South Africa
| A Obstacles to Access | 19 25 |
| B Limits on Content | 28 35 |
| C Violations of User Rights | 26 40 |
Internet freedom in South Africa declined slightly due to a spike in false and misleading information around the 2024 general elections. The government continued its efforts to address weaknesses in the electrical grid that have posed a challenge to internet access in recent years. The country remained vulnerable to cyberattacks, and government surveillance of online activity was an ongoing concern.
- In July 2024, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA)—the country’s communications and broadcasting regulator—amended regulations under the Electronic Communications Act to prevent anticompetitive abuses of power in the market for mobile service providers. According to the new rules, dominant providers such as MTN and Vodacom would be required to provide ICASA with relevant documents, accounts, and records related to their operations (A4).1
- Disinformation campaigns surged during and after the May 2024 general elections. This online content manipulation, which included material generated by artificial intelligence (AI) tools,2 was amplified by paid social media commentators who deliberately spread false and misleading information about the integrity of the balloting.3 According to the Institute for Security Studies, the uMkhonto weSizwe Party, which won 14 percent of the vote in the parliamentary elections, used paid commentators on social media to push unfounded claims that the elections had been marred by irregularities (B5).4
- In February 2025, the Competition Commission of South Africa released provisional findings from its Media and Digital Platforms Market Inquiry. The report showed that Google’s search engine dominance had contributed to a material and financial “erosion of the media” in South Africa over the last decade and half, in part due to the Google algorithm’s prioritization of global over local news media. Uncompetitive and opaque practices regarding advertisements on social media platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and X had a similar negative impact on the financial viability of more traditional news outlets, according to the report (B6 and B7).5
- Authorities investigated internet users for social media posts that were deemed inflammatory or likely to incite violence during the coverage period. In January 2025, Duduzile Zuma-Sambudla, the daughter of former President Jacob Zuma, was arrested on terrorism charges related to her social media posts, which allegedly incited violence during deadly riots in 2021. She was released pending trial shortly after her arrest, and no verdict had been reached by the end of the coverage period (C3).6
- The General Intelligence Amendment Bill was signed into law in March 2025. While the legislation included protections related to the data collected and managed by the National Communications Centre (NCC), such as a requirement that intelligence services obtain approval from a judge before conducting mass interceptions, civil society groups expressed some concern about vague definitions within the law (C5 and C6).7
- 1Osamu Ekhator, “ICASA tightens rules on mobile market power with act amendment,” Techpoint Africa, July 12, 2024, https://techpoint.africa/news/new-regulations-south-african-mobile-oper…; Law Library, “Mobile Broadband Services Amendment Regulations, 2024,” July 5, 2024, https://lawlibrary.org.za/akn/za/act/genn/2024/2617/eng@2024-07-05.
- 2Vittoria Elliott, “A Former President’s Daughter Used X to Bombard South Africa With Conspiracy Theories,” Wired, June 3, 2024, https://www.wired.com/story/south-africa-x-twitter-disinformation/; Taryn Khourie, “US president Joe Biden did not warn of South African sanctions if ruling ANC wins 2024 elections – ignore AI-generated video,” Africa Check, April 30, 2024, https://africacheck.org/fact-checks/meta-programme-fact-checks/us-presi….
- 3Kirsten Cosser, “Zero evidence of South African electoral commission bribery by ruling party and official opposition and commission is ‘considering legal options’,” Africa Check, June 4, 2025, https://africacheck.org/fact-checks/meta-programme-fact-checks/zero-evi….
- 4Karen Allen and Jean le Roux, “Under the influence? Online mis/disinformation in South Africa’s May 2024 election,” Institute for Security Studies, December 2024, https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1734073957062-sar-61.p…; Rebecca Davis, “It’s all fake – nano-influencers and their paid campaigns to stroke political egos,” Daily Maverick, May 3, 2025, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2025-05-03-its-all-fake-nano-in….
- 5Competition Commission South Africa, “Media and Digital Platforms Market Inquiry (MDPMI) Provisional Report,” February 2025, https://sanef.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/MDPMI-Provisional-Repor…; SANEF, “Media Milestone Against Big Tech’s Unfair Competition,” February 25, 2025, https://sanef.org.za/media-milestone-against-big-techs-unfair-competiti….
- 6Mogomotsi Magome and Gerald Imray, “Daughter of former South African President Jacob Zuma arrested on terrorism charges over riots,” Associated Press, January 30, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/south-africa-zuma-daughter-arrest-riots-d720…; “Riots Trial Of Ex S.Africa President's Daughter To Start In November,” Barron’s, March 20, 2025, https://www.barrons.com/news/riots-trial-of-ex-s-africa-president-s-dau…; “Zuma's daughter faces terrorism charges over South Africa riots,” BBC, January 30, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwyekqn1k1ko.
- 7Press Council FAIR, “General Intelligence Law Amendment Act adopted; still ‘deeply flawed’,” March 29, 2025, https://presscouncil.org.za/2025/03/29/general-intelligence-law-amendme…; The Presidency Republic of South Africa, “President Ramaphosa assents to General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill,” March 28, 2025, https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/president-ramaphosa-assents-general-in….
South Africa is a constitutional democracy. Since the end of apartheid in 1994, it has been regarded globally as a proponent of human rights and a leader on the African continent. However, reports of corruption among government officials often emerge, and in recent years, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) has been accused of undermining state institutions to protect corrupt officials and preserve its power as its support base has begun to wane. The ANC lost its absolute majority in the legislature after 30 years in power following the 2024 general elections. Gender-based violence is a severe challenge.
This report has been abridged for Freedom on the Net 2025 due to ongoing budget constraints. Please consider making a donation to support future editions of this vital resource.
For additional background information, see last year’s full report.
| Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? | 5.005 6.006 |
| Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? | 2.002 3.003 |
| Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? | 6.006 6.006 |
| Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? | 4.004 6.006 |
| Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? | 2.002 4.004 |
| Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? | 6.006 6.006 |
| Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? | 3.003 4.004 |
| Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? | 3.003 4.004 |
| Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? | 3.003 4.004 |
| Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? | 2.002 4.004 |
Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because the election period was dominated by disinformation campaigns in which political parties and paid commentators sought to discredit the election results.1
- 1Karen Allen and Jean le Roux, “Under the influence? Online mis/disinformation in South Africa’s May 2024 election,” Institute for Security Studies, December 2024, https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1734073957062-sar-61.p…; Rebecca Davis, “It’s all fake – nano-influencers and their paid campaigns to stroke political egos,” Daily Maverick, May 3, 2025, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2025-05-03-its-all-fake-nano-in….
| Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? | 2.002 3.003 |
| Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? | 3.003 4.004 |
| Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? | 6.006 6.006 |
| Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? | 5.005 6.006 |
| Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? | 2.002 4.004 |
| Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? | 5.005 6.006 |
| Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? | 3.003 4.004 |
| Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? | 2.002 6.006 |
| Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? | 3.003 6.006 |
| Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? | 4.004 5.005 |
| Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? | 2.002 3.003 |
Country Facts
-
Population
59,890,000 -
Global Freedom Score
81 100 free -
Internet Freedom Score
73 100 free -
Freedom in the World Status
Free -
Networks Restricted
No -
Websites Blocked
No -
Pro-government Commentators
Yes -
Users Arrested
Yes