ilham-bin….
- 3. Roy Franedya, “Making a Social Media Account Will Have to Use a Cell Phone Number, Why?” CNBC Indonesia, June 19, 2019, https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/fintech/20190619001405-37-79202/bikin-aku….
- 4. Bernhart Farras, “Protect Internet Users, Ministry of Communication and Information Review VPN Licensing,” CNBC Indonesia, June 12, 2019, https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/fintech/20190612135204-37-77882/lindungi-….
|Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy?||2.002 6.006|
Government surveillance of online activities limits the right to privacy. Although this right is constitutionally guaranteed, no specific law stipulates its protection. Article 40 of Law No. 46/1999 on Post and Telecommunication prohibits the interception of information transmitted through any form of telecommunications.1 However, at least 10 other laws, including the ITE Law and seven executive regulations, allow certain government or law enforcement agencies to conduct surveillance, including electronically.2 These include the Commission Eradication Commission (KPK),3 the National Narcotics Board, and the National Intelligence Service, among others. The laws do not clearly provide for the scope of interception, despite a 2010 Constitutional Court decision that requires government agencies to have detailed and regulated interception procedures.4 The legal framework also fails to provide for judicial or parliamentary oversight of surveillance activity and remedies for those who allege abuse.
The 2016 amendments to the ITE Law revised some provisions governing interception in response to the 2010 Constitutional Court decision, introducing penalties for interception conducted outside the context of law enforcement. The government indicated that further details concerning interception procedures would be addressed in future regulations.5
During the previous coverage period, the government announced its interest in passing legislation on surveillance and cybersecurity. The Surveillance Bill would authorize the use of wiretapping and various additional mechanisms to conduct monitoring. The Cybersecurity and Defence Bill, which was drafted and announced to the public in August 2019, includes concerning provisions that give the BSSN broad powers to mitigate and respond to cyberthreats, including by cutting data flows (see A3).6 Civil society expressed outcry regarding both process and content; the bill was tabled in July 2019,7 and was not included in the National Legislation Programme 2021.8
In May 2018, Parliament adopted amendments to the 2003 Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism Law (CT Law) that give authorities sweeping surveillance powers to fight terrorism, which is broadly defined. Article 31 permits security officials to “intercept any conversation by telephone or other means of communication suspected of being used to prepare, plan, and commit a criminal act of terrorism.” Human Rights Watch and local civil society groups warned that the language could be interpreted to facilitate disproportionate surveillance that violates privacy rights.9
Authorities monitor social media platforms. In preparation for the 2019 elections, the MCIT created a “war room” in October 2018 that employed 70 engineers tasked with monitoring social media platforms in real time.10 The MCIT reported that it would “take action” if it found users had violated the ITE Law. In January 2018, the BSSN reportedly began to formalize its response to cyberthreats, which included a social media program (see B3).11
Reports have linked authorities to the purchase and use of spyware and other sophisticated surveillance tools. In December 2020, the Toronto-based group Citizen Lab reported that Indonesia had likely purchased Circles technology.12 In late 2015, reports indicated a number of government groups were “likely” using sophisticated FinFisher spyware, which collects data such as Skype audio, key logs, and screenshots.13 Swiss and British companies have also received licenses to export interception technology, particularly international mobile subscriber identity-catcher (IMSI-catchers), to Indonesia.14 Additionally, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported in October 2018 that Indonesian authorities purchased surveillance products from the Israeli-US company Verint to track LGBT+ rights activists and religious minorities.15
Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, Indonesia rolled out the app PeduliLindungi (Care Protect), which pulls location data using Bluetooth proximity tracking to facilitate contact tracing and allows users to register for and obtain certification of their vaccination.16 Civil society groups urged the government to ensure the app aligns with personal data protection principles and to expedite the enactment of a personal data protection law.17
- 1. Andylala Waluyo, “Pemerintah Selidiki Telkomsel dan Indosat Terkait Isu Penyadapan,” Voice of America, February 19, 2014, https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/pemerintah-selidiki-telkomsel-dan-indosa….
- 2. For a full list of the laws, see Supriyadi Widodo Eddyono and Erasmus A. T. Napitupulu, “Komentar Atas Pengaturan Penyadapan Dalam Rancangan,” KUHAP, ICJR, policy paper, October 2013, https://web.archive.org/web/20141220085634/http://kuhap.or.id/data/wp-c….
- 3. With the issuance of Law 19/2019 on KPK to revise the previous Law 30/2002, the authority to grant surveillance/tapping operation is no longer with the KPK Chairman but under the Supervisory Board. This change limits the authority of the KPK Chairman to only an administrative function, which is considered as weakening the authority and independency of KPK to fight against corruption. The law was passed within 13 working days and with minimum to no public consultation and thus was widely opposed by the public. The law is undergoing judicial review at the Constitutional Court. “Revised KPK Law May Weaken Anti-Graft Body's Authority: Vice Chairman,” Jakarta Post, September 17, 2019, https://en.antaranews.com/news/132928/revised-kpk-law-may-weaken-anti-g…; “Constitutional Court Probes Why KPK Bill Got Speedy Treatment,” Jakarta Post, February 4, 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/02/04/constitutional-court-pro….
- 4. For the Constitutional Court decision, see Nomor 5/PUU-VIII/2010, https://mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/Putusan%20%205_PUU_V….
- 5. “’Interception’ Using CCTV Under the 2016 Revision of the ITE Law,” HPRP Lawyers, 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20170101010547/http://hprplawyers.com/inter….
- 6. Damar Juniarto, “Catatan Kritis atas RUU Keamanan dan Ketahanan Siber,” Medium, September 19, 2019, https://medium.com/@DamarJuniarto/catatan-kritis-atas-ruu-keamanan-dan-…; “RUU Keamanan Dan Ketahanan Siber,” Elsam, 2019, https://elsam.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/OK-RUU-KKS-Problem-dalam…; “SAFEnet Criticism over Indonesia’s Cybersecurity Draft Bill,” SAFEnet, September 25, 2019, https://safenet.or.id/2019/09/safenet-criticism-over-indonesia-cybersec….
- 7. “DPR Tunda Pengesahan RUU Keamanan dan Ketahanan Siber,” detiknews, September 27, 2019, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4724504/dpr-tunda-pengesahan-ruu-keaman…; Damar Juniarto, “Catatan Kritis atas RUU Keamanan dan Ketahanan Siber,” Medium, September 19, 2019, https://medium.com/@DamarJuniarto/catatan-kritis-atas-ruu-keamanan-dan-…; “RUU Keamanan Dan Ketahanan Siber,” Elsam, 2019, https://elsam.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/OK-RUU-KKS-Problem-dalam…; “SAFEnet Criticism over Indonesia’s Cybersecurity Draft Bill,” SAFEnet, September 25, 2019, https://safenet.or.id/2019/09/safenet-criticism-over-indonesia-cybersec….
- 8. "Plenary Session of DPR Agrees on 33 Priority Prolegnas Bills for 2021," Council of Representation of the Republic of Indonesia, March 23, 2021, https://www.dpr.go.id/berita/detail/id/32239/t/Paripurna+DPR+Sepakati+3…
- 9. “Letter on Indonesia’s New Counterterrorism Law,” Human Rights Watch, June 20, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/20/letter-indonesias-new-counterterror….
- 10. Tassia Sipahutara and Karlis Salna, “Inside the Government-Run War Room Fighting Indonesian Fake News,” Bloomberg, October 24, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-24/inside-the-governmen….
- 11. Resty Woro Yuniar, “Can Indonesia’s New Cybercrime Unit Win Its War on Fake News?” South China Morning Post, February 18, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2132683/can-indonesi….
- 12. Bill Marczak, John Scott-Railton, Siddharth Prakash Rao, Siena Anstis, and Ron Deibert, “Running in Circles,” December 1, 2020, https://citizenlab.ca/2020/12/running-in-circles-uncovering-the-clients…
- 13. Bill Marczak, John Scott-Railton, Adam Senft, Irene Poetranto, and Sarah McKune, “Pay No Attention to the Server Behind the Proxy,” Citizen Lab, October 15, 2015, https://citizenlab.ca/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferati….
- 14. “State of Privacy Indonesia,” Privacy International, January 26, 2019, https://privacyinternational.org/state-privacy/1003/state-privacy-indon…; Joseph Cox, “British Companies Are Selling Advanced Spy Tech to Authoritarian Regimes,” Vice, August 26, 2016, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4xaq4m/the-uk-companies-exporting-in….
- 15. Hagar Shezaf and Jonathan Jacobson, “Revealed: Israel's Cyber-spy Industry Helps World Dictators Hunt Dissidents and Gays,” Haaretz, October 20, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-israel-s-cyber-sp….
- 16. PeduliLindungi, https://pedulilindungi.id/#tentang.; "PeduliLindung gets additional registration features and vaccine certificates," Antara News, February 1, 2021, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/1977243/pedulilindungi-dapat-tambahan…
- 17. “Human Rights Groups Urge Privacy Protection in COVID-19 Contact Tracing Efforts,” Jakarta Post, July 1, 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/07/01/human-rights-groups-urge…; Irene Poetranto and Sinta Dewi Rosadi, “Robust Personal Data Protection Critical in COVID-19 Fight," Jakarta Post, April 17, 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2020/04/17/robust-personal-data….
|Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy?||4.004 6.006|
The absence of a comprehensive personal data protection law, an independent data protection authority, and synchronous technical personal data protection regulations in Indonesia have made it challenging to identify and act upon infringements of users’ privacy rights. As of June 2021, Indonesia’s Personal Data Protection Bill had yet to be finalized, and parliamentary discussions on the formation of an independent data protection authority had stalled.1
In February 2020, the Minister of Communication and Information Johnny G. Plate acknowledged that without a comprehensive personal data protection law, identifying data collection practices by digital providers that infringe on users’ right to privacy remains a challenge.2 Data breaches (see C8) and illegal data transfers are the only clear evidence of users’ privacy rights infringements.3
Several laws expand the government’s ability to access personal data held by private companies. Governmental Regulation No. 71/ 2019 (PP 71/2019) states that only data related to government administration, defense, security are subject to data localization requirements;4 it replaced a previous regulation5 that required electronic system providers that offer “public services” to build local data centers.6
The regulation MR 5/2020, which became effective in November 2020 and complements PP 71/2019, mandates that ESOs provide authorities “direct access” to their systems and users’ personal data when requested, for monitoring and law enforcement purposes. Any ESOs whose digital content is used or accessed within Indonesia must also appoint an in-country representative to respond to content removal and personal data access orders (see B3 and B6).7
Some international companies are beginning to store user data domestically. The MCIT requested that Google develop a data center integrated with the government’s system to ensure users’ data is held on servers within Indonesia. Due to the potential of cloud computing business in Indonesia, Google and Amazon are reportedly seeking to develop data centers in Jakarta.8
A 2016 MCIT regulation9 stated that personal data must be encrypted if it is stored in an electronic system, though a separate MCIT directive stated that Over the Top (OTT) providers—that is, video streaming services that work directly through the internt—must allow legal data interception for law enforcement purposes, raising concerns about the security of encryption.10 Moreover, a government regulation issued in 2000 requires telecommunications providers to retain records of customer usage for at least three months.11 Some companies have complied with law enforcement agencies’ requests for data.
There are no clear privacy and personal data protection policies that guide the processing of sensitive health data of users in Indonesia, even as the government has implemented Google-form based vaccination registrations and has partnered with private corporations to support COVID-19 vaccination efforts.12
- 1. "Personal Data Protection Bill Never Passed, Where is it Blocked?" Voice of America Indonesia, June 9, 2021, https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/ruu-perlindungan-data-pribadi-tak-kunjun…
- 2. Minister of Communication and Information: Cases of Personal Data Breach is Difficult to Detect," CNN Indonesia, February 26, 2020, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/teknologi/20200225204935-185-478090/menkom…
- 3. "The Most Misuse of Personal Data by Illegal Fintech," Finansial Bisnis, July 20, 2020, https://finansial.bisnis.com/read/20200720/563/1268374/penyalahgunaan-d…
- 4. “PP PSTE: Mandatory Registration List & Government Right to Disconnect,” CNN Indonesia, October 28, 2019, https://cnnindonesia.com/teknologi/20191028102006-185-443409/pp-pste-wa….; “The Revision of PP PSTE Is in the Finalization Stage,” Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, July 24, 2018, https://kominfo.go.id/content/detail/13563/revisi-pp-pste-masuk-tahap-f…; Irma Yunita, “Revision of PP No.82 and Its Impact on Indonesian’s Corporate,” Telkom Telstra, https://www.telkomtelstra.co.id/en/insights/blogs/482-revision-pp-no-82….
- 5. “The Revision of PP PSTE Is in the Finalization Stage,” Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, July 24, 2018, https://kominfo.go.id/content/detail/13563/revisi-pp-pste-masuk-tahap-f….
- 6. “Indonesia,” Linklaters LLP and Allens, July 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20160405081116/https://clientsites.linklate…; “Regulation of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, Number 82 of 2012, Concerning Electronic System and Transaction Operation,” 2012, http://www.flevin.com/id/lgso/translations/JICA%20Mirror/english/4902_P…; “Indonesia May Force Web Giants to Build Local Data Centers,” Asia Sentinel, January 17, 2014, https://www.asiasentinel.com/econ-business/indonesia-web-giants-local-d…; Vanesha Manuturi and Basten Gokkon, “Web Giants to Build Data Centers in Indonesia?” Jakarta Globe, January 15, 2014, https://web.archive.org/web/20150827051118/http://jakartaglobe.beritasa…; Anupam Chander and Uyên P. Lê, “Data Nationalism,” Emory Law Journal 64, no. 3 (2015): 677-739, http://law.emory.edu/elj/_documents/volumes/64/3/articles/chander-le.pdf.
- 7. SAFEnet, "Analysis of Indonesia MR5/2020 concerning Private Electronic System Operators," May 12, 2021, https://safenet.or.id/2021/05/position-paper-analysis-of-the-minister-o…; "Indonesia: Suspend, Revise New Internet Regulation," Human Rights Watch, May 21, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/05/21/indonesia-suspend-revise-new-intern…; Katitza Rodriguez, "Indonesia’s Proposed Online Intermediary Regulation May be the Most Repressive Yet," Electronic Frontier Foundation, February 16, 2021, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/02/indonesias-proposed-online-interm… ; "GNI Expresses Concerns About and Calls on Indonesia to Reconsider the ‘MR5’ Regulation," Global Network Initiative, June 11, 2021, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/mr5-indonesia/
- 8. “Google Cloud to Open First Data Center in Indonesia,” NNA Business News, March 9, 2020, https://english.nna.jp/articles/8022; Cindy Mutia Annur, “Pasar Indonesia Besar, Google Mau Turuti Aturan Integrasi Cloud,” Katadata, March 5, 2020, https://katadata.co.id/berita/2020/03/05/pasar-indonesia-besar-google-m…; Cindy Mutia Annur, “Menkominfo Minta Google Buat Pusat Data Terintegrasi Dengan Pemerintah,” Katadata, November 20, 2019, https://katadata.co.id/berita/2019/11/20/menkominfo-minta-google-buat-p….
- 9. Article 15.2 of the MCI Regulation No. 20 of 2016 concerning Personal Data Protection in Electronic System.
- 10. MCI Circular letter no 3/2016 article 5.5.7, 2016, https://web.kominfo.go.id/sites/default/files/users/3997/Surat%20Edaran…
- 11. International Comparative Legal Guides, ICLG, http://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/telecoms-media-and-internet-laws/t….
- 12. "Covid-19 Vaccination Registration Link for the Elderly in 34 Cities," Kompas, February 21, 2021, https://tekno.kompas.com/read/2021/02/21/19110067/link-pendaftaran-vaks…; "Registration For The Elderly Covid-19 Vaccination In Dki Jakarta And The Province Capital," Ministry of Health, accessed on July 13, 2021,https://www.kemkes.go.id/article/view/21022000001/Informasi-Pendaftaran…; "Gojek, Halodoc & Ministry of Health Launch COVID-19 Check," CNBC Indonesia, March 22, 2020 https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/tech/20200322205646-37-146784/gojek-halod…; “Ministry of Health Collaborates with Gojek and Halodoc to Help Implement COVID-19 Vaccination,” Sehat Negeriku, March 3, 2021, https://sehatnegeriku.kemkes.go.id/baca/umum/20210303/4837120/menkes-ga…; "Gotong Royong Covid-19 Vaccination in Jakarta Fully Managed by Corporations," Tempo, May 20, 2021, https://en.tempo.co/read/1463978/gotong-royong-covid-19-vaccination-in-…
|Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities?||2.002 5.005|
Online journalists and users regularly face harassment and intimidation in retaliation for their online activities.1
During the coverage period, journalists faced physical harassment and intimidation for their online activities. In May 2021, the house of a journalist for LinkTodays.com, Abdul Kohar Lubis, was set on fire. 2 That same month, an online journalist Mulyono was beaten and doused with gasoline by his neighbor, who accused him of reporting on a street orchestra concert that took place in their neighborhood during the pandemic. 3 In June 2021, the chief editor of North Sumatra’s online media outlet LasserNewsToday.com, Mara Salem, was shot in his car. Police investigations revealed that the shooter owned a nightclub, which Salem reported was involved in drug distribution.4
Journalists are often doxed and harassed for their online activities. SAFEnet reported that there were 13 cases of doxing of journalists, human rights activists, and citizens in 2020—double the number of cases in 2019.5 In March 2021, a journalist with Liputan6.com, Akbar Fua, was doxed after publishing about a criminal group that stormed a police station in Konawe, Kendari City, to secure the release of nine others who had been arrested.6 In September 2020, an individual publicly revealed the home address, family photos, and telephone number of Cakrayuri Nuralam, an online journalist with liputan6.com who published an article verifying that Arteria Dahlan, a politician with the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), was the grandchild of the founder of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in West Sumatera.7
Internet users in academic communities have also been targeted for their online activity. A number of protestors who joined the Yogyakarta demonstration against the controversial omnibus law in October 2020 were doxed. For example, the personal data of student protestor Azhar Jusardi Putra and activists Ernawati and Ardy Syihab were circulated on WhatsApp and social media. Putra’s WhatsApp account was also hacked and his mother received death threats.8 In June 2020, organizer and journalist Tantowi Anwari, a speaker at an online discussion at the University of Lampung titled “Racial Discrimination against Papua, #PapuansLivesMatter,” was doxed and subjected to online threats and harassment (see C8).9
Activists and journalists reporting on and discussing Papua and West Papua consistently face intimidation. In April 2021, the car of the founder of independent news site Jubi, Victor Mambor, was vandalized.10 In 2019, human rights lawyer Veronica Koman, who is based in Australia, was reportedly harassed, threatened with sexual violence and death, and had personal information released online, following comments she posted about the 2019 protests in Papua.11
Maaher At-Thuwalibi, a cleric of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), died of preexisting health issues at a National Police detention center while detained for alleged online hate speech and defamation towards an influential cleric. His family members alleged that his health further deteriorated because of the conditions in the cennter.12 In July 2018, journalist Muhammad Yusuf of the local news site Kemajuan Rakyat, who was charged with defamation, alo died in detention (see C3).13
- 1. “A Digital Attack on the Implementation of Papuan Racism Discussions, a Real Threat of Democracy,” Kontras, June 12, 2020, https://kontras.org/2020/06/12/serangan-digital-terhadap-penyelenggaran…; Irham Duillah, “End of Year 2018 Notes: Journalists Overshadowed Persecution and Physical Violence,” Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, December 31, 2018, https://aji.or.id/read/press-release/887/catatan-akhir-tahun-2018-jurna…; Alliance of Independent Journalists, “From Our Member Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), Indonesia – 2018 Year-End Note: Persecution and Violence Threaten Journalists,” Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, January 8, 2019, https://www.forum-asia.org/?p=27974.
- 2. "Abdul Kohar Lubis's house burned by OTK in Siantar," News Corner, May 30, 2021, https://newscorner.id/rumah-abdul-kohar-lubis-dibakar-otk-di-siantar/
- 3. "Mojokerto Online Media Journalist, Persecuted by Residents," Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, May 24, 2021, https://advokasi.aji.or.id/read/data-kekerasan/1940.html?y=2021&m=1&ye=…
- 4. “Journalist Marsal Harahap, Found Dead with Gunshot Wounds,” Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, June 19, 2021 https://advokasi.aji.or.id/read/data-kekerasan/1947.html?y=2021&m=1&ye=…; “Ahmad Muzani: To Finish Shooting Journalists, Komnas HAM Needs To Form A Team," Voice of America Indonesia, June 20, 2021, https://voi.id/en/news/60518/ahmad-muzani-to-finish-shooting-journalist…; “North Sumatra Police Chief Says Mara Salem Harahap Was Killed Due to Heartache of THM Owner,” Sumut News, June 24, 2021, https://kumparan.com/sumutnews/kapolda-sumut-sebut-marasalem-harahap-di…
- 5. SAFEnet, "The Rise of Doxing Attacks and the Challenges of Their Protection in Indonesia," December 22, 2020 https://id.safenet.or.id/2020/12/riset-peningkatan-serangan-doxing-dan-…
- 6. “Liputan6 Journalist Experiences Doxing,” Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, March 13, 2021, https://advokasi.aji.or.id/read/data-kekerasan/1924.html?y=2021&m=1&ye=…
- 7. "Statement regarding Doxing Journalist Cakrayuri Nuralam," Liputan6, September 12, 2020, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/4354423/pernyataan-liputan6com-soal-…
- 8. “Kagama says UGM Philosophy Students Become Victims of Doxing Related to Demo,” detikNews, October 20, 2020, https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-tengah/d-5224142/kagama-ungkap-mahas…
- 9. Egi Adyatama, “LBH Pers, SAFEnet Report Terror Cases to Komnas HAM,” Tempo, June 12, 2020, https://en.tempo.co/read/1352932/lbh-pers-safenet-report-terror-cases-t…; “A Digital Attack on the Implementation of Papuan Racism Discussions, a Real Threat of Democracy,” Kontras, June 12, 2020, https://kontras.org/2020/06/12/serangan-digital-terhadap-penyelenggaran…
- 10. "Papuan Jubi Journalist Terrorized: Car Vandalized & Social Media Doxing," Tirto, April 22, 2021, https://tirto.id/jurnalis-jubi-papua-diteror-mobil-dirusak-doxing-media…
- 11. “Indonesian Human Rights Lawyer Koman Refuses to Be Cowed on Papua,” Reuters, October 22, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-papua-lawyer/indonesian-hu….
- 12. "Chronology of Ustadz Maaher Sickness to Death," Detik News, February 8, 2021, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5366748/kronologi-ustadz-maaher-sakit-h…; "Controversial cleric Maaher At-Thuwailibi dies in police custody," Coconuts Jakarta, February 9, 2021, https://coconuts.co/jakarta/news/controversial-cleric-maaher-at-thuwail…; "Whistleblower Prays for Ustaz Maaher's Death Husnul Khatimah," CNN Indonesia, February 9, 2021, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20210209125029-20-604104/pelapor-…; "Komnas HAM: Maaher At-Thuwailibi Died of Illness," Kompas, February 18, 2021, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/02/18/17070391/komnas-ham-maaher-…; Sukma A, "The Family of the Late Ustadz Maheer Reveals the Condition of the Prison Cell Occupied," Terkini, February 10, 2021, https://makassar.terkini.id/keluarga-almarhum-ustadz-maheer-ungkap-kond…
- 13. “CPJ Calls on Indonesia to Investigate Death of Detained Journalist,” Committee to Protect Journalists, June 26, 2018, https://cpj.org/2018/06/cpj-calls-on-indonesia-to-investigate-death-of-…; Michelle Winowatan, “Indonesian Reporter Dies in Police Custody,” Human Rights Watch, June 26, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/26/indonesian-reporter-dies-police-cus….
|Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack?||1.001 3.003|
Civil servants, journalists, activists, civil society groups, and news outlets have experienced technical attacks in recent years. The websites of government entities and private companies also face hacks and data breaches.
Employees of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), anticorruption activists, and journalists who have publicly discussed the controversial National Insight Test (TWK)—a civics evaluation that state employees are required to pass due to 2019 legislative amendments, which has been criticized for the appropriateness of some of its questions—had their private social media accounts hacked. In June 2021, the whistleblowing platform IndonesiaLeaks faced hacking attempts on its website and its Twitter account after publishing an investigative report on the TWK.1 That same month, the Telegram accounts of the KPK’s Senior Investigator Novel Baswedan, and Director of Intercommission and Agency Network, Sujanarko, were hacked.2 In May 2021, the think tank Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) reported experiencing several hacking attempts during a virtual press conference that featured eight previous KPK leaders as panelists.3
Individuals and news outlets criticizing the government’s handling of COVID-19 were also subjected to technical attacks. In August 2020, University of Indonesia professor Dr. Pandu Riono, who criticized the government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, claimed that hackers posted photos to his Twitter feed of him and a woman they claimed to be his mistress.4 In August 2020, several media outlets and civil society organizations—including Tempo, Tirto.id, and the Centre for Indonesia’s Strategic Development Initiatives (CISDI)—were hacked after posting articles that criticized the government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. Several organizations claimed that hackers erased content from their websites.5
In June 2020, the organizers of a University of Lampung online discussion about racial discrimination in Papua stated that their food delivery service accounts were hacked in order to place large orders and transfer the balance from their digital wallets to another account (see C7).6
Data breaches are also frequent in Indonesia.7 In May 2021, the Healthcare and Social Security Agency (BPJS Kesehatan), which administers Indonesia’s universal health coverage program, experienced a massive data breach. The personal data of 270 million participants were leaked and sold in a hacking forum called Raid Forums.8 In November 2020, the breach of hotel management and booking platform RedDoorz led to 5.8 million individuals’ data being leaked and sold online.
- 1. "KKJ Condemns Terrors Following IndonesiaLeaks Investigative Report," Tempo, June 9, 2021 https://en.tempo.co/read/1470464/kkj-condemns-terrors-following-indones…
- 2. "Novel Baswedan's Telegram Account and the Director of the KPK Hijacked!" Detik News, May 20, 2021, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5576933/akun-telegram-novel-baswedan-da…
- 3. "ICW Says There was a Hacking Effort in Press Conference regarding KPK Employees Who Did Not Pass TWK," Kompas, May 17, 2021, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/05/17/22382131/icw-sebut-ada-upay…
- 4. “Epidemiologist Pandu Riono's Twitter Account Hacked,” Jakarta Post, August 20, 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/08/20/epidemiologist-pandu-rio….
- 5. Kate Lamb and Stanley Widianto, “Digital Attacks Raise Fears Over Press Freedoms in Indonesia,” Reuters, August 24, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-media-hacking-idUSKBN25K14G.; "CISDI Site Hacked, Important Content and Documents Disappear," Liputan6, 22 August, 2020, https://www.liputan6.com/tekno/read/4336686/situs-cisdi-kena-retas-kont…
- 6. Alfian Putra Abdi, “Di Balik Dugaan BIN Merecoki Diskusi Papua di Universitas Lampung,” tirto.id, June 14, 2020, https://tirto.id/di-balik-dugaan-bin-merecoki-diskusi-papua-di-universi….
- 7. “Hacker Allegedly Breaches Govt Database on COVID-19 Test-Takers,” Jakarta Post, June 21, 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/06/20/hacker-allegedly-breache…; Fanny Potkin, “Indonesia's Tokopedia Probes Alleged Data Leak of 91 Million Users,” Reuters, May 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tokopedia-cyber/indonesias-tokopedia….
- 8. "Indonesia summons state health insurer over alleged data leak," Reuters, May 21, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/technology/indonesia-summons-state-health-insur…
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Global Freedom Score59 100 partly free
Internet Freedom Score48 100 partly free
Freedom in the World StatusPartly Free