Russia

Not Free
17
100
A Obstacles to Access 10 25
B Limits on Content 4 35
C Violations of User Rights 3 40
Last Year's Score & Status
20 100 Not Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
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header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2024 – May 31, 2025

Internet freedom in Russia hit a new low as authorities ramped up efforts to isolate the population from the global internet. Throughout the coverage period, efforts to test the sovereign internet led to internet outages; authorities also began throttling the internet in May 2025, with some officials saying the restrictions were necessary amid the threat of drone strikes from Ukraine. (The Russian military had launched an illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.) Roskomnadzor, the state communications regulator, continued to block critical news websites and targeted end-to-end encrypted messaging applications and some of the remaining foreign platforms that hosted user-generated content. Government agencies went to extensive lengths to surveil those who criticized the government online. Courts have also ordered the imprisonment of users who criticized the Ukraine invasion, and the government more broadly.

  • Intermittently in January and March 2025, people in Russia faced issues accessing the internet, which Roskomnadzor blamed on the “use of foreign server infrastructure.”1 Previously, in December 2024, people in Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia faced internet outages as Roskomnadzor tested the sovereign internet, which has previously led to internet outages. Some analysts suggested that authorities were testing the sovereign internet in the three regions as part of preparations to disconnect them from services like Telegram in the case of future unrest (A1 and A3).2
  • Beginning ahead of Victory Day, the May 9 holiday that marks the Soviet Union’s defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II, Roskomnadzor began shutting down mobile internet in regions across Russia, reportedly due to concerns about Ukrainian drone strikes. It also shut down fixed-line broadband at a more limited scale, and for shorter periods. The number of mobile and fixed-line broadband shutdowns increased throughout the summer, after the coverage period, with the longest shutdowns occurring on weekends.3 Since September 2025, after the coverage period, a select number of websites, including state websites, Russian social media networks and messaging applications, and the sites of Russian banks, have remained online during these shutdowns (A3).4
  • In July 2024, Roskomnadzor began throttling YouTube, one of the few major foreign platforms that had been left unblocked by the government since 2022, because of the platform’s alleged “anti-Russian policy.” The practice ramped up in August 2024 and again in December (A3 and B1).5
  • In October 2024, Roskomnadzor blocked thousands of websites that used Cloudflare’s Encrypted Client Hello (ECH), a protocol extension that makes it more difficult for third parties to determine the website a user is visiting.6 In June 2025, after the coverage period, Russian internet service providers began throttling websites that used Cloudflare services generally (A3, B1, and C4).7
  • Roskomnadzor ordered the blocking of end-to-end encrypted messaging applications Signal in August 2024 and Viber in December 2024 for violating the country’s antiterrorism, extremism, and drug-trafficking laws, among others.8 Then, in October 2024, Russia blocked the messaging platform Discord, with the Russian news agency TASS reporting that it had violated national law.9 In August 2025, after the coverage period, Roskomnadzor said it had begun nationwide throttling of Telegram, which had been blocked in Dagestan, Chechnya, Stavropol, and Ingushetia between October 2024 and May 2025,10 and the end-to-end encrypted messaging application WhatsApp, over fraud and terrorism concerns; WhatsApp had not been blocked alongside Facebook and Instragram when the Russian government declared parent company Meta an extremist organization in March 2022. In October 2025, Roskomnadzor began fully blocking WhatsApp (A3, B1, and C4).11
  • In June 2024, the Kremlin announced that it would block access to 81 media outlets operating in Europe, including Agence France-Press, Politico, Der Spiegel, La Repubblica, and Le Monde, and banned their outlets in Russia in retaliation for European sanctions against Russian outlets, including RIA Novosti, Izvestia, and Rossiyskaya Gazeta (B1 and B6).12
  • In August 2024, President Putin signed a law requiring Roskomnadzor to create a list of all bloggers and influencers with more than 10,000 followers. Under the law, bloggers and influencers who failed to provide the regulator with required information will be banned from advertising and monetizing their content, and may be blocked. Those that do comply will be subject to penalties for republishing information from bloggers not on the register. The law also requires social networks, communications platforms, and messaging applications to provide information on users to Roskomnadzor or the Federal Security Service of Russia (FSB) at their request, label users who are included on the register, and block users who fail to register as required by Roskomnadzor (B6 and C6).13
  • In April 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law increasing the penalties for people who “discredit the armed forces” from a maximum of 5 years to 7 years, and introducing maximum prison sentences of 7 years for people who assist international organizations that Russia does not participate in or assist in the prosecution of government and military officials. It additionally stipulated maximum prison sentences of 5 years for people who call for Russia to face sanctions. The law came into effect in September 2025, after the coverage period (C2).14
  • In March 2025, 67-year-old activist Alexander Skobov, a well-known dissident who had routinely criticized regional military operations since the time of the Soviet Union, was sentenced to 16 years in prison on terrorism charges over Telegram posts he made in 2023 concerning the Crimean bridge explosion (C3).15
  • In April 2025, a Moscow court sentenced Antonina Favorskaya and Artyom Kriger, two journalists who worked for online news outlet Sota.vision; Konstantin Gabov, a freelance producer who had worked with an array of international media organizations; and Sergey Karelin, a video producer who had worked with the Associated Press, to five-and-a-half years in prison on charges of aiding Aleksey Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (C3).16

header2 Political Overview

Power in Russia’s authoritarian political system is concentrated in the hands of President Vladimir Putin. With subservient courts and security forces, a controlled media environment, and a legislature consisting of a ruling party and pliable opposition factions, the Kremlin manipulates elections and suppresses genuine opposition. Rampant corruption facilitates shifting links among state officials and organized crime groups. Since the regime launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, authorities have intensified restrictions on individual rights and liberties in order to stifle domestic dissent.

This report has been abridged for Freedom on the Net 2025 due to ongoing budget constraints. Please consider making a donation to support future editions of this vital resource.

For additional background information, see last year’s full report. 

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 5.005 6.006
A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 2.002 3.003
A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 2.002 6.006
A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 1.001 6.006
A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 0.000 4.004

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 0.000 6.006

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because Roskomnadzor expanded the blocking and throttling of platforms containing user-generated content,1 news websites,2 and other online resources.

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 0.000 4.004
B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 0.000 4.004
B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 1.001 4.004
B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 0.000 4.004
B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 0.000 3.003
B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 1.001 4.004
B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 2.002 6.006

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 0.000 6.006

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because of the further degradation of due process in Russia,1 including efforts to obstruct lawyers.

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 0.000 4.004
C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 1.001 6.006
C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 0.000 4.004

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because of the blocking of end-to-end encrypted messaging platforms, the expanded blocking of virtual private networks (VPNs), and Roskomnadzor’s orders to remove VPNs from digital marketplaces.1

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 1.001 6.006
C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 0.000 6.006
C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 1.001 5.005
C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 0.000 3.003

On Russia

See all data, scores & information on this country or territory.

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  • Population

    144,200,000
  • Global Freedom Score

    12 100 not free
  • Internet Freedom Score

    17 100 not free
  • Freedom in the World Status

    Not Free
  • Networks Restricted

    Yes
  • Websites Blocked

    Yes
  • Pro-government Commentators

    Yes
  • Users Arrested

    Yes