STAY UP TO DATE: The Effects of the US Foreign Aid Freeze on Freedom House
Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Freedom on the Net 2024

Philippines

Partly Free
60
100
A Obstacles to Access 16 25
B Limits on Content 23 35
C Violations of User Rights 21 40
Last Year's Score & Status
61 100 Partly Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
Philippines_hero_map

header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2023 - May 31, 2024

Internet freedom declined during the coverage period, as cyberattacks against online news outlets persisted. Red-tagging—a form of harassment whereby targets are accused of having links with local communist groups—physical assaults, and politicized lawsuits continued to impact media workers and activists operating online.

  • Authorities imposed brief restrictions on mobile networks during local festivities in October 2023 and January 2024 (see A3).
  • Of the 27 websites blocked in June 2022 for alleged affiliation with “Communist-Terrorist” groups, 26 remained blocked during the coverage period, including news site Pinoy Weekly (see B1).
  • In October 2023, drag performer Pura Luka Vega was arrested for offending religious sentiments after a video of Vega performing a Christian prayer while dressed as Jesus Christ went viral (see C3).
  • In July 2023, the National Telecommunications Commission shared that more than 113 million SIM cards had been registered under the SIM Card Registration Act, which took effect during the previous coverage period and requires all SIM card users to register their SIM cards by providing their personal details and photo identification (see C4).
  • The authorities’ use of red-tagging, a form of harassment that involves accusing targets of having links with local communist groups, continued during the coverage period (see C7).
  • In November 2023, a two-day long cyberattack against the nonprofit Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) prompted the independent media agency to temporarily take down its site to prevent further attacks and damage (see C8).

header2 Political Overview

The Philippines hosts a vibrant political landscape, and elections are free from overt restrictions. However, established political elites benefit from structural advantages, and problems including highly organized disinformation campaigns and widespread vote buying have undermined fair competition. Corruption is endemic, and anticorruption bodies struggle to uphold their mandates. Journalists and activists who are perceived as critical of the government or other powerful interests can face criminal cases, and in some cases lethal violence. Terrorist and insurgent activity continues on the southern island of Mindanao. Extrajudicial killings and other abuses by police and military personnel remain a concern. While the levels of violence and impunity are thought to have decreased somewhat since a new administration took office in 2022, harmful practices such as “red-tagging”—the denunciation of government critics as supposed communists—have persisted.

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 4.004 6.006

The internet penetration rate in the Philippines was 73.6 percent as of January 2024, according to DataReportal.1 People in the Philippines access the internet through mobile devices far more than through fixed-line connections.2

The two major telecommunications companies—PLDT (formerly known as the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company) and Globe Telecom—have also introduced fifth-generation (5G) technology for mobile networks nationwide.3 According to Ookla, in March 2024, the median mobile internet speed was 30.90 megabits per second (Mbps), while the median fixed broadband speed was 93.91 Mbps.

The government has several ongoing projects to improve connectivity. According to a 2017 law, public places such as hospitals and schools must provide free Wi-Fi.4 In December 2022, the government announced its commitment to setting up 15,000 Wi-Fi sites in 2023, and as of October 2023, 4,790 access points had been established, providing free internet access to 1,499 remote locations.5

In May 2020, the Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) released the Common Tower Policy, which allows the construction of shared towers for telecommunications companies to provide faster and cheaper internet service throughout the country.6 In November 2021, the DICT announced its plan to build 178,000 cellular towers by 2025, noting that over 25,000 government-funded cellular towers were in operation.7 In June 2024, after the end of the coverage period, the DICT reported that 2,374 new cell sites had been built so far.8

Former president Duterte’s administration launched the National Broadband Plan (NBP) in 2017 to improve broadband connectivity and later reported that the plan would be operational in 2023, though it has since experienced delays.9 In 2020, the DICT signed agreements to connect several provincial networks to the fiber-optic backbone.10

In June 2023, PLDT reported that because one of their submarine cable partners experienced a loss in bandwidth capacity, network users’ internet connectivity and access to Google services were impacted for one day.11

In July 2022, during the previous coverage period, internet services in several North Luzon towns and cities were temporarily halted due to a magnitude 7.0 earthquake.12 The country’s main international airport in Manila temporarily lost communications, including internet connectivity, due to a power outage in January 2023.13

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 1.001 3.003

A digital divide exists in the Philippines, mainly due to the cost of network subscriptions and the geography of network coverage. As of June 2023, according to the DICT, 65 percent of the Philippines does not have easy access to the internet.1

While mobile and fixed-line data package prices are generally uniform across the country, daily minimum wages in urban areas are significantly higher than those in some rural areas.2 Users also experience significant differences in internet speeds and quality of service depending on the region.3 In February 2023, satellite-based internet provider SpaceX was launched in the Philippines, expanding internet connectivity to remote areas.4

According to internet comparison site Cable, the average monthly cost of a broadband package in 2023 was 2,049.50 PHP ($35.55), while the cost on average for 1 gigabyte (GB) of mobile data was 33.32 PHP ($0.60) as of September 2023.5 According to Statista, in 2022, the median monthly wage for full time workers in the Philippines was 18,432 PHP ($345.81).6

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 5.005 6.006

During the coverage period, in both October 2023 and January 2024, authorities announced that they would temporarily restrict mobile services and apply artificial signal jamming during major festivities in several cities.

In October 2023, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) announced a temporary cutoff of network services during the MassKara Festival in Bacolod, Negros Occidental.1 Memos on the suspension of cellular services were given to all three network providers. In January 2024, the country’s interior secretary announced that cellular signals would be jammed during the Traslación procession, a religious tradition that has historically drawn millions of participants during the Roman Catholic Feast of the Black Nazarene in Manila.2

Local government leaders and police also reportedly considered shutting down mobile services during other festivities—including in Cagayan de Oro,3 Aklan,4 and Iloilo5—for security purposes, but ultimately did not.

One provider, PLDT, plays an outsized role in the country’s telecommunications infrastructure. The private entity owns the majority of fixed-line connections, as well as a 429,000-kilometer fiber-optic network that connects to several international networks, 6 and is part of a network of 16 international cable systems.7 In 2021, PLDT invested in the Apricot cable system, the Jupiter cable project, and the Asia Direct Cable (ADC) system.8 The company received provisional authority in July 2023 to build two landing cables for the Apricot system, which is expected to be done by early 2025.9

In 2021, Converge ICT Solutions, a fiber broadband operator, invested $100 million to participate in the Bifrost cable system, which is expected to be completed in 2025 (see A1).10 In 2017, Globe Telecom launched a $250 million submarine cable that links Davao and the United States.11

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 4.004 6.006

Internet service is currently classified as a value-added service and is therefore subject to fewer regulatory requirements than mobile and fixed-phone services.

Companies entering the market go through a two-stage process. First, they must obtain a congressional license that involves parliamentary hearings and the approval of both the upper and lower houses of Congress. Second, they need to apply for certification from the NTC. Companies have separately complained about cumbersome permit procedures to build new cell towers.1 In July 2023, President Marcos signed Executive Order No. 32, which streamlines the permit process required to construct telecommunications infrastructure by implementing a processing timeline on permit requests and simplifying the permit application process.2 In October 2023, the Anti-Red Tape Authority (ARTA) signed the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the executive order, formalizing the new policy’s guidelines.3

At present, the telecommunications industry is dominated by two companies, PLDT and Globe Telecom, each of which have acquired a number of minor players over the last two decades.4 As of 2022, PLDT held 43 percent of the market, with 74.1 million mobile, fixed-line, and broadband subscribers,5 while Globe held 52 percent, with over 86.7 million mobile subscribers.6 The 2016 joint acquisition of the San Miguel Corporation’s telecommunications assets by PLDT and Globe resulted in the two companies controlling about 80 percent of all available cellular frequencies.7

New service providers face legal obstacles, such as constitutional limitations on the people or companies that can operate a public utility, in obtaining a congressional franchise.8 Still, in 2021, Dito Telecommunity Corporation, a telecommunications company formerly known as Mislatel,9 launched its commercial operations in the cities of Davao and Cebu,10 and, as of mid-2023, had expanded to most provinces.11 Dito reported a subscriber base of 8 million in August 2023.12

In September 2023, satellite internet provider Astranis announced that it would be entering the market in 2024.13 In February 2023, Space X launched its satellite internet provider Starlink in the Philippines, making the country the first in southeast Asia with Starlink coverage (see A2).14

The Philippine Competition Act was signed in 2015 to protect consumers and preserve commercial competition. 15 The law established the Philippine Competition Commission (PCC)16 but does not prohibit monopolies and will not prevent an entity from dominating a market so long as the company does not commit certain legally prohibited abuses.17

In April 2023, the Republic Act (RA) No. 11659 came into effect, which amends the Public Service Act by delineating specific public services—not including telecommunications—as “public utilities.”18 The amendment allows 100 percent foreign ownership of telecommunication companies operating in the Philippines.19

In July 2021, the House of Representatives passed the Open Access in Data Transmission Act, which would have liberalized the telecommunications industry and avoided a monopoly by a single provider, though it remained pending, awaiting Senate approval, as of the end of the coverage period.20 Under the law, the government would encourage more players to build and operate broadband networks, promote infrastructure sharing, and make spectrum management more transparent—which would likely lower the cost of access for users.21 In May 2024, the act was refiled in the Senate as the Konektadong Pinoy Act, and is currently awaiting presidential approval.22

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 2.002 4.004

While national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology generally operate independently, all heads of government agencies are appointed by the president. 1 Under the previous Duterte administration, the political ties of previous DICT secretaries and the way that the DICT allocated its funds raised concerns.2

The DICT is responsible for planning, developing, and promoting a national information and communications technology (ICT) development agenda. Attached to the DICT are three offices, one of which is the NTC, which regulates the industry with quasi-judicial powers and supervises the provision of public telecommunications services.

  • 1Executive Order No. 292, signed in July 1987, states that all Department Secretaries, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and senior level officials shall be appointed by the President, see “Executive Order No. 292 [Book IV/Chapter 10-Appointments and Qualifications],” Official Gazette of the Republic of Philippines, July 25, 1987, https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1987/07/25/executive-order-no-292-bo…; Neil Arwin Mercado, “Erwin Tulfo to serve as DSWD secretary; 4 other Marcos Cabinet members named,” INQUIRER.net, May 30, 2022, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1604321/erwin-tulfo-to-serve-as-dswd-secr….
  • 2“The Philippines,” in Shahbaz, Funk, Friedrich, Vesteinsson, Baker, Grothe, Masinsin, Vepa, Weal eds. Freedom on the Net 2022, Freedom House, 2022, freedomonthenet.org.

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 4.004 6.006

In previous years, authorities regularly blocked websites and news outlets criticizing the government, especially during tense political moments. However, in recent years, under the current Marcos administration, the government has instead pursued various other tactics to suppress critical speech, including the red-tagging of activists and journalists (see C7). Nevertheless, nearly all blocks against websites that were enacted under the Duterte administration have remained in place.

In June 2022, in the weeks before President Marcos was sworn in, Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then the national security advisor, requested that the NTC block 27 websites, alleging that they were affiliated to “Communist-Terrorist” groups and citing the Anti-Terror Act as justification for the request (see C2). The websites included Philippine news outlets Bulatlat and Pinoy Weekly, US–based publications CounterPunch and Monthly Review, and several sites affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which former president Duterte listed as a terrorist group.1 Service providers, including PLDT, complied with the NTC order.2

Toward the end of August 2022, Bulatlat became accessible again after a regional trial court cited the NTC for indirect contempt of an earlier court injunction favoring the outlet.3 Despite the decision to restore access to Bulatlat, the NTC blocking order remained in effect, and the other 26 sites remained blocked as of May 2024.4 News outlet Pinoy Weekly, one of the 27 sites blocked in June 2022, has continued to operate online from a mirror site.

Internet users freely access social networks and communication apps including YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and international blog-hosting services. In May 2024, at the end of the coverage period, the deputy majority leader of the House of Representatives, Bienvenido Abante, filed a proposed Act Regulating Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications with the House of Representatives, which would grant the president the power to ban apps controlled by foreign adverseries in the interest of national security, citing TikTok as an example.5 That same month, the government reportedly rejected the proposed legislation, and the DICT instead cited a need for regulation, arguing that “the maximum step is to ban.”6 Earlier, in September 2023, the NSC announced a new task force to research and consider a potential ban against TikTok for government security employees, citing concerns about cyberespionage.7 In November 2023, the NSC launched a threat assessment on TikTok to see if it merits a partial ban, which would only cover the state security sector.8

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 3.003 4.004

The government does not systematically order the removal of online content, although there have been some instances of information being removed in recent years.1 Government authorities also have reportedly forced people to publicly apologize for critical social media posts.2

Local activists criticized Meta’s “automated censorship” and “arbitrar[y]” enforcement of its community guidelines after posts honoring CPP founder Jose Maria Sison were taken down for violating community standards.3 In May 2023, Meta restricted the Facebook page of online alternative news outlet Bulatlat after it posted a quote by Benito Tiamzon, previous chairman of the CPP, on its page.4 That same month, Bulatlat later reported that its account had been demoted to “not recommendable,” effectively limiting the reach of its page, for violating the platform’s community standards on content relating to “organizations or individuals that proclaim a violent mission or are engaged in violence.”5

Previously, in March 2022, after the Guinness World Records website removed the entry for “the greatest robbery of a government,” which had been attributed to former dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr.,6 activists voiced concerns that the incoming presidential administration of Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who is his son, would seek to remove online content in order to paper over abuses perpetrated by the dictatorship.7

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 3.003 4.004

The NTC’s blocking of 27 websites in June 2022 received widespread criticism for lacking credible evidence, due process, and a clear legal basis (see B1).1 While then national security advisor Esperon alleged that the websites had links to “Communist-Terrorist” groups and cited the Anti-Terror Act to justify the order, most of the organizations whose websites were included on the list were civil society or media organizations, including news outlets Bulatlat and Pinoy Weekly.

Content blocking is allowed under a law that requires internet service providers (ISPs) to prevent access to child sexual abuse imagery.2 The police may request that ISPs block sites hosting such images, and ISPs typically comply with such orders.3

In May 2024, the Senate approved the Digital Economy Taxation bill, which would allow the government to block online or digital platforms that do not comply with tax laws or pay the appropriate taxes. The bill remained awaiting presidential approval at the end of the coverage period.4

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 2.002 4.004

Self-censorship remains a problem for those communicating online.

Many journalists practice self-censorship due to the persistent pressures and threats they face, including high levels of violence and civil and criminal cases related to their online activity.1 Additionally, the trolling and red-tagging2 of journalists, as well as threats, arrests, and other forms of harassment and attacks (see C3 and C7),3 have deterred people from freely expressing themselves online.4 Journalists have reported double- and triple-checking their stories before publishing to prevent negative consequences or to avoid offending the wrong person, especially when reporting on issues related to corruption or illegal drugs.5

In August 2023, the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI) took down an article it had published online two days earlier about a donation the current speaker of the house, who is also President Marcos’ cousin, made to Harvard University. The article was originally published by US–based magazine FilAm, with which PDI has a content partnership. FilAm has since alleged that the article “was deactivated by order of the owners [of PDI], who are related to House Speaker Martin Romualdez.”6 Soon after, Rene Ciria-Cruz, the PDI’s US bureau chief resigned, explaining in an interview with online news outlet Rappler that he “tendered [his] resignation on September 1 because no public officials should be shielded from scrutiny by the free press.”7

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 1.001 4.004

Online sources of information have been increasingly manipulated by the government and other actors, with commenters and trolls on social media distorting the information landscape online in an attempt to shape political outcomes. Public relations firms offer services to circulate false or misleading information online to boost partisan narratives.1

Ahead of the May 2022 elections, politicians and political parties enlisted disinformation-for-hire firms, mobilized support from microinfluencers and hyperpartisan outlets, and coordinated harassment campaigns to delegitimize critics and the media (see C7), reportedly spending billions of pesos.2 For instance, pro-Marcos disinformation networks sought to rebrand the Marcos family, including by minimizing the atrocities perpetrated by now president Marcos’s father and branding the Marcoses as glamorous and familial.

Hyperpartisan news outlets, including those on YouTube, have contributed to the growing amount of misleading and fraudulent content online.3 Philippine celebrities are also paid to share content that contains partisan false information.4

In April 2024, the government announced that it was investigating a deepfake audio that had circulated online and falsely portrayed President Marcos as advocating for military retaliation against China amid tensions between the two governments over the South China Sea. Presidential Communications Office assistant secretary Patricia Kayle shared that the office suspected that a foreign actor was behind the manipulated audio.5

To combat the impact of disinformation, a number of fact-checking initiatives have emerged in recent years. Social media platforms have also attempted to respond to the increasing levels of online disinformation in the country (see B7).

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 1.001 3.003

Some economic and regulatory constraints have impacted individuals’ ability to publish content online, including instances in which the licenses of media outlets critical of the government have been revoked.

In April 2023, the Kalinga Provincial Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict issued Resolution No. 2023-04, which requires nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Kalinga to be approved by the local government before conducting any activities.1 Along with the resolution, the task force also issued a list of organizations believed to be “front organizations” of the CPP, effectively red-tagging the groups and limiting their ability to operate. Included on the list were media organizations and journalist coalitions like Northern Dispatch (NorDis), the College Editors Guild of the Philippines (CEGP), and the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP).2

Two days before the end of then president Duterte’s term in June 2022, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) upheld its 2018 decision to revoke news website Rappler’s operating license for allegedly violating a legal provision mandating full Philippine ownership and control of mass media (see C3). The SEC based its ruling on depository receipts issued by Rappler Holdings to the Omidyar Network Fund LLC, a fund created by eBay founder and US citizen Pierre Omidyar.3 The outlet—which had been critical of Duterte and his violent war on drugs and had suggested that he had “weaponized” social media to discredit his political opponents—once again indicated its intent to appeal, and remained in operation.4 As of September 2023, the appeal for the SEC decision remained pending with the Court of Appeals.5

In 2019, the SEC released a circular to registered nonprofit organizations, including those in media and civil society, to disclose activities and funding received from foreign donors under the guise of protecting against money laundering and terrorist financing.6

In 2020, news network ABS–CBN was forced to shut down its broadcasting services after Congress failed to renew its franchise. Critics assailed ABS–CBN’s closure as politically motivated and called it an attack on press freedom and democracy.7 ABS–CBN frequencies were subsequently awarded to allies of then president Duterte.8 In May 2023, Prime Media Holdings Incorporated, founded by House Speaker Martin Romualdez, a cousin of President Marcos, formed a joint venture company with ABS–CBN due to the broadcaster’s financial struggles since shutting its broadcast operations.9

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 3.003 4.004

Online platforms are regularly used to discuss politics, especially around elections. Generally, the Philippine blogosphere is rich and thriving. In January 2021, media researchers found that Filipinos were shifting away from news organizations as sources of information and increasingly relying on digital platforms.1

The diversity of the online information landscape has been undermined by the normalization of disinformation, the shift toward a hyperpartisan information ecosystem, continued harassment against independent outlets and journalists, online self-censorship, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against alternative media outlets (see B4, B5, C7, and C8).

Additionally, in recent years, it has become increasingly difficult for media outlets to sustain themselves financially.2 In January 2024, CNN Philippines shut down its operations after years of financial struggles, further limiting reliable sources of news and information in the country.3 ABS-CBN has reportedly struggling financially since it was forced to shut down its broadcasting services in the Philippines in 2020, further limiting the availability of independent news in the country (see B6).4

Despite challenges in combating the impact of disinformation, fact-checking initiatives continue. In January 2022, more than 100 media, academic, civil society, legal, and church groups launched fact checking initiative #FactsFirstPh.5 As of the end of the coverage period, the site has published over 1,500 fact checks since its launch. The collaborative fact-checking project Tsek.ph relaunched for the 2022 elections, bringing together 34 partners across the media, academia, and civil society.6

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 6.006 6.006

Digital activism in the Philippines has had a significant impact in the past, making national and international headlines and at times prompting positive action from the government. Mobilization tools and websites are freely available for users, though harassment against government critics and political opposition have reportedly dissuaded smaller, localized efforts in mobilizing, campaigning online.

The use of hashtags on social media is popular, both as a tool to draw attention to individual events and as a means of participating in broader social movements. During the 2022 elections, opposing camps engaged in so-called hashtag wars in an attempt to consolidate online support.1

In 2021, the online Tumindig (Arise) movement used social media to show Filipinos’ resistance against the atrocities committed during the Duterte administration and to signal their desire for political reform in the run-up to the 2022 national elections.2

Citizens also frequently employ online petitions to call for action on matters relevant to the public. In February 2022, the Computer Professionals’ Union started an online petition calling on then president Duterte to veto the proposed SIM Card Registration Act (see C4).3

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 3.003 6.006

The Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution protects freedom of speech and expression as well as press freedom, although these rights are not always upheld in practice.

Judicial independence deteriorated during the previous Duterte administration. Some courts displayed increased independence from the government in the latter part of 2022, after Duterte left office.1 The constitution allows the president to fill vacancies in the Supreme Court and lower courts—without a confirmation process (Art. VIII, Sec. 9)—from a list provided by the Judicial and Bar Council.2

Comprehensive legislation on freedom of information was still pending during the coverage period.3 In 2016, then president Duterte signed an executive order on freedom of information, giving the public the right to request information from select government agencies.4

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

Some laws undermine free expression protections granted by the constitution. Users have faced criminal charges for online activity under the libel law, which the Supreme Court upheld in 2014. Section 4c (4) of the 2012 Cybercrime Prevention Act classifies libel as a cybercrime. Section 6 prescribes prison terms of up to eight years for online libel,1 which is almost double the maximum penalty for the offense when it is perpetrated offline.2 Several bills have sought to repeal the provision on cyberlibel, including a bill to decriminalize libel filed by an opposition senator in December 2022.3

The penal code also criminalizes certain categories of online speech and activities. Inciting sedition by means of “speeches, proclamations, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations” is a crime under Article 142.4 Article 154 penalizes a range of online speech categories, notably “printing, lithography, or any other means of publication” that result in the spread of allegedly false news that “may endanger the public order, or cause damage to the interest or credit of the state.”5 Individuals prosecuted under these provisions face prison terms varying from one month and one day to six months, fines ranging from 200 pesos (approximately $4.00) to 1,000 pesos (approximately $20.76), or both.6

The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 was signed into law in July 2020 (see C5). Section 9 of the law criminalizes incitement to terrorism, which is broadly defined as when “any person who, without taking any direct part in the commission of terrorism,” incites others to commit terrorist acts “by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners, and other representations.” Those who are convicted could face 12-year prison terms.7 Those suspected of terrorism can be detained for up to 14 days without warrant or charge; their detention can also be extended by another 10 days. In December 2021, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law, only striking down a provision that defined terrorism so broadly as to include protest and dissent and a section on designating terrorists at the request of other governments or international bodies.8

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 3.003 6.006

Journalists and ordinary social media users face criminal and civil penalties for their online activities, most often under libel laws.

In January 2024, the Anti-Cybercrime Group (ACG) shared that it had served 134 arrest warrants for cyberlibel in 2023.1 In May 2024, several media freedom organizations, including the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR) and the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), published a joint report that found that under President Marcos, between July 2022 and April 2024, eight journalists had been charged with libel and cyberlibel.2

In October 2023, drag performer Pura Luka Vega was arrested under Article 201 of the Penal Code for allegedly offending religious sentiment after a video of Vega dressed as Jesus Christ and performing Ama Namin, a Christian prayer, went viral. Vega was released on bail three days later.3 In February 2024, Vega was again arrested on three counts of violating Article 201 over the same video and posted bail the next day.4

In April 2024, a 22-year-old who uses the pseudonym Robert was arrested for cyberlibel after he posted screenshots of conversations between a high school teacher and student to Facebook in August 2022. The screenshots purportedly depicted the teacher’s alleged harassment of the student.5

Frenchie Mae Cumpio, the executive director of news website Eastern Vista, remained in detention during the coverage period after being arrested in February 2020 alongside four human rights defenders. They were detained on charges of possessing illegal firearms and financing terrorism; however, human rights groups have since voiced concerns about the government’s pattern of weaponizing such laws against government critics and have called for an impartial review of the case.6 In June 2023, Cumpio was informed that murder and attempted murder charges had also been filed against her and her fellow detainees in 2021.7

There have been some positive developments in cases regarding online speech in recent years. While the news site Rappler and its staff members have faced a series of legal challenges in relation to their online reporting over the past decade,8 in September 2023, both Rappler and its founder, Maria Ressa, were acquitted of tax evasion charges filed by the Duterte government in 2018. During the previous coverage period, in January 2023, the Court of Tax Appeals acquitted Rappler and Ressa of four similar charges of tax evasion, also filed in 2018.9 In December 2023, the Justice Department dismissed charges of alleged foreign ownership against Maria Ressa, relating to money Rappler had received in 2015 from an American philanthropic investment fund.

Still, during the coverage period, Rappler continued to face a cyberlibel case involving a 2012 article it had published linking a businessman to illegal activities.10 Additionally, in July 2022, as part of an ongoing cyberlibel case, the Court of Appeals upheld a 2020 criminal conviction of both Ressa and former researcher Reynaldo Santos Jr.,11 and added eight months to the maximum sentence of six years’ imprisonment that had been imposed on the pair. An appellate court upheld the July ruling in October 2022.12 Rappler has indicated that it plans to appeal to the Supreme Court.13

Indigenous rights activists have also faced legal action. During the previous coverage period, in December 2022, Sarah Dekdeken, secretary general of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance, was convicted of cyberlibel. Dekdeken was ordered to pay a fine and damages after she was sued by a regional police director over a social media post in which she accused him of ordering the dismantling of monuments honoring tribal leaders.14 That same month, Frank Cimatu, a contributer at Rappler, was convicted of cyberlibel for his 2017 Facebook post in which he wrote about alleged corrupt practices by then-Agriculture Secretary Manny Piñol.15

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 3.003 4.004

The SIM Card Registration Act was enacted on October 10, 2022 and took effect by the end of that year.1 Under the act, SIM card owners are required to register with their service providers within six months to avoid deactivation, and users who purchase new cards will need to provide their personal information and a valid photo identification document at the point of sale.2 The law includes fines for failing to register SIM cards, as well as criminal penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment for providing false information or fraudulent identification documents in order to register and up to six years’ imprisonment for SIM card spoofing with the intent to cause harm.3 Critics in both civil society and the private sector have raised concerns that the law could facilitate privacy abuses and fail to limit spam and fraud.4

In July 2023, the NTC shared that more than 113 million SIM cards had been registered.5

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

Despite constitutional protections to ensure the privacy of communications, surveillance is a growing concern in the Philippines. Budget allocations for intelligence funds and funds for surveillance activities in civilian government agencies have increased under the Marcos administration.1 In 2023, while crafting the 2024 national budget, the Marcos administration proposed allocating 10.1 billion pesos ($175.03 million) to intelligence and confidential funds.2

Several reports in recent years have indicated that the government has acquired various surveillance technologies. In January 2021, Bloomberg News reported that the Philippines had purchased surveillance technology from Sandvine, a technology company based in Canada.3 In February 2018, reports revealed that the British government sold high-tech spying equipment worth £150,000 ($200,000) to the Philippines, including tools to listen in on telephone conversations, like international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI)–catchers—also known by the product name Stingrays—and surveillance tools to monitor internet activity.4

Concerns about surveillance grew when, during a visit to Marawi in 2017, former president Duterte admitted to wiretapping politicians allegedly involved in the drug trade.5 He implied that the government possessed wiretapping or interception capabilities again in February 2018, when he said he knew in advance that the International Criminal Court (ICC) would undertake an initial review of allegations that he had committed crimes against humanity while conducting the brutal war on drugs.6 Human rights groups and those opposed to the war on drugs, such as Catholic priests, have suspected that their communications are vulnerable to government surveillance.7

The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020,8 which effectively replaced the Human Security Act of 2007, was signed by the president and entered into force in July 2020 (see C2).9 The law expands the definition of terrorism and allows law enforcement and the military to conduct surveillance of any form on an individual suspected of a terrorist act for 60 days, with a potential extension of 30 days.10 Those suspected of supporting a terrorist organization can also be subjected to surveillance. Civil society groups and critics fear that the law could be used to surveil government critics, including left-wing groups that are often tagged as terrorists (see C7).11

Authorities have increased their capacity to monitor social media platforms. In January 2019, the DICT contracted local company Integrated Computer Systems, Inc., and Israeli-American company Verint Systems, Ltd., for the department’s Cybersecurity Management System (CMS), which includes a social media monitoring component. Monitoring is conducted in “near real time,” including during election periods, to identify misinformation and other threats.12 Similarly, the AFP created a social media monitoring cell in October 2018, receiving training from the US military on how to monitor platforms to “counter misinformation by violent extremism organizations.”13

In February 2020, the deputy chief for operations of the Philippine National Police (PNP) encouraged police officers to be more active on social media to aid in crime prevention efforts. The statement followed an earlier order by the PNP’s chief to monitor crimes and abuses on social media.14

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 4.004 6.006

Telecommunications providers are required to collect personal data and provide it to law enforcement under certain circumstances. The SIM Card Registration Act mandates that service providers collect personal data, including copies of a valid photo identification document (see C4). After launching in December 2022, the registration process raised further privacy concerns over the companies’ handling of this data, with reports that companies were also asking users to consent to using their data for promotional and other purposes.1

In 2015, the government issued rules under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, clarifying some sections of the law that pertain to surveillance. Under its provisions, ISPs must collect and preserve data for up to six months on request. Law enforcement authorities tasked with investigating cybercrime—the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the PNP’s cybercrime unit—require a court order to access computer data.2

The Data Privacy Act of 2012 established parameters for the collection of personal financial information as well as an independent privacy regulator.3 In practice, however, the privacy law is being applied disproportionately, penalizing journalists and individuals while lacking appropriate and proportionate action on offenses made by government agencies and corporations.4 Other laws with implications for user privacy include the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, which explicitly states that while it does not “require an ISP to engage in the monitoring of any user,”5 it does require them to “obtain” and “preserve” evidence of violations or risk their licenses being revoked. The law also authorizes local government units to oversee and regulate commercial establishments that provide internet services.

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 2.002 5.005

Journalists and rights activists, especially women, have been increasingly targeted with online intimidation and harassment in recent years.1 The authorities’ use of red-tagging, a form of harassment whereby targets are accused of having links with local communist groups, continued during the coverage period.2

Violence against journalists and activists is a significant problem in the Philippines, although it is not always directly related to their online activity. A joint report from CMFR and PCIJ found that between July 2022 and April 2024, there had been at least 135 instances of violence and threats against journalists, including the killing of 3 and assault and harassment of 14.3 According to a July 2023 report by the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), at least 198 journalists have been killed since 1986.4

In July 2023, Joshua Abiad, a photojournalist for online outlet Remate Online, was shot and injured, alongside three of his family members.5

In June 2023, the official account of online media outlet VERA Files received a series of online threats through Facebook messenger, one of which included a photo of two men holding firearms.6 According to VERA Files president Ellen Tordesillas, the threats followed a fact check the outlet had posted which corrected a statement from Senator Ronald Dela Rosa about comments made by former president Rodrigo Duterte about police officers involved in the drug trade.

In October 2023, two Cagayan de Oro–based journalists were doxed using their personal information from the City Housing and Urban Development Department by a user who claimed that the journalists’ use of government funds to live in social housing, or government-subsidized housing, while criticizing the government was hypocritical.7 In September 2023, prominent Filipino broadcaster Atom Araullo filed a civil defamation lawsuit, seeking 2 million PHP ($36,021.40) in damages, against the two hosts of the Sonshine Media Network International (SMNI) show “Laban Kasama ang Bayan” for allegedly carrying out a continuous red-tagging campaign against Araullo and his family since 2022.8

During the previous coverage period, in October 2022, online political commentator Percival Mabasa (also known as Percy Lapid), was killed. His murder was seen as possibly motivated by his critiques of leading government figures on his online video channel, which had amassed more than 200,000 subscribers at the time of his death.9

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 1.001 3.003

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to increased cyberattacks directed at online news outlets during the coverage period.

Technical attacks against media outlets persisted during the coverage period.

In November 2023, a two-day long cyberattack against the nonprofit Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) prompted the independent media agency to temporarily take down its site to prevent further attacks and damage.1

In May 2024, media company ABS–CBN was subject to a ransomware attack, affecting around 500 gigabytes’ (GB) worth of data.2 In June 2023, alternative media outfit Dampig Katarungan reported that their Facebook page had been subject to an attack that removed its staff’s administrator access to the account.3

Government and official state accounts and websites also continued to experience cyberattacks during the coverage period. In September 2023, the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, a government-owned corporation, was the victim of a Medusa ransomware attack, compromising the data of over 13 million members of the insurance group.4

Previously, DDoS attacks against media outlets covering the election campaign intensified in late 2021 and early 2022, which included news outfits like ABS–CBN News, Rappler, Philstar, and VERA Files.5 In February 2022, CNN Philippines experienced a DDoS attack as it hosted a presidential debate.6

On Philippines

See all data, scores & information on this country or territory.

See More

Country Facts

  • Population

    115,600,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    58 100 partly free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    61 100 partly free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Partly Free

  • Networks Restricted

    Yes

  • Websites Blocked

    Yes

  • Pro-government Commentators

    Yes

  • Users Arrested

    Yes