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Freedom on the Net 2024

South Africa

Free
74
100
A Obstacles to Access 19 25
B Limits on Content 29 35
C Violations of User Rights 26 40
Last Year's Score & Status
73 100 Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
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header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2023 - May 31, 2024

Internet freedom slightly improved in South Africa, though false and misleading information spiked around the country’s 2024 elections. The government has been working to alleviate the electricity constraints that have posed challenges to internet access in recent years. The country remains vulnerable to cyberattacks, and government surveillance of online activity remains a concern.

  • Decreased load shedding—planned blackouts—alleviated the burden of frequent power outages on mobile network operators (see A1).
  • The Film and Publications Board (FPB) published a notice in terms of the Film and Publications Act prohibiting the spread of false and misleading election information, which was later withdrawn after a legal challenge from civil society groups who argued that its broad definitions threatened free expression (see B3 and C2).
  • Disinformation and online harassment surged around the May 2024 elections, and networks of Russian accounts frequently amplified false and misleading content on social media, sowing doubt about the integrity of the vote. Prominent members of the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK Party) also harassed an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) commissioner, Janet Love, and called for her arrest on social media over baseless claims of vote-rigging (see B5 and C7).
  • In November 2023, Parliament passed a bill to amend the 2002 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act (RICA) following a ruling from the Constitutional Court. If signed, the bill would improve judicial oversight of communications surveillance and provide new safeguards against the surveillance of journalists and lawyers to protect anonymous sources and client confidentiality (see C5).
  • The website of the Daily Maverick was targeted with a massive distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack after publishing an article about Indian prime minister Narendra Modi during the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit in August 2023 (see C8).

header2 Political Overview

South Africa is a constitutional democracy. Since the end of apartheid in 1994, it has been regarded globally as a proponent of human rights and a leader on the African continent. However, reports of corruption among government officials often emerge, and in recent years, the prominent African National Congress (ANC) has been accused of undermining state institutions to protect corrupt officials and preserve its power as its support base has begun to wane. Gender-based violence is a severe challenge. South Africa held hotly contested national elections in May 2024, which saw the ANC lose the majority it had held since the country’s first democratic elections in 1994.

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 5.005 6.006

Score Change: The score increased from 4 to 5 due to a decrease in the frequency of load shedding that disrupted internet connectivity compared to the previous coverage period.

Internet penetration has expanded rapidly in South Africa. DataReportal’s Digital 2024 report found that the internet penetration rate was 74.7 percent as of January 2024.1 According to the 2022 General Household Survey conducted by Statistics South Africa, the national statistics agency, 75.3 percent of South African households have at least one member who can access the internet at home, work, school, public hotspots, or internet cafés.2

The majority of users (69.6 percent) access the internet through their mobile devices; only 13 percent of households had access to fixed-line internet at home as of 2022.3 According to Ookla, in April 2024, the median mobile download speed in South Africa was 50.7 megabits per second (Mbps), while the median mobile upload speed was 8.3 Mbps. The median download speed for a fixed-line connection the same month was 47.3 Mbps, while the median fixed-line upload speed was 39.12 Mbps.4

The fiber-optic network in South Africa has grown at an exponential rate. Most suburban areas of the major urban centers are already covered with fiber-optic cables, and new “last mile” providers of fiber-optic cables have begun to wire homes by connecting to competitive internet backbones run by larger operators. At least 36 companies provide fiber-optic network infrastructure as of 2023.5 Vumatel and Telkom subsidiary Openserve provided the largest shares of fiber-to-the-home services as of 2023; other companies provide fiber-optic connections to a considerably smaller share of buildings.6

The government has prioritized universal internet access since the adoption of its broadband policy, the SA Connect program, in 2013.7 Phase one of the project involved rolling out broadband to schools, clinics, police stations, and other government facilities in underserved communities.8 In the 2023–24 budget, the second phase of the SA Connect program was allocated 3 billion rand ($162.2 million) for capital equipment and new fiber infrastructure, or to lease existing fiber in order to expand information communications networks to underserviced areas.9 In 2023, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA)—the country’s communications and broadcasting regulator—announced that companies obtaining spectrum licenses would be required to contribute to the SA Connect program by connecting public schools, hospitals, clinics, and tribal authorities, and by providing zero-rated access to government websites.10

In February 2023, the former minister of communications and digital technologies announced that the department plans to roll out 14,024 community Wi-Fi hotspots across 16 districts in the 2023–24 financial year.11 Several other initiatives have enjoyed modest success in rolling out public Wi-Fi in metropolitan areas, including Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Tshwane,12 and the Ekurhuleni municipality.13 Similar projects have been rolled out in other provinces and towns across the country.14 As of January 2024, 231 community Wi-Fi hotspots had been connected across five of South Africa’s nine provinces.15

The availability of the internet has been significantly limited by power cuts introduced by the national power company, Eskom, to stave off years of mismanagement.16 Since 2019, Eskom has conducted load shedding—planned blackouts—on a regular basis due to reduced power-generating capacity caused by a lack of maintenance at power stations, as well as operational, structural, and financial problems.17 Mobile operators struggled with the adverse effects of the power outages, which severely affect network quality.18 Operators have had to implement tighter security and surveillance measures to protect cell phone towers during power outages due to a wave of thefts and vandalism of tower batteries and generators.19

From February through April 2023, President Cyril Ramaphosa declared a national state of disaster due to the electricity crisis.20, 21 Following the termination of the state of disaster, ICASA established a council committee to mitigate the effects of load shedding on the information and communications technology (ICT) sector.22 The Department of Communications and Digital Technologies (DCDT) also published policy directions to request that ICASA identify critical electronic communications and broadcasting infrastructure in order for the DCDT minister to grant exemptions from future load shedding.23

Load shedding decreased in frequency during the coverage period, with outages of shorter duration than in previous years, and with few disruptions to electricity from March 2024 onwards.24 Occasional “load reductions” in areas of high electricity use were still carried out to avoid overloading infrastructure, which predominantly impacted those living in informal settlements.25

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 2.002 3.003

Score Change: The score improved from 1 to 2 to reflect the closing of South Africa’s gender digital divide and the narrowing of the urban-rural divide in internet access.

Although South Africa has made progress to reduce digital inequality, high costs remain a primary obstacle to internet access.1

In 2023, the average cost of 1 gigabyte (GB) of mobile data was 34.69 rand ($1.81) according to Cable.2 Though mobile service providers are gradually providing more low-cost data packages to lower-income customers,3 those without internet access have pinpointed the high costs as the main reason for their lack of connectivity; in 2022, 59 percent of individuals earning less than 2,500 rand ($150) per month reported the costs of data as their main limitation to accessing the internet.4

ICASA has taken steps to address the high cost of data. The introduction of the End-User and Subscriber Service Charter (EUSSC) Regulation Amendment of 2018, which came into force in April 2019, requires service providers to give users the option to roll over their data bundles from month to month for a maximum period of three years; to transfer their data to another user within the same network; and to provide opt-in and opt-out choices for out-of-bundle data charges, which are considerably more expensive, upon exhaustion of their data.5 In March 2024, ICASA published draft amendments to the 2016 EUSSC regulations, which seek to further strengthen consumer protections, for public comment.6

In 2022, ICASA reported that all leading mobile network operators had lowered their prices for prepaid 1 GB bundles.7

An investigation launched in 2017 by the Competition Commission of South Africa found that the average price of data had not declined as significantly over time as the prices in other countries.8 Vodacom and MTN, which together control 80 percent of the market, reached agreements with the Competition Commission that include several concessions aimed at making internet access more affordable. The concessions, effective as of April 2020, included reducing prices for data bundles, expanding the range of zero-rated websites (websites individuals can access at no cost), and providing a daily amount of free data.9

Zero-rated services are often used by South Africans who are already connected to reduce their costs of access, and not necessarily as their exclusive means of accessing the internet.10 Currently, zero-rated offerings by mobile operators essentially offer free internet access to a few over-the-top (OTT) media services such as free basics on Facebook, X, and educational services, including D6 Communicator for schools and Vodacom e-school learning apps.11 Some other services are partially zero-rated in that users receive them as part of a paid package. Network operators in South Africa also offer zero-rated services for various government, education, health, and public organizations’ websites.12 As part of its Open Time Initiative, MTN zero-rates over 350 education, health, and employment websites.13 Vodacom zero-rates a number of government websites, schools, and universities through its ConnectU Platform.14 Furthermore, ICASA announced that as part of the social obligations imposed by the regulator on the licensees that obtained spectrum during a 2022 auction, those licensees will be required to provide zero-rated access to a range of public benefit websites, including government websites.15

Though the country has achieved nearly 100 percent third-generation (3G) network coverage, disparities in internet access remain between urban and rural dwellers, in part due to cost.16 According to the 2022 General Household Survey, only 1.6 percent of people in rural areas had access to the internet at home, compared to 10.7 percent of those in urban areas and 21.4 percent of those in metropolitan areas.17 Similarly, mobile internet access in rural areas lags behind access in urban and metropolitan areas: only 61.1 percent of rural dwellers had access to the internet on mobile devices, compared to 71.2 percent of urban dwellers and 74.1 percent of people in metropolitan areas.18 However, between 2018 and 2022, Research ICT Africa observed a decline in the gap in internet use between urban and rural areas from 45 to 20 percent.19

The digital divide between men and women in South Africa decreased from 16 percent to a negligible difference by the end of 2022, with the shares of men and women who use the internet both standing at 76 percent.20 However, a February 2022 report from the Alliance for Affordable Internet found that as of February 2022, 16.4 percent of men and 12.1 percent of women had “meaningful internet connectivity,” which they define as fourth-generation (4G) network speeds, smartphone ownership, daily use, and unlimited access at a location relevant to them.21, 22 Access to the internet among youth is relatively high, at 92 percent, compared to 76 percent of the general population.23

Importantly, proof of residence requirements for SIM card registration (see C4) present an obstacle to mobile phone usage for many South Africans who live in informal settlements.

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 6.006 6.006

There is no evidence that the government exercises control over internet infrastructure to censor content or to restrict connectivity.

The government does not have direct control over the country’s internet backbone or its connection to the international internet, and there have been no intentional disruptions to connectivity. International internet connectivity is facilitated via ten undersea cables—SAT–3, WACS, the South Africa Far East (SAFE) cable, EASSy, 2Africa, ACE, Equiano, METISS, SEACOM, and T3.1 Each cable is owned and operated by a consortium of private companies, with the exception of Equiano, which is fully owned by Google,2 and the T3 cable, which belongs to Mauritius Telecom, which is majority-owned by the government of Mauritius.3 Several operators oversee South Africa’s national fiber-optic cable networks, including Telkom and the privately owned MTN, Vodacom, Cell C, Neotel-Liquid, and Broadband Infraco. Internet traffic between different networks is exchanged at internet exchange points (IXPs) located in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban, which are operated by South Africa’s nonprofit Internet Service Providers’ Association (ISPA) and NapAfrica.4 The three IXPs are hosted in vendor-neutral data centers owned by the South African firm Teraco.5

A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 4.004 6.006

South Africa has a competitive internet service provider (ISP) market. The ISPA currently has over 220 members in South Africa, which are mostly private enterprises.1 However, the fixed-line connectivity market is dominated by Telkom, of which the government has a 40 percent share.2

There are four major mobile carriers in South Africa’s fixed and mobile telecommunications market—Vodacom, MTN, Cell C, and Telkom Mobile—the first three of which are privately owned. Vodacom dominates the South African mobile telecom market with a 43 percent share of revenue, followed by MTN with 26 percent, Telkom with 23 percent, and Cell C with 8 percent.3 In addition to the major players, there is also a data-only mobile network operator, Rain, which is a relatively new entrant to the market.

In 2021, ICASA released the findings of a 2018 inquiry on competition in the mobile broadband services market,4 which claimed that Vodacom and MTN dominate the field. The regulations proposed alongside the findings, which aim to regulate the two providers more stringently, with particular focus on exclusionary pricing schemes, were published and came into force in 2022.5 In September 2022, MTN brought an application in the High Court challenging their status as a significant market power.6 In response, ICASA published draft amendments to the regulations in January 2024, stating that the issues MTN raised in its court application were regulatory oversights that could be resolved by amending the regulations rather than scrapping them entirely.7

In July 2022, MTN entered talks to acquire Telkom.8 In August, data-only mobile operator Rain announced that it planned to approach Telkom with a merger proposition.9 The press release was retracted after South Africa’s Takeover Regulation Panel (TRP) censured Rain for not seeking prior approval, but in September, Rain submitted a new proposal offering its network to Telkom for acquisition.10 Acquisition talks between Rain and Telkom failed in January 2023, months after MTN walked away from a deal with Telkom in October 2022.11 Analysts expected that the failed Rain-Telkom deal would bring MTN back to the table.12 However, in August 2023, MTN responded to rumors and confirmed that it was not back in talks to acquire Telkom.13 In June of that year, Telkom also confirmed it had received an unsolicited bid for a controlling stake in the company from a consortium.14

The licensing processes for fixed and mobile phone services, as well as internet services, are overseen by ICASA and are clear and easily accessible on ICASA’s website.15 The licensing fees imposed by ICASA are reasonable and do not impose an undue barrier to the diversity of service providers.

While no informal connection between licensees or prospective licensees and government officials is required for service providers, ICASA is seen by some as a “fractured and weak” institution, which affects its capacity to execute its mandate, which includes licensing.16

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 2.002 4.004

The autonomy of the regulator, ICASA, is protected by the constitution. A transparent and participatory appointment process involving parliamentary oversight is guaranteed by the law that established the body.1 There is, however, a perception that in practice, political interference is a problem in the agency, and that membership on the ICASA board is open only to supporters of the ruling party.2

ICASA’s independence has also been compromised by encroachments on its mandate by other government entities. In addition to ICASA, the .za Domain Name Authority (.ZADNA), the Universal Service and Access Agency of South Africa (USAASA), and the DCDT—formed in June 2019 as a result of the merger of the Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services and the Department of Communications3—have regulatory power over ICTs. The proliferation of regulatory bodies has led to redundancy and poor coordination and contributes to the perception that the country lacks a comprehensive approach to ICT regulation.

The Information Regulator is the data protection authority in South Africa. According to the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPI) Act, the Information Regulator is independent, subject only to the constitution, and accountable to the National Assembly.4 However, the Information Regulator has remained dependent on the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJ&CD) for funding. In February 2023, members of Parliament demanded action from the National Treasury to ensure the financial independence of the Information Regulator.5 Once the process is finalized, the Information Regulator will account directly to Parliament through the National Assembly.6

In July 2023, the Information Regulator issued an administrative fine of 5 million rand ($277,200) to the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development for contravening the POPI Act,7 in a move that saw the Information Regulator assert its independence from the DOJ&CD after the department failed to respond to an enforcement notice. The DOJ&CD was ordered to pay the fine or elect to be tried in court on a charge of committing an offense under the POPI Act. The DOJ&CD took the matter to court in October 2023.8

Another key actor in the regulation of ICTs is the Film and Publication Board (FPB), which traditionally regulates the distribution of films, games, and other publications. The Films and Publications Act of 1996 was amended in 2019 and enacted in March 2022 to extend the authority of the FPB to regulate such content on the internet (see B3).9, 10 In 2016, the FPB signed a memorandum of understanding with ICASA to address regulatory overlaps created by the proposed amendments, which will effectively create cojurisdiction over online content.11 These amendments further complicate the regulation of online content, and it remains unclear how the two bodies will implement the agreement.

Access providers and other internet-related groups are active in lobbying for a better legislative and policy environment for the sector. In 2009, the ISPA was recognized as a self-regulatory body by the Department of Communications, and it exercises authority over its members through transparent processes (see B3).12

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 6.006 6.006

Neither the state nor other actors block or filter internet and other ICT content, and there is no evidence of blocking or content filtering on mobile phones.

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 3.003 4.004

State and nonstate actors do not frequently force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete legitimate content. Decisions on takedowns for online content are made not by the state but by the self-regulatory body, the ISPA.1

The Electronic Communications and Transaction Act (ECTA) requires ISPs to respond to takedown notices regarding illegal content such as child sexual abuse images, defamatory material, or copyright violations. Members of the ISPA—the industry’s representative body—are not held liable for third-party content that they do not create or select, though they can lose their protection from liability if they do not respond to takedown requests.2

In 2023, the ISPA reported receiving 600 takedown requests. The ISPA accepted 200 of these requests, almost all of which resulted in content being removed. Nearly half of accepted takedown requests were for copyright and trademark violations; about a fifth of accepted requests were for material that was classified as defamation, hate speech, harassment, or a violation of privacy.3

Meta reported no requests for content restrictions in 2023.4 Google reported that it received two requests for the removal of 14 pieces of content from Google Web Search and Google Images from the South African government between January and June 2023, relating to privacy and security. The company removed eleven pieces of content for violating policy; the other three items were not found.5 From July to December 2023, the company reported receiving two requests to remove five pieces of content from Web Search for defamation due to a third-party court order. Google reported that it had insufficient information to take action on any of the five content items.6

After two videos related to the Economic Freedom Fighters' (EFF’s) national shutdown in March 2023 (see C3) circulated on social media, the FPB issued takedown requests to Twitter, stating that the videos violated the Film and Publications Act because they contained incitement to violence and harm and threatened children. The FPB also stated that individuals who shared, reposted, or otherwise distributed the videos online could be held liable7 and receive up to five years in jail.8

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 3.003 4.004

Restrictions on the internet are generally transparent and proportional, with a few exceptions. The ISPA takes a self-regulatory approach to restricting access to unlawful internet and digital content hosted by its members. This process is in accordance with the takedown procedures provided in the ECTA1 and is guided by the ISPA’s complaints procedures.2 ISPs often err on the side of caution by taking down content upon receipt of a notice to avoid litigation (see B2), and there is no incentive for providers to defend the rights of the original content creator if they believe the takedown notice was requested in bad faith.

The ISPA code of conduct requires members to respect freedoms of speech and expression as guaranteed by the constitution, and to act lawfully and cooperate with law enforcement agencies, though no specific reference is made to a proportionality test as a consideration in restricting access.3 There is an internal appeal process available to those who may be aggrieved by the ISPA’s actions, as well as an avenue for appeal in the courts.4

The ISPA reports annually on activities related to restrictions on content. The reports indicate that most takedown notifications do not result in content removal: in 2023, about one-third of the 600 takedown notices lodged with the ISPA were accepted (see B2). The most common basis for content being removed is copyright and trademark infringement. Other reasons for removal include fraud, malware or phishing, defamation, hate speech, harassment, and invasion of privacy.5

The Films and Publications Amendment Act, which was implemented in March 2022,6 empowers the FPB to issue takedown orders under the ECTA for online content judged to be prohibited (see A5). The amendment has been criticized by the ISPA for, among other things, exceeding the FPB’s mandate and opening online content to state censorship, given the quasi-government nature of the FPB and its limited capacity compared to the courts in adjudicating justifiable limitations to freedom of expression (see C1).7 Regulations to implement the act were published in September 2022.8 Parts 5 and 6 of the regulations deal with online content classification. Online content distributors who are registered with the FPB can either submit online content to the FPB for classification or apply for a self-classification permit.

Since the enactment of the Film and Publications Amendment Act and implementing regulations, the FPB has continued to exercise its powers over online content. In October 2022, the FPB issued a notice giving internet access and service providers 90 days to update the board on a number of items, including how they have moderated their child-oriented services; prominently displayed reasonable safety messages in a language that will be clearly understood by children; provided mechanisms to enable children to report suspicious behavior to the service provider; and where feasible, provided children and parents with information concerning software that can be used to block or filter content considered unsuitable for children.9 Those who fail to comply with the regulations can receive a fine of up to 50,000 rand ($2,700), a prison term of six months, or both upon conviction.

In March 2024, the FPB published a notice in terms of Section 18H and Section 27A of the Film and Publications Act, identifying mis- and disinformation and “fake news” as prohibited content falling within its mandate due to the potential for such content to propagate war, incite violence, or spread hate speech, particularly in electoral periods.10 By including mis- and disinformation in its definition of “prohibited content,” the notice broadened the types of content that platforms, search engines, and content hosts were obliged to prevent and remove. The FPB’s notice puts an obligation on ISPs; user-to-user services, including social media and video sharing platforms; and search engines, when they know their platforms are being used to host or distribute prohibited content, to inform the FPB in writing within 30 days of “reasonable measures” available as well as the steps taken to prevent access to prohibited content ahead of and during the 2024 elections. The notice also empowered the FPB’s Enforcement Committee to punish those determined to have distributed false or misleading content without judicial oversight (see C2).

After the notice was issued, several civil society and media organizations filed a legal case to challenge the notice as unconstitutional.11 The application to the court criticized the notice for its vague definitions of mis- and disinformation, arguing that it would unjustifiably limit political rights and the right to freedom of expression. The applicants further castigated the FPB for attempting to bring regulations into force that would expand its own mandate without public participation, and emphasized that placing the regulation of content in the purview of a government department would have a chilling effect on free speech.12 Following this legal challenge, the FPB withdrew the notice in April 2024.

In July 2023, ahead of the 2024 elections, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) signed a Framework of Cooperation with Meta, Google, and TikTok. The agreement allows signatories to cooperate with the IEC in response to disinformation and other harmful content, as well as with Media Monitoring Africa, a civil society group that operates a public fact-checking platform, Real411.13 The framework includes commitments to dedicate resources to prioritize referrals that come from the Real411 adjudication teams during the election period, and specifies that platforms may take action against disinformation in line with their policies for content flagged through the Real411 review process—whether those actions are adding advisory warnings to, delisting, or removing content determined to contain disinformation during the independent review process.

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 3.003 4.004

Although the government does not limit or manipulate online discussions, online self-censorship is a growing concern in South Africa.

Online harassment of journalists increased in the run-up to the 2024 national and provincial elections (see C7), leading to greater self-censorship online. Women journalists were frequently targeted with online abuse and threats of physical violence, which has led some to change their reporting coverage or avoid social media entirely in recent years.1 The leader of the EFF, Julius Malema, has on several occasions attacked and encouraged attacks against journalists online, which some contend form part of a well-orchestrated cyberbullying strategy intended to deter other journalists and commentators from issuing reports or making statements critical of the EFF.2

Despite the perception that online self-censorship by journalists has increased, ordinary citizens and journalists, including those who have been subjected to online abuse, continue to report on politically sensitive issues.3

In November 2023, the South African National Editors’ Forum (SANEF) announced a partnership with the IEC to ensure the safety of journalists during elections.4 This partnership followed concerns by SANEF regarding intimidation towards journalists from members of political parties during elections. According to SANEF, political parties have banned journalists from covering their events if they dislike their reporting.

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 3.003 4.004

Manipulation of the online space by political actors—including through bogus social media profiles, targeted commenting on social media posts, and bots—is a growing problem in South Africa. Reports of false or misleading information increased around the 2024 elections, and some parties sought to undermine the credibility of the vote.

Some of the most prominent disinformation narratives in 2024 alleged that the IEC and one of its commissioners, Janet Love, planned to rig the election.1 Posts made false claims that the uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) Party had received the majority of votes and that the IEC was in league with other parties, including the African National Congress (ANC) and the Democratic Alliance (DA), to steal the vote.2 TikTok videos with thousands of views claimed that the United States (US) was planning a coup in South Africa, and encouraged viewers to vote for the MK and EFF parties to guard against “Western influence.”3 Disinformation researchers identified networks of pro-Russian accounts—active since 2022—that began amplifying messages from the newly formed MK Party that attacked the IEC and questioned the validity of the 2024 electoral results, claiming that the vote had been compromised by US interference.4

The EFF was also targeted by right-wing accounts spreading false information and xenophobic narratives ahead of the election. Using decontextualized photos, accounts claimed that the EFF was forging documents to bring Zimbabweans into the country to increase the party’s vote share.5

During the 2024 election period, investigations by the Daily Maverick revealed the growing use of paid influencers to drive discussions and trending topics on social media platforms, particularly X, ahead of the May 2024 elections. The majority of paid influencer accounts posted content promoting the EFF and ActionSA parties, followed by the MK Party. Who had paid the influencers was not clear; ActionSA denied paying influencers to promote its campaign narratives online.6

While there were instances where generative artificial intelligence (AI) was used to create party propaganda ahead of the elections, including a deepfake video of former US president Donald Trump endorsing the MK Party and another of US rapper Eminem endorsing the EFF, these videos were quickly debunked by fact checkers.7

The government and the ANC have not attempted to overtly influence the editorial lines of media outlets in recent years. However, the 2013 purchase of the Independent Group, a large media conglomerate, by ANC ally Iqbal Survé, and persistent interference with the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) have taken a toll on fair and balanced media content in South Africa.8 In January 2020, disclosures from the African News Agency, a newswire company operated by the Independent Group, revealed that security forces had them paid 20 million rand ($1.2 million) to carry positive stories about former president Jacob Zuma. The company has denied any wrongdoing.9

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 2.002 3.003

For the most part, there are no economic or regulatory constraints that significantly affect users’ ability to publish content online. The online environment in South Africa is net neutral, although net neutrality has not been expressly provided for in law or policy.1 The ISPA is at the forefront of promoting net neutrality and believes that it is essential for the transparent management of networks and the prevention of anticompetitive behavior.2

The Film and Publications Amendment Act, which came into effect in March 2022, requires commercial distributors to classify all online content by submitting it to the FPB prior to its publication or by self-classifying it.3 Noncommercial distributors—those who publish content for personal use—are not required to classify their content. The act penalizes failing to register with the FPB as a distributor with a fine of 150,000 rand ($9,300) and failing to classify content with a fine of 500,000 rand ($31,000).4

Some online platforms are required to pay licensing fees. In November 2020, the FPB finalized revisions to the tariff structure that require online streaming services to pay a licensing fee per film and per series season that they offer.5 The revised fees benefit content distributors with fewer titles, while those with more content pay significantly more than the previous license fee of 795,000 rand ($49,500).6

Content published by journalists online is overseen by a self-regulatory body, the Press Ombudsman, which is an independent body set up by the media industry to adjudicate public complaints. Membership in the Press Ombudsman is voluntary.7

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 3.003 4.004

Online media in South Africa is vibrant, representing a wide range of international and national viewpoints and perspectives.

In October 2023, the Competition Commission announced the launch of the Media and Digital Platforms Market Inquiry, which was motivated by concerns that digital platforms that distribute news media and advertising technology could impede competition and harm the country’s news media sector.1 The inquiry held public hearings in March 2024, with a provisional report of results expected by October 2024.2

Web-only news platforms, such as News24, have become particularly popular in recent years, with key news stories often broken online before in print or broadcast outlets. While content in both English and Afrikaans is well-represented online, the other 9 of South Africa’s 11 official languages are underrepresented on the internet, including on government websites. Additionally, the perspectives of women, rural dwellers, persons with disabilities, LGBT+ people, and ethnic and religious minorities are underrepresented and marginalized in the media, including online media.3

In April 2023, the SABC launched a 24-hour news television channel to broadcast current news in African languages.4 The channel is available on the SABC+ streaming service as well as on digital terrestrial television. The channel carries news bulletins and current affairs programming in Indigenous languages and also covers parliamentary proceedings.5 The channel is mainly meant to serve communities underserved by mainstream commercial media.

In February 2022, an expert panel appointed by the president revealed that false information that spread on social media contributed to the violence that occurred during the civil unrest in July 2021, which was largely fueled by economic inequality.6

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 6.006 6.006

Neither the government nor nonstate actors restrict the use of digital tools for mobilization and campaigning. South Africa has a robust online community that addresses contemporary social, economic, and political issues. In the lead-up to the 2024 elections, content creators on TikTok used the platform to discuss politics and encourage young South Africans, who have had low turnout rates in recent elections, to vote in 2024. One influencer said she had encouraged more than 28,000 people to register to vote.1

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 5.005 6.006

There are no specific legislative provisions to protect online modes of expression. However, the constitution provides for freedom of the press and freedom of expression, among other guarantees. It includes constraints on “propaganda for war; incitement of imminent violence; or advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender, or religion and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.”1 The right of access to information held by the state, and in limited circumstances by private bodies, is also guaranteed by the constitution.2 These rights apply to all members of the public and to journalists equally, whether they operate online or offline.

The judiciary is generally regarded as independent, and in recent years has been seen as the branch of government that has been most dedicated to upholding the rule of law by constraining the executive and legislative branches from arbitrary actions.3 In May 2022, the Western Cape High Court ruled that journalists had the right to access information held by private bodies in order to report on matters of public interest in its Tiso Blackstar Group & Other v Steinhoff Int. Holdings NV decision.4

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

Several laws are vulnerable to being misused to prosecute online journalists and activists. The offense of crimen injuria, or insulting the dignity of a person, has been invoked to prosecute online harassment.1

Defamation is a criminal offense, though prosecutions are rare, and until recently, defamation charges were not brought against people for online activity. The ANC committed to scrapping criminal defamation in September 2015, but there have been no moves to introduce legislation to fulfill this promise.2

In 2021, the government passed the Cybercrimes Act, 2020, which contains some provisions regulating online speech. For instance, the law bars electronic content that incites or threatens violence to people or damage to property, and it criminalizes the nonconsensual sharing of intimate images. In December 2021, following a presidential proclamation, certain sections of the law relating to intercepting data and unlawfully accessing computer systems were enacted (see C8).3 Violators of those provisions face a penalty of up to three years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both. These prohibitions do not directly criminalize online activities protected under international human rights standards; however, some commentators suggested the provision barring incitement to violence might be used to prosecute people for social media posts supporting the July 2021 unrest (see C3).4

Observers have expressed concern that the 2022 Films and Publications Amendment Act could restrict freedom of expression and make content vulnerable to censorship (see B3).

In March 2024, the FPB published a notice in terms of Section 18H and Section 27A of the Film and Publications Act prohibiting the dissemination of mis- and disinformation due to its potential to propagate war, incite violence, or spread hate speech, particularly in electoral periods. Those who knowingly distribute prohibited content online, including mis- and disinformation, could be fined up to 150,000 rand ($8,035), imprisoned for up to two years, or both. The notice empowered the FPB’s enforcement committee to adjudicate cases, impose fines, suspend registration certificates, and refer cases to the National Director of Public Prosecutions.5 Following a legal challenge from several civil society groups, who criticized the notice for containing vague definitions of mis- and disinformation, claiming that it would unjustifiably limit freedom of expression, the FPB withdrew the notice in April 2024 (see B3).6

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

Authorities have investigated and charged internet users for social media posts deemed inflammatory or likely to incite violence.

Ahead of the 2024 national and provincial elections, police stated that they were monitoring social media and would apprehend anyone inciting violence online over electoral disputes.1 In June 2024, after the end of the coverage period, a social media user was detained for inciting public violence after making a post calling for President Ramaphosa to be removed and for the country to be “shut down.” He was charged with violating Section 17 of the 1965 Riotous Assemblies Act, as well as Section 14 of the Cybercrimes Act.2

In March 2023, the FPB opened a case with the police against a member of the EFF who warned students not to attend school on the day of the party’s national shutdown in a video that was posted on social media one day after the EFF told the government to close schools during the national shutdown. The FPB stated that the video incited violence and threatened schoolchildren.3 The FPB opened another EFF shutdown–related case against a man who appeared in a viral video telling shop owners to close their stores and join protest marches if they wanted to avoid their shops being looted during the shutdown, which the FPB called inciting violence and threatening to children.4 The FPB stated that people who reposted or shared the videos online could also face charges. The current status of these cases is unknown.

Following fatal riots in support of former president Jacob Zuma in 2021, South African authorities committed to prosecuting people who supported the unrest on social media.5 In August 2021, South African police released a statement that authorities had identified people spreading “inflammatory messages on various social media platforms advocating for violence” and “warned” them that doing so is a criminal offense.6 A February 2022 report on the riots revealed that the minister of police had identified 12 individuals who made incendiary social media posts, but only charged a few for incitement to violence.7

In March 2022, a case against Zamaswazi Majozi, a leading voice in the Radical Economic Transformation political faction, for her online activities during the July 2021 unrest8 was struck from the court roll following numerous requests from the state prosecuting authority to postpone the hearing.9

In August 2022, 65 people were arrested for allegedly instigating riots in July 2021 by using a WhatsApp group to communicate with groups that caused destruction.10 The trial was still ongoing at the end of the coverage period.

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 3.003 4.004

South Africa has few restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption. There are no laws requiring internet users, website owners, or bloggers to register with the government or any of its agencies. Users are also not required to use their real names when posting comments on the internet, including on social media platforms.

The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act (RICA) of 2002, however, compromises users’ rights to anonymous communication by requiring mobile subscribers to provide national identification numbers, copies of national identification documents, and proof of physical address to service providers.1 An identification number is legally required for any SIM card purchase, and registration requires proof of residence and an identity document.2 In March 2022, ICASA published the Draft Numbering Plan Regulations, which, if passed, will require users to provide biometric data when purchasing or registering a SIM card.3

Users are not explicitly prohibited from using encryption to safeguard their communications. However, RICA empowers a judge to force the disclosure of decryption keys or to require assistance in decryption in specified circumstances, upon approval of a request made by the police, military, intelligence, or other law enforcement agencies.4 Similarly, the Cybercrimes Act, which was passed in May 2021, includes provisions obligating companies to decrypt data to facilitate the search and seizure of stored data under the provisions of that law (see C6).5

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

Strong concerns about potentially unchecked government surveillance powers over online activity remain, but some legal safeguards related to surveillance do exist.

RICA does not permit the blanket collection of telecommunications metadata but provides for a stringent process for the targeted collection of metadata, the interception of communications, and the decryption of private communications, all of which require a court order.1 Under RICA, the threshold for granting a court order is low, oversight is insufficient, and in the past, users did not have to be informed that their communications had been intercepted.2 A loophole allows communications to be intercepted under the Criminal Procedure Act, which lacks certain safeguards and has been abused by law enforcement agencies.3 Up to 95 percent of court orders involving the interception of communications are not approved by a RICA judge, and most of the court orders outside of RICA are for metadata; metadata from 70,000 to 195,000 mobile users is collected every year.4

The South African government has the technical capacity to undertake bulk and targeted surveillance, and it has been acknowledged that bulk surveillance is undertaken by various government agencies.5 The National Communication Centre (NCC) is responsible for intercepting foreign signal intelligence and does so without oversight; the agency has disclosed that the content it intercepts includes domestic communications as well.6

In September 2019, a high court ruled that numerous provisions of RICA were unconstitutional;7 the amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism had filed a case in 2017 challenging its constitutionality on several fronts. The presiding judges found that bulk surveillance conducted by the NCC was unlawful because there is no legislation that authorizes the state to conduct such interception of private communications. The ruling postponed the resulting invalidation of RICA for two years to permit Parliament to pass legislation amending the unconstitutional provisions while imposing interim changes to the law. The interim changes included requiring the NCC to notify individuals who have their communications intercepted within 90 days after the surveillance is terminated and to disclose in its application when the target of surveillance is a journalist or lawyer. The high court ruling was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in February 2021, which also extended the period before RICA’s invalidation to three years, or until February 2024.8 In September 2021, the designated RICA judge, Justice Bess Nkabinde, expressed concerns that unlawful interception of communications of private and public officials continued despite the law being declared unconstitutional.9

In November 2023, Parliament passed the RICA Amendment Bill.10 The bill was created in accordance with the February 2021 Constitutional Court ruling, and provides for the notification of persons of their surveillance within 90 days of termination. If such notification cannot be given without jeopardizing the purpose of surveillance, the bill requires notification no longer than two years after termination. However, in cases where notification could impact national security, the designated judge may determine the period of time to withhold notification. The bill provides for the appointment of both an independent designated judge and an independent review judge, who has powers to confirm or reject any decision made by the designated judge. The bill also provides for procedures to ensure that data obtained pursuant to the interception of communications is managed lawfully and is not used or interfered with unlawfully. The bill further seeks to provide for procedures to be followed in dealing with the data obtained from surveillance. Notably, it also provides for adequate safeguards where the subject of surveillance is a practicing journalist or lawyer: applicants are required to disclose in their warrants that the subject is a journalist or lawyer, and the designated judge can issue a direction or entry warrant with conditions to protect the confidentiality of sources or the legal privilege enjoyed by clients. The bill had not yet been signed at the end of the coverage period.11

Despite the additional safeguards introduced by these proposed amendments, some civil society organizations have called attention to a remaining loophole under Section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act,12 a parallel procedure that allows police to access a person’s communication data with just a magistrate’s order, without any of RICA’s existing safeguards. Section 205 has been documented to have been used to access the data of journalists, police investigators, lawyers, and government officials.13

The South African police possess international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI)–catcher technology, also known by the product name Stingrays, which permit the bulk interception of mobile phone traffic, although the extent of its use is uncertain.14 The Ministry of State Security does not believe that IMSI catchers are governed by RICA, and their use is therefore unregulated.15 The government has claimed that the technology is used only for national security matters.16 Nonetheless, consistent weaknesses in oversight mechanisms within the state security departments leave surveillance open to abuse; in addition, the interception of communications that originate outside South Africa are essentially unregulated.17

The court rulings on RICA rendered the state’s use of IMSI catchers illegal unless new legislation is passed to regulate such use for bulk surveillance. In May 2023, the minister of justice and constitutional development granted the South African Police Service (SAPS) a certificate of exemption in terms of Section 46(3) of RICA.18 The exemption allows the SAPS to procure and use interception technologies including “IMSI catchers, equipment reasonably necessary to be used with IMSI catchers, and software to be installed on such IMSI catchers.”19 The exemption was granted after receiving parliamentary approval, despite opposition parties expressing concern that Parliament has been misled about the purchase of the communication interception technologies.20 Some opposition members of Parliament cited the lack of trust in the SAPS as a reason for opposing the exemption.21

The SAPS and the National Joint Operational Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS) have publicly stated that they monitor social media for criminal offenses such as incitement to violence.22

South Africa's intelligence services have been reported to use a social media analytics and monitoring tool called Media Sonar, which allows for the searching and analyzing of social media content of users within a defined geolocation and using keyword searches.23

In March 2023, the SAPS put out a request for bids to procure open-source intelligence and social media investigation and monitoring technologies.24 This tool will be used to collect and mine data including hashtags, authors, date and time, and individuals of interest from social media sources, searches in public domain data, and the dark web. According to the SAPS bid documentation, the tool must also be able to assist in the identification of trends for certain types of searches.25

Journalists have been frequently targeted for surveillance by the state, usually as a means of identifying confidential sources.26 For example, in March 2021, the online outlet News24 disclosed that officers with the police intelligence division had targeted its journalists with location tracking and communications interception tools, apparently in response to the outlet’s investigation into unrest within the division.27

In a 2018 report by Citizen Lab, a Canadian internet watchdog, South Africa was listed as one of 45 countries worldwide using Pegasus, a targeted spyware software developed by the Israeli technology firm NSO Group. Pegasus is known to be used by governments to spy on journalists, human rights defenders, and the opposition.28

Beyond RICA, the Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act serves as South Africa’s legal framework protecting the constitutional right to privacy. It includes provisions to protect users’ online security, privacy, and data, and allows an individual to bring civil claims against those who contravene the law (see C6).29

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 3.003 6.006

RICA provides for a legal process for the interception of communications, and service providers are, under certain circumstances, required to aid the government in surveillance.

According to RICA, service providers, including ISPs, are required to use systems with the technical capacity for communications to be intercepted; they are also required to retain customer metadata for three to five years, a provision that concerns privacy advocates.1 RICA specifically requires service providers to intercept and provide the communications of their customers upon a judge’s directive.2 In practice, however, the bulk of requests for information are not made through RICA and are thus not transparent or subject to appeal (see C5).

The Cybercrimes Act also expands the scope of real-time communications interception under RICA.3 The law establishes broad authority for officials to access data stored by service providers and other companies when those data relate to cybercrimes that the law defines. Along with several provisions that relate to online activities (see C2), the act establishes a broad range of violations relating to computer use. Seizure of data generally requires a warrant, though the law establishes a broad range of exceptions.

The POPI Act of 2013, part of South Africa’s data protection framework, entered fully into force on July 1, 2020.4 The law establishes safeguards for the processing of personal data, including requirements for consent, retention limitations, and notice and limitations on automated processing and cross-border data transfers. The POPI Act defines personal data broadly, covering information about individuals, their beliefs, and their legal identity, and it establishes more extensive safeguards for particularly sensitive personal data. It includes a standard set of exceptions, including national security and criminal matters. Penalties for contravening the law are stiff, including prison terms and fines of up to 10 million rand ($620,000).5

While the ECTA does not require ISPs to actively monitor content or to seek information on unlawful activity, the minister of communications may, under certain circumstances, require ISPs to provide information on the illegal activities of their users or information that facilitates the identification of users.6

Under the Film and Publications Amendment Act, enacted in March 2022, internet access providers who have knowledge that their services are being used to host or distribute child sexual abuse images, war propaganda, or content that incites violence and hatred of an identifiable group, are required to report to the police details on the person maintaining, hosting, distributing, or in any way contributing to the circulation of this content.7

MTN received 199 lawful interception requests from the government in 2023, according to the company’s annual transparency report.8

Neither RICA nor the POPI Act impose data localization requirements. In May 2024, the DCDT published the National Data and Cloud Policy.9 The policy requires that government data pertaining to state security and sovereignty must be stored in digital infrastructure within South Africa’s borders.

In February 2023, South Africa’s Information Regulator referred the National Department of Health to its Enforcement Committee regarding personal information that was collected during the pandemic.10 This followed numerous unsuccessful requests for information made by the regulator to the Department of Health to ascertain whether the department had destroyed or de-identified the database that contained information such as the names, identity or passport numbers, and residential addresses of people who might have contracted COVID-19. The information was collected pursuant to the Disaster Management Regulations, which also directed that the databases must be destroyed or de-identified within six weeks of the end of the state of disaster, which occurred in April 2022. If the Enforcement Committee issues an enforcement notice, it will have the same effect as a court order.

C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 4.004 5.005

Cases of online harassment surged around the May 2024 elections, though there were few reported cases of extralegal intimidation or violence against bloggers or journalists. Women and LGBT+ people continue to experience routine harassment online.

In May 2024, while reporting on a rally for the MK Party ahead of the election, a digital journalist who works for the online newspaper News24 reported being shoved to the ground by men in military fatigues.1

South Africa’s IEC and one of its commissioners, Janet Love, were targeted with threats and harassment on social media platforms during and after the 2024 elections. Prominent members of the MK Party, including Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, the daughter of former president Zuma, amplified threats against Love and calls for her arrest on social media platforms.2

Women journalists and politicians faced rampant online gender-based violence around the 2024 elections. One study of online gendered abuse and disinformation directed at women candidates from major political parties found that abusive content in languages other than English was frequently not moderated by social media platforms.3

A May 2024 study of online violence directed at women journalists from the Daily Maverick revealed that coverage of corruption scandals and critical reporting on the government often served as a catalyst for harassment and violent threats on Twitter, in what the International Center for Journalists said showed clear intent to silence and suppress their reporting.4 While there were no incidents in which this online abuse resulted in offline violence, South Africa’s high rates of gender-based violence have raised fears of physical attacks, leading several women journalists from the Daily Maverick to temporarily relocate after being targeted online.5

Online harassment based on gender and sexuality is rampant in South Africa, and racist language is common. Over 70 percent of women in a snapshot survey conducted by the South Africa Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) in 2023 reported experiencing abuse and harassment online, with 95 percent reporting seeing other women face abuse as well.6 A survey of LGBT+ youth released in April 2020 found that 82 percent reported experiencing harassment online because of their identity.7

Certain xenophobic hashtags such as #PutSouthAfricansFirst gained wider usage in South African online spaces in 2023.8 Political parties such as the African Transformation Movement (ATM), the Patriotic Alliance, and ActionSA reportedly used such hashtags to spread xenophobic narratives and amass voter support ahead of the 2024 elections.9 In January 2024, videos in which armed Patriotic Alliance party members were seen patrolling the border between Zimbabwe and South Africa and shouting at people who they claimed were attempting to illegally cross into South Africa, went viral on TikTok and WhatsApp, contributing to a surge in the use of xenophobic hashtags.10

The SAHRC’s Social Media Charter provides guidelines for individuals and organizations to promote responsible and ethical behavior on social media, and includes sections on accountability, freedom of expression, privacy, and the protection of vulnerable groups.11

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 2.002 3.003

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because the Daily Maverick was targeted with a malicious cyberattack after publishing an unflattering article about Indian prime minister Narendra Modi.

Opposition voices have not been subject to technical attacks in several years. However, South Africa is vulnerable to cybersecurity threats on many fronts, and independent news media have been recent targets.

After reporting that Indian prime minister Narendra Modi had refused to disembark from his plane because South Africa had only sent a cabinet minister to meet him in August 2023, the website of the Daily Maverick experienced a massive malicious distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack linked to servers based in India. The outlet was able to recover its site after blocking all web traffic from India, while investigating alternate ways to make the article accessible to Indian readers.1

In April 2023, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJ&CD) suffered a cyberattack for the third time in three years.2 Criminals targeted the Guardian’s Fund, which sits within the DOJ&CD and was created to manage money on behalf of persons who are legally incapable of doing so themselves. The hackers managed to steal 18 million rand ($1.06 million), which led to the suspension all payments by the fund, in turn causing financial trouble for many of its beneficiaries.3

In December 2021, following a presidential proclamation, Chapter 2 of the Cybercrimes Act became operational,4 criminalizing the unlawful interference with computer systems, and the illegal access, interception, and possession of data, including passwords. This provision replaced parts of the ECTA that protected against cyberattacks by criminalizing access, interception, or interference of an individual’s data without permission; the unlawful production, sale, procurement, design, distribution, or possession of a device used to overcome security measures or the protection of data; the use of such a device to unlawfully overcome security measures for the protection of data; and interference with an information system that protects data.5

On South Africa

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Country Facts

  • Population

    59,890,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    81 100 free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    73 100 free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    No

  • Pro-government Commentators

    No

  • Users Arrested

    No