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Freedom on the Net 2024

Hungary

Partly Free
69
100
A Obstacles to Access 21 25
B Limits on Content 24 35
C Violations of User Rights 24 40
Last Year's Score & Status
69 100 Partly Free
Scores are based on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free). See the methodology and report acknowledgements.
Hungary_hero

header1 Key Developments, June 1, 2023 – May 31, 2024

The internet freedom environment in Hungary did not experience significant changes during the coverage period. Hungary enjoys high levels of overall connectivity and affordable internet access. While there are few overt restrictions on content in Hungary and people rarely are detained or imprisoned in retaliation for their online activities, the government exerts control over telecommunications and the online media landscape.

  • The territorial coverage of 5G networks improved by 44.6 percent during the coverage period (see A1).
  • In February 2024, a law came into force implementing the Digital Services Act (DSA), the European Union (EU) regulation that establishes a notice-and-action system for reporting content across the EU and imposes transparency and risk mitigation obligations on certain platforms and search engines (see A5, B2, and B3).
  • In December 2023, the government enacted the Defense of Sovereignty Act, which establishes an office that can investigate “activities aimed at influencing democratic discourse,” including civil society organizations and media outlets that operate online. Over 100 civil society organizations shared an online petition against the law (see B6 and B8).
  • In August 2023, the International Press Institute (IPI) reported that 40 media outlets in Hungary had experienced cyberattacks since April. A month later, IPI experienced a cyberattack that took it offline for three days (see C8).

header2 Political Overview

Since taking power in 2010 elections, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Alliance of Young Democrats–Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz) party has pushed through constitutional and legal changes that have allowed it to consolidate control over the country’s independent institutions. The Fidesz government has passed antimigrant and anti-LGBT+ policies, as well as laws that hamper the operations of opposition groups, journalists, universities, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are critical of the ruling party or whose perspectives Fidesz otherwise finds unfavorable.

A Obstacles to Access

A1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? 6.006 6.006

Hungary’s internet penetration rate has steadily increased in recent years. In 2023, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) reported that 91.5 percent of individuals had access to the internet 1

The government introduced the National Digitalisation Strategy in 2021, which aims to provide a network capable of processing at least 1 gigabit per second (Gbps) to 95 percent of households by 2030.2 According to Ookla’s SpeedTest, as of May 2024, the median mobile broadband download speed was 54.45 Mbps, while the median fixed broadband download speed was 179.88 Mbps.3

According to 2023 data from the ITU, the fixed broadband penetration rate is 36.8 percent and the mobile broadband penetration rate is 86.2 percent.4 According to 2024 data from the European Commission’s State of the Digital Decade report, 5G networks covered 83.7 percent of the country, a 44.6 percent increase from 2023, when they covered 57.9 percent.5

Public Wi-Fi hotspots are widely available throughout Budapest, the capital, and other major cities in Hungary.6

A2 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? 3.003 3.003

The cost of internet access is not prohibitive. According to the ITU, the monthly cost of 5 gigabytes (GB) of fixed broadband internet connection was 0.61 percent of gross national income (GNI) per capita in 2022, while the monthly cost of a 2 GB mobile data plan was 0.56 percent of GNI per capita.1 In 2022, Hungary’s GNI per capita was $19,010, according to the World Bank.2

Levels of access differ based on geographic and socioeconomic conditions; there are lower access rates among rural areas and low-income families. A digital divide based on ethnicity has also been observed: Romany people have historically had less access to the internet.3 In towns with significant Romany populations, people tend to rely on mobile data, as cable internet is often unavailable in their homes.4

A3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? 6.006 6.006

The government does not restrict commercial information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure,1 and backbone networks are owned by private companies rather than the state.2 Legally, however, the internet and other telecommunications services can be restricted or suspended in the event of an attack on Hungary, for preemptive defense, or during a national emergency.3

The Budapest Internet Exchange (BIX), which distributes Hungarian internet traffic among domestic internet service providers (ISPs), is overseen by the nonprofit Council of Hungarian Internet Service Providers (ISZT)4 without any government interference.5

  • 1Zoltán Kalmár, Council of Hungarian Internet Service Providers, e-mail communication, January 24, 2012.
  • 2rentIT Kft., “Magyarország internetes infrastruktúrája [Hungary's internet infrastructure],” January 29, 2010, https://www.rentit.hu/hu-HU/Cikk/erdekessegek/magyarorszag-internetes-i…
  • 3Act CXIII of 2011 on Home Defense, Military of Hungary, and the Implementable Measures under Special Legal Order, Art. 68, Par. 5.
  • 4Budapest Internet Exchange (BIX), “BIX Charter,” April 21, 2009, http://bix.hu/?lang=en&page=charter
  • 5Zoltán Kalmár, Council of Hungarian Internet Service Providers, email communication, January 24, 2012.
A4 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? 4.004 6.006

The ICT market in Hungary lacks significant competition. However, there are no onerous legal, regulatory, or economic barriers to entry for potential competitors.

Prior to 2022, there were four major mobile service providers: market leader Magyar Telekom, Yettel (formerly Telenor), Vodafone,1 and DIGI.2 In January 2022, the Romanian-owned DIGI sold 100 percent of the shares of its Hungarian operation to 4iG.3 The deal was deemed to be in the “national strategic interest,” preventing the Hungarian Competition Authority from reviewing it.4 In an October 2023 interview, an opposition politician claimed that 4iG holds a monopoly on the fixed-line broadband market in 117 municipalities, but that his 2022 submission to the Competition Authority had been rejected due to the government decree that exempted the acquisition from state scrutiny.5

In August 2022, 4iG purchased 51 percent of Vodafone’s fixed-line and mobile business in Hungary for a reported 715 billion forints ($2.1 billion), which made 4iG the country’s second-largest telecommunications operator. Corvinus International Investment acquired a 49 percent minority share on behalf of the Hungarian state.6 In January 2023, the Hungarian government once again ruled that the deal was in the “national strategic interest.”7 In March 2023, as a result of a share exchange between 4iG and the Hungarian state, 4iG further increased its share to 70.5 percent of Vodafone’s Hungarian holdings. The exchanged shares belonged to Yettel, providing the Hungarian state with a 25 percent stake in the company.8 According to a June 2024 report from Research and Markets, 4iG remains the largest mobile operator in the country.9

There are no specific laws or regulations governing the provision of Wi-Fi hotspots or other public internet connections in Hungary.

A5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? 2.002 4.004

The National Media and Communications Authority (NMHH) and the Media Council, established under media laws passed in 2010, are responsible for overseeing and regulating the telecommunications and mass communications industries. The NMHH is also responsible for implementing the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) at the national level (see B2 and B3).

The head of the NMHH is appointed by the president, based on the recommendation of the prime minister, for a nonrenewable nine-year term—longer than two full terms of parliamentarians.1 The head of the NMHH also chairs the Media Council, Hungary’s media regulator (see B6). At the end of 2019, five new members were elected to the Media Council, all supported exclusively by members of the ruling coalition. In October 2021, Monika Karas, the head of the Media Council, stepped down prematurely to become the vice president of the State Audit Office. Critics saw her change of position as a means to ensure that Fidesz was able to select her successor prior to the 2022 general elections.2

A 2019 report from a joint international press freedom mission to Hungary questioned the impartiality and transparency of the NMHH and especially of the Media Council.3

With the adoption of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, which entered into force in 2012, the government prematurely ended the six-year term of the data protection and freedom of information commissioner, replacing him and his office with the National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (NAIH). The head of the new authority is appointed by the president based on the recommendation of the prime minister for a nine-year term and can be dismissed by the president if the prime minister recommends it,4 calling into question the independence of the agency. In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that Hungary failed to fulfill its obligations under EU law when it ended the data protection commissioner’s term.5 The independence of the authority has been called into question several times, including during the Pegasus spyware scandal (see C5), which the authority claimed did not violate the law.6

B Limits on Content

B1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 4.004 6.006

The government rarely blocks websites, though in early 2022 it blocked the websites of Russian state-owned media outlets in response to an EU regulation. The government does not place any restrictions on access to social media or communications applications. Unauthorized online gambling is illegal,1 and ISPs block a few hundred unauthorized gambling websites at the request of the National Tax and Customs Administration.2 However, unauthorized gambling websites frequently change their URLs to circumvent blocking.3

In early March 2022, following the Russian government’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU’s European Council issued Regulation 2022/350, ordering member states to “urgently suspend the broadcasting activities of” Russian-state owned websites, including Russia Today (RT), RT France, RT Germany, RT Spanish, and RT UK, and block their websites because they “engaged in continuous and concerted propaganda actions targeted at civil society.”4 Soon after, the NMHH confirmed that it would comply with the order and blocked access to the websites.5 In June 2022, the EU adopted a new package of sanctions, which also included directives to block Russian state-owned broadcasters RTR Planeta, Russia 24, and TV Centre International.6 In May 2024, the EU also suspended the broadcasting licenses of Russian outlets Voice of Europe, RIA Novosti, Izvestia, and Rossiyskaya Gazeta and ordered their blocking.7

The authorities sometimes block content under a criminal code article that bans public denial of the Holocaust. However, as many websites found guilty of this offense are hosted outside of Hungary, enforcement of these decisions is often inconsistent.8

B2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

The government and its allies sometimes use court orders to pressure publishers and content hosts to delete content.

In the past, some public figures have sent legal requests to hosting providers to compel them to delete online content. In February 2022, an article by online news outlet Alfahir was removed after Béla Merkely, the chancellor of Semmelweiss University, made a request to the hosting provider.1 Likewise, the courts have ordered news outlets to remove investigative articles and issued fines based on those articles under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).2

The DSA mandates that specific platforms operating in the EU establish mechanisms that take action against illegal content and provide more transparency on platform functions and decision-making (see A5 and B3).3 Between October 2023 and March 2024, the NMHH issued two orders requiring Facebook4 to act against illegal content and under Article 9 of the DSA.

In the first half of 2023, Facebook restricted access to 26 items for alleged violations of Hungarian laws based on requests from the government and courts; it restricted access to 86 items for the same reason in the second half of the year.5 In the first half of 2023, Hungarian authorities sent Google four content removal requests concerning four items, and the company removed all of them. In the second half of the year, authorities sent Google 5 requests concerning 13 items and the company removed 2 of them in response. Two of the requests in the second half of the year concerned “government criticism.”6 Twitter did not produce a transparency report on content removal that covered the reporting period.

B3 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 3.003 4.004

For the most part, restrictions on the internet are proportional, but vague language in Hungary’s legal framework leaves some online news outlets at risk of unjustified content removal.

In November 2023, the Hungarian parliament adopted the DSA Executive Act, which implements the EU’s DSA in Hungary. The DSA Executive Act came into force in February 2024. The broader DSA sets up a notice-and-action regime across the EU, which allows member states to define illegal content and places transparency, reporting, and risk assessment obligations on some platforms, with heightened obligations for platforms and search engines with over 40 million monthly users. The Hungarian government has appointed the NMHH as its “digital service coordinator,” or the national body responsible for implementing the DSA (see A5).1 In February 2024, 36 members of the European Parliament raised concerns about the NMHH’s role because of its history of spreading government propaganda.2

Media laws from 2010 stipulate that media content—both online and offline—may not offend, discriminate, or “incite hatred against persons, nations, communities, national, ethnic, linguistic, and other minorities or any majority as well as any church or religious group.”3 Further, by law, media content must respect the constitutional order and human rights, and must not violate public morals.4 However, the legal framework does not define the meaning of “any majority” or “public morals.” If an online news outlet disobeys the law, the Media Council may oblige it to “discontinue its unlawful conduct,” publish a notice on its front page, pay a fine of up to 25 million Hungarian forints ($72,000), or any combination of the three.5 If a website repeatedly violates the law, ISPs can be ordered to suspend the site’s domain, and as a last resort, the NMHH can delete the website from its administrative registry, making it illegal for the website to publish.6 Any such action can be appealed in court.7

Under the criminal code in effect since 2013, websites can be blocked for hosting unlawful content, such as defamation, Holocaust denial, or child abuse.8 Hosts are required to make content inaccessible, either temporarily or permanently, upon receiving a court order stating that the hosted content is illegal.9 The law stipulates that if the illegal content is hosted on a server located outside the country, a Hungarian court can request that the minister of justice block or remove the content.10 The prosecutor, the ISP, and the content provider can appeal the court order within eight days of the decision. The NMHH is the authority responsible for managing the list of websites blocked by court orders.11 The list, known as the Central Electronic Database of Decrees on Inaccessibility (KEHTA), went into effect in 2014, with the primary aim of fighting child pornography.

In 2020, to comply with the regulations of the EU’s new Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the NMHH was given powers to oversee video content shared on platforms like YouTube and Facebook. Platforms are liable for moderating content—for example, disabling harmful content for children—and can be fined up to 100 million forints ($290,000) for failing to comply.12

Though the law generally protects against intermediary liability for content posted by third parties, in some cases courts have held individuals responsible for third-party comments on their websites. In two high-profile cases, Hungarian courts have held online news outlets liable for defamatory third-party content. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has overruled the Hungarian courts in both instances. Additionally, in 2016, László Toroczkai, the far-right mayor of Ásotthalom, was held liable by a court for “disseminating” a defamatory comment posted by another user on his Facebook page, which stated that a journalist “should be hanged.” The court found that, by allowing comments on his page, Toroczkai had accepted responsibility for any unlawful content posted by others.13

According to national legislation, which is based on the EU E-Commerce Directive, ISPs and other intermediaries are not legally responsible for content so long as they serve as “mere conduits.”14 Intermediaries are also not obliged to verify the content they transmit, store, or make available, nor do they need to search for unlawful activity (see C6).15 However, Hungarian courts have tended to argue that this liability regime only applies to e-commerce and is not applicable to content that violates personality rights. Hosts are not liable for hosted content but must restrict access to content deemed illegal by a court.

Both print and online media outlets bear editorial responsibility if their aim is to distribute content to the public for “information, entertainment, or training purposes.”16 The law fails to clarify what editorial responsibility entails and whether it would imply legal liability for online publications.17

The EU Directive on Copyright was implemented in Hungary in June 202118 and holds “online content sharing service providers” liable for copyright violations that take place on their platforms.19

The Media Council has also used the 2021 Child Protection Law (see B4), which prevents platforms and media outlets from showing LGBT+ content to children under 18, to demand that platforms based in other countries restrict access to content for children of certain ages. For example, in September 2022 the Media Council ruled that the depiction of a short kiss between two girls in Jurassic World: Camp Cretaceous, an animated show on Netflix, could be harmful for the development of children, arguing it should not be recommended for children under 12 years old. The Media Council also argued that the animated film Baymax! should be subject to the same age recommendation because a character suggests that a boy ask another boy on a date. Because Netflix’s operations are based in the Netherlands, the Media Council lacked jurisdiction and turned to its Dutch counterpart,20 which declined to comment on individual cases.21

B4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? 3.003 4.004

Among ordinary users, self-censorship is not common.

In June 2021, the parliament enacted a law that prevents media outlets, among other institutions, from displaying content that “propagates or portrays divergence from self-identity corresponding to sex at birth, sex change, or homosexuality” to children under 18. According to the Venice Commission, the newly introduced amendments to the law include vague terminology that is “open to abuse in individual cases” and “has a detrimental effect on freedom of expression” (see B3).1 A February 2024 report from Amnesty International found that “some media service providers and bookshops in Hungary are exercising self-censorship [around LGBT+ content] to avoid legal sanctions.”2

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the parliament amended the criminal code to extend the legal definition of scaremongering (see C2)3 to punish those who disseminate false information that “undermines the effort to protect the country in a state of emergency” with up to five years’ imprisonment.4 The Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU) found that healthcare workers and other professionals involved in the fight against COVID-19 became less likely to speak publicly for fear of retaliation, including under the aforementioned amendments.5

B5 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? 2.002 4.004

The ongoing consolidation of online media outlets in the hands of progovernment owners has led to manipulation of the online information landscape that benefits the ruling party. In November 2018, the owners of almost all government-friendly private media outlets, including many online news outlets, donated their holdings to a newly created Hungarian nonprofit entity called the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA), which was exempted from regulatory scrutiny because the government determined its formation was of “strategic national importance.”1

Observers have noted the increasing number of independent online outlets, including the country’s preeminent online news outlet, Index.hu,2 that have been acquired or partially acquired by progovernment entities in recent years. These acquisitions are often followed by shifts toward a more government-friendly editorial voice.3 In January 2022, former Index.hu editor Balázs Gabay detailed the reasons for his resignation from the company in a social media post, claiming that several articles published anonymously on the site obviously favored the government and discredited the opposition.4 In February 2024 Árpád Szakács, a former Mediaworks employee, said that during the previous campaign period he was one of the editors who attended biweekly meetings with a minister of the prime minister's Cabinet Office, where the minister coordinated the editorial content of progovernment outlets to align with Fidesz’s narrative.5

In addition to favorable coverage from privately owned online media, the government enjoys editorial control over several state-run media outlets that publish online. State-owned news agency Magyar Távirati Iroda (MTI) offers its news free of charge, making it difficult for other actors to compete. Many online media outlets that have been impacted by the economic crisis lack the staff needed to produce original reporting and tend to republish MTI wire stories.6

In March 2022, independent outlet Direkt36 reported on the inner workings of MTI based on leaked emails. Direkt36’s reports found that Bertalan Havasi, the prime minister’s chief of press, ordered the news agency to write a story and provided the article’s title and lead paragraph. Direkt36 also reported that employees at MTI were forbidden from changing the title and lead of press statements issued by ministries.7 MTI failed to report on the inaugural opposition primaries held in 2021,8 and leaked recordings have previously revealed that senior editors at MTI prevented reporters from covering the opposition or criticizing the government.9

Government-sponsored and -aligned false and deceptive information has continued to mar Hungary’s online information environment. A June 2023 report by EU DisinfoLab noted that compared with other governments in the EU, Hungary is a “special case” because “one of the major sources of disinformation is the government itself.”10 According to the data in Meta Ad Library, the Hungarian Government and its allies have spent an aggregated 10 billion forints ($29 million) on advertisements on the platform between 2019 and 2023.11 Historically, progovernment content manipulation has intensified before elections. For example, ahead of the June 2024 European Parliament elections, progovernment outlets circulated a narrative claiming European People’s Party (EPP) leader Manfred Weber planned to introduce military conscription in the EU.12

Also ahead of the European Parliament elections, progovernment influencers at the Megafon Center, an organization that enlists content creators to support pro-Fidesz narratives, disseminated paid social media content promoting Fidesz and discrediting opposition politicians and other actors critical of the government.13 For example, the center spread narratives about the “dollar-left” and “dollar-media” in Hungary, implying that opposition and independent media outlets work at the behest of the United States.14 Between the beginning of 2024 and the June 2024 European Parliament elections, the outlet spent 650 million forints ($1.9 million) on Facebook advertising, more than any other political party in the EU during that period, according to Agence France-Presse (AFP).15

Ahead of the April 2022 elections, Facebook pages were set up to smear opposition candidates in specific districts. These pages spent significant resources targeting their posts, and provided insufficient contact information for those trying to reach their administrators.16 In that period, the government promoted the false narrative that Péter Márki-Zay, the opposition candidate for prime minister, had stated that he would deploy troops in Ukraine.17

In January 2018, online media outlet 444.hu reported on a sophisticated network of unpaid users coordinated by the ruling Fidesz party that shared progovernment content on Facebook.18

Far-right blogs and news websites are known to circulate pro-Russia propaganda.19 Some spam Facebook with false information.20 Following the Russian government’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Hungarian progovernment media outlets and pundits continued to disseminate Russian disinformation,21 and amplified their content on social media.22 These trends continued during the war.23

A 2023 report from the UK-based NGO #ShePersisted found that women in Hungary, particularly those working in politics and activism, have been the subjects of disinformation, which often accuses them of working on behalf of foreign interests.24

B6 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? 1.001 3.003

In Hungary, online media outlets in particular face economic and regulatory obstacles to their operation.

The Media Council is the NMHH’s decision-making body in matters related to media outlets. Its responsibilities include allocating television and radio frequencies and penalizing violators of media regulations. All online media outlets are required to register with the NMHH within 60 days of starting operations.1

Some Media Council decisions have been regarded as politicized. For instance, the Media Council permitted the progovernment KESMA (see B5) to skirt a regulation aimed at preventing market concentration,2 while preventing other independent media outlets from merging. 3

The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), which aims to protect journalists from interference and harmonize the EU’s approach to media pluralism and editorial independence across member states, came into force in May 2024.4 The act recognizes that recipients of media services have the right to access a diverse content, and it requires member states to provide a framework to accomplish this objective (see C1). As of the end of the coverage period, the EMFA had not been transposed into Hungarian law.

In December 2023, the government passed a new package of legislation called the Defense of National Sovereignty Act, which nominally aims to protect Hungarian public discourse from foreign interference. Under it, a new state body called the Sovereignty Protection Office was formed and given broad powers to inspect any person or organization suspected of being involved in activities that can jeopardize Hungary’s sovereignty. The new law would enable the Sovereignty Protection Office to investigate civil society organizations and media outlets, including those that operate online. The body would be able to collaborate with intelligence services in these investigations. According to critics, the law is a tool to support the power of the government and discourage citizens from public participation.5 In March 2024, the Venice Commission advised the government to repeal the act establishing and empowering the Sovereignty Protection Office.6 In June 2024, after the coverage period, the Sovereignty Protection Office launched investigations against Transparency International Hungary7 and investigative news site Átlátszó.8

In November 2022, tax authorities questioned Zoltán Varga, the owner of the biggest nongovernment media portfolio, based on the complaint of a Fidesz lawmaker.9

The Hungarian government has increasingly channeled advertising revenue to benefit outlets that publish progovernment content. So-called national consultations and other large-scale, state-financed media campaigns are an integral part of the government’s communications strategy. In recent years, the government has allocated tens of billions of forints to finance its communication campaigns,10 and as of December 2022 the state remained the biggest advertiser on the market.11 The political nature of government advertising, which gives partisan outlets a financial advantage, has further distorted the online media landscape.12

In 2016, the NMHH began enforcing EU net neutrality regulations. Two mobile internet providers, Magyar Telekom13 and Telenor,14 were found to have violated the regulations by giving certain video streaming services preferential treatment, and the NMHH ordered the providers to cease the discriminatory practice.15

B7 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 3.003 4.004

The online media environment remains relatively diverse, though independent news websites face increasing pressure to conform to progovernment narratives. The purchase of online media outlets by progovernment entities has negatively impacted diversity (see B5), and led to a decline in the number of independent and opposition-affiliated news websites. According to a 2021 report from Dunja Mijatović, the commissioner of human rights for the Council of Europe, “the combined effects of a politically controlled media regulatory authority and distortionary state intervention in the media market have eroded media pluralism and freedom of expression in Hungary.”1

For example, after the 2018 parliamentary elections, both the print and online editions of the 80-year-old Magyar Nemzet, one of the leading daily newspapers, were closed due to financial struggles at the paper.2 In February 2019, the political daily newspaper Magyar Idők was rebranded and continued its operations under the name Magyar Nemzet with a strong progovernment bent.3

Independent media is still able to carry out investigative journalism. Independent news site 444.hu published a story in February 2024 about President Katalin Novák pardoning a former deputy director of a child protection home, who had been convicted of pressuring children to revoke their testimonies accusing the director of the institution of sexual harassment.4 Novák resigned a week after the story was published.

In January 2022, 444.hu launched the country’s first fact-checking site, lakmusz.hu, in cooperation with AFP.5

The government and state authorities have also banned journalists, including those who work online, from physically entering hospitals6 and conferences. Independent media outlets were banned from the prime minister’s State of the Nation event in February 2024.7 In May 2023, a reporter from The Guardian was escorted out of the venue of the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), which brings together conservative activists and elected officials, while she was in the middle of an interview, allegedly because her registration was accepted only due to a “system error.”8 In February 2022, Orbán issued a decree overturning a court ruling that hospital directors had the right to determine whether journalists were allowed to enter hospitals, not the Ministry of Human Resources. The initial case was launched in 2021 by Telex.hu after the ministry denied journalists access to hospitals.9

During Pope Francis’s April 2023 visit to Hungary, 444.hu photojournalist Dániel Németh was denied access to official events on the basis that his presence would pose a criminal, public safety, or national security risk. Németh was previously surveilled with Pegasus (see C5).10

Independent online media outlets have given a voice to minorities, including Hungary’s Roma,11 LGBT+ people, and religious groups.

B8 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 6.006 6.006

In Hungary, social media platforms are freely available and are a popular tool for advocacy and organizing protests. Teachers, students, and parents took to the internet to organize several rallies in the fall of 2022 protesting the working conditions of teachers, low wages, and the general state of the Hungarian education system.1 In February 2024, social media influencers organized the largest demonstration in years, attracting a crowd of approximately 150,000 people in Budapest to call for a better child protection system.2 Beginning in December 2023, more than 100 civil society organizations organized a petition to protest the Defense of Sovereignty Act (see B8).3 In May 2023, people organized to protest the “status law,” which was passed in July 2023. The law strips teachers of their status as public servants.4

According to a law on assembly that came into effect in October 2018, organizers are obliged to notify the police of any demonstration 48 hours before publicly announcing it. Those who fail to notify the police can be charged with a misdemeanor and can be fined. Additionally, inviting participants to a demonstration banned by the police was criminalized.5

C Violations of User Rights

C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? 4.004 6.006

The Fundamental Law of Hungary acknowledges the right to freedom of expression and defends “freedom and diversity of the press,”1 although there are no laws that specifically protect online expression. Additionally, in 2013, the Fundamental Law was amended to specify instances in which freedom of speech could be limited. Article 9.2 states that freedom of speech may not be exercised with the aim of violating the dignity of the Hungarian nation or of any national, ethnic, racial, or religious community. The amendment has been criticized for its overly broad scope and lack of clarity.2 An amendment inserted into the Fundamental Law in 2016 gives the government the power to override acts of the parliament for up to 15 days if a state of emergency is declared following a terrorist attack.3 In June 2018, another amendment was inserted into the Fundamental Law, declaring that freedom of expression cannot violate the private and family lives of others or the integrity of the home.4

At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, the parliament passed a law extending the executive’s power to rule by decree in a “state of danger” (a type of state of emergency) from 15 days to an indefinite period; the government subsequently declared a state of danger that initially lasted three months.5 The extraordinary legal order was introduced again in November 2020 and extended repeatedly, lasting until the end of May 2022.6

In May 2022, the Fundamental Law was amended to enable the declaration of a state of danger in case of an “armed conflict, war or humanitarian disaster in a neighboring country.”7 A state of danger was declared, then extended through May 20238 and later to November 2023,9 May 2024,10 and November 2024.11 Under the state of danger, the government is able to rule by decree, “suspend the application” of certain laws, and take other extraordinary measures.12

A 2011 overhaul of the judiciary called into question the independence of the court system. In 2020, the government further consolidated its control over the courts.13 In December 2022, the European Commission tied the payment of Hungary’s recovery and resilience plan to the fulfillment of 27 “super milestones,” four of which relate to the independence of the judiciary.14 In May 2023, parliament adopted a comprehensive amendment reforming the laws regulating the judiciary.15 According to experts, the reform “shows a willingness to fulfill” the super milestones, but compliance is “still deficient.”16

Members of the judiciary are sometimes publicly attacked for political reasons. Progovernment media outlets attempted to pressure two judges who are members of the National Judicial Council to resign in November 2022, after they attended a meeting with US ambassador David Pressman.17

C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 2.002 4.004

There are several laws that could potentially be misused to penalize legitimate online activities. The Hungarian criminal code bans the humiliation of national symbols (the national anthem, flag, and coat of arms), dissemination of totalitarian symbols (the swastika and the red star), denial of the sins of National Socialism and communism, and public scaremongering through the media.1 Article 337 of the criminal code, as amended in March 2020, punishes the spread of “any untrue fact or any misrepresented true fact that is capable of hindering or preventing the efficiency of protection” with up to five years in prison.2 It also punishes information spread “with regard to the public danger that is capable of causing disturbance or unrest in a larger group” with up to three years in prison.

In May 2023, parliament passed a law partially decriminalizing defamation and slander that is “within a scope of discussion of public affairs and is committed by means of a press product or media service,” but exempting cases where a claim is “aimed at an obvious and seriously humiliating denial of the victim’s human dignity.”3 The law was welcomed by experts, although they pointed out that the political intent behind the amendment may be to protect progovernment media commentators from criminal charges that are brought against them for coordinated smear campaigns of opposition figures.4

For cases that do not meet these new criteria, Hungarian law does not distinguish between traditional and online media outlets in libel or defamation cases, and the criminal code stipulates that if slander is committed “before the public at large,” it can be punished by imprisonment of up to one year.5 Anyone publishing defamatory video content can be punished with up to one year in prison, while anyone publishing a defamatory audio recording can be imprisoned for up to two years. If the video is published on a platform with a wide audience or causes significant harm, the sentence can be increased to up to three years in prison.6 Defamation cases have decreased since a 1994 Constitutional Court decision that asserted that a public figure’s tolerance of criticism should be higher than that of an ordinary citizen.7

The civil code also protects citizens from defamation and insults to their honor,8 and compels those who are found responsible to pay restitution.9 The code includes a provision that may limit the free discussion of public affairs in cases where the human dignity of a public figure is violated.10

The “Stop Soros” law passed in June 2018, named to reference Jewish philanthropist George Soros and to pander to antisemitic conspiracy theorists, includes vaguely worded provisions penalizing any activity that “facilitates or supports illegal immigration” or assists individuals who are entering or remaining in Hungary illegally.11 These penalties presumably applied to online activities. However, there have been no prosecutions under the law to date. In November 2021, the European Court of Justice found that the measure breaches EU law,12 and it was subsequently amended in January 2023.13 Although the wording is still problematic, the amended law clarifies that it does not apply to online activities.14

C3 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? 5.005 6.006

Users are occasionally arrested, detained, and prosecuted for their online activities, although not systematically, and fewer individuals were penalized for online activities during the coverage period.

In March 2023, a woman was arrested after she claimed that she had placed a bomb in the house of Dániel Deák, a professor at Budapest’s Corvinus University and a prominent Fidesz supporter, in a comment on one of Deák's Facebook posts. In the comment, she indicated that the threat was satirical. Deák called the fire department, which did not find a bomb.1 In June 2023, the woman was charged with “threatening to cause public danger.”2

In March 2022, the government ordered law enforcement to use fearmongering laws to investigate every case in which false information about the country’s petrol shortage was disseminated.3

In Hungary, online media outlets can face civil proceedings related to the content they produce, and many have in-house counsel to deal with the volume of claims. In the reporting period, Prime Minister Orbán initiated several civil procedures against media outlets that quoted the head of German retail chain SPAR, who said that Orbán had advised SPAR Hungary to sell some of its shares to one of his family members. Most of the court cases were won by the media outlets.4

C4 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts
Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? 2.002 4.004

Some laws restrict online anonymity in Hungary. Generally, users who wish to comment on web articles need to register with the website by providing an email address or their social media credentials. The operator of a website may be asked to provide the authorities with a commenter’s internet protocol (IP) address, email address, and other data in case of an investigation.1 Additionally, users must provide personal data upon purchasing a SIM card in order to sign a contract with a mobile service provider.2

In 2016, new antiterrorism legislation sought to expand authorities’ access to encrypted content online. The legislation amends the Online Trade Services and Services Connected to the Information Society Act, and obligates providers of encrypted services, including messaging platforms, to grant authorized intelligence agencies access to the communications of their clients upon request, unless compliance is impossible because the communication is encrypted end-to-end. Providers of encrypted services must store their clients’ messages and metadata for up to one year (see C6).3 The legislation revealed the authorities’ intent to undermine encryption, though it is unclear how it is enforced.

C5 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? 2.002 6.006

The lack of judicial oversight of state surveillance of ICTs and the Hungarian government’s use of invasive surveillance technology have raised concerns about the degree to which the right to privacy online is protected. Concerns that the government is abusing state surveillance powers abound.

In July 2021, Amnesty International and Forbidden Stories identified phone numbers linked to Hungarian journalists and lawyers in a leaked dataset. Investigators describe the dataset as a list of people of interest to clients of the company NSO Group, which sells the spyware product Pegasus.1 According to a forensic investigation, Pegasus infected mobile devices belonging to Direkt36 journalists Szabolcs Panyi and András Szabó in 2019.2 The mobile device of Brigitta Csikász, an experienced investigative reporter, was also infected with the spyware,3 while former hvg.hu journalist Dávid Dercsényi had many of his former phone numbers selected for targeting.4 Zoltán Varga, the owner of the media company Centrál Médiacsoport, also had his phone number selected for targeting, as did prominent Hungarian lawyers.5

Initially, the government declined to confirm its use of Pegasus spyware, but in November 2021 it was acknowledged by officials.6 Oversight of its use by parliament was limited, as the hearing of the National Security Committee was confidential, and the minutes cannot be disclosed until 2050. The data protection authority investigated “hundreds” of Pegasus-related cases but, in January 2022, concluded that none of them constituted violations of any laws or regulations.7 The HCLU has initiated dozens of legal procedures since news of the scandal broke, but they have been unsuccessful because the law allows government use of spyware without prior judicial oversight on “national security” grounds.8

An April 2023 report from Citizen Lab, a research center based at the University of Toronto, found servers produced by QuaDream, an Israeli company known for selling spyware to government clients, in Hungary. The spyware enables operators to obtain access to targets’ iOS devices through a zero-click exploit, which can take over a phone without any action from the user, such as clicking on a link or an attachment.9

In March 2020, during the legal declaration of a state of danger (see C1), the government issued a decree allowing the minister for innovation and technology to access and handle “any available data” to address and prevent the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic,10 without adequate safeguards or transparency. In early May 2020, a government decree suspended several provisions of the GDPR for the duration of the extraordinary legal order.11

In November 2018, investigative news website Átlátszó.hu reported that the Hungarian government had contracted a private company to monitor content on various social media platforms.12

Prior to the Pegasus revelations, several civil society organizations claimed that the authorities had purchased potentially invasive surveillance technologies. In 2015, files leaked from the Milan-based commercial spyware company Hacking Team revealed that the Hungarian government was a client.13

C6 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts
Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? 4.004 6.006

The Electronic Communications Act obliges service providers to collect the data of their users indiscriminately and transfer it to state authorities when requested. The process lacks transparency. As a member of the EU, entities in Hungary must also abide by the GDPR.

The NAIH is tasked with enforcing data protection legislation, but its impartiality has repeatedly been called into question (see A5). According to a December 2022 report by Human Rights Watch, “when faced with complaints that implicate government abuse of personal data, the NAIH has demonstrated that it is not always willing or able to act as an independent authority.”1

Mobile service providers and ISPs in Hungary must retain user data for up to one year and provide that data to the authorities upon request.2 Following a 2016 appeal from the HCLU, the Constitutional Court found this law unconstitutional and called on parliament to amend the legislation by the end of 2022,3 but parliament failed to comply. There is no publicly available information on how often providers hand over user data, despite the fact that the government has a legal obligation to provide the European Commission with statistics on user data requests made by investigating authorities.4 By law, “electronic service providers” are also obligated to cooperate with intelligence agencies.5 Additionally, the Electronic Communications Act states that service providers must agree with the Special Service for National Security upon written request “about the conditions of the use of tools and methods for the covert acquisition of information and covert acquisition of data.”6

National security services can currently gather metadata “from telecommunications systems and other data storage devices” without a warrant.7 Security agents can access and record the content of communications transmitted via ICTs, though a warrant is required to do so.8 Privacy experts say the authorities have installed black boxes allowing them direct access to ISPs’ networks.9 There is no data on the extent to which, or how regularly, the authorities monitor ICTs.

  • 1Human Rights Watch, “Trapped in a Web The Exploitation of Personal Data in Hungary’s 2022 Elections,” December 1, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/12/01/trapped-web/exploitation-personal….
  • 2Act C of 2003, Art. 159/A
  • 315/2022. (VII. 14.) Constitutional Court Decision, https://alkotmanybirosag.hu/ugyadatlap/?id=BE10B8DB3AC6C7AEC1258709005B…
  • 4Act C of 2003, Art. 159/A, Par. 7.
  • 5Act C of 2003, Art. 92, Par. 1. Electronic service providers provide electronic communications service, which means a “service normally provided against remuneration, which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance, and if applicable routing of signals on electronic communications networks, but exclude services providing or exercising editorial control over the content transmitted using electronic communications network; it does not include information society services, defined under separate legislation, which do not consist primarily in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks,” Act C of 2003, Art. 188, Par. 13.
  • 6Act C of 2003, Art. 92, Par. 2.
  • 7Act CXXV of 1995, Art. 54.
  • 8Act CXXV of 1995, Art. 56.
  • 9“Hungary – Privacy Profile,” Privacy International, January 22, 2011.
C7 1.00-5.00 pts0-5 pts
Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? 4.004 5.005

Critics of the government who speak out online brave coordinated, targeted harassment from government officials and progovernment actors, including government-friendly media outlets and anonymous trolls.1 During the coverage period, András Jámbor, a member of the parliament, was repeatedly accused of pedophilia by progovernment outlets without any substantial evidence.2 A 2023 report from #ShePersisted (see B5) found that women in politics and activism are targeted with online harassment, including by being doxed.3 Far-right actors are also known to wage smear campaigns against perceived enemies.4

In May 2024, journalists working for the outlet Telex, which operates online, were harassed by police while attempting to interview Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó after a campaign event in Kalocsa. They were denied entrance to the event, and as they waited for the minister in the parking lot police physically barred them from asking question and ordered them to turn off their camera so that they could check its serial number “to make sure it was not stolen.”5

András Dezső, a journalist covering national security and criminal issues, revealed in October 2021 that officers of the Constitution Protection Office, who alleged that they had damaging private information about him, attempted to blackmail him in 2015 for his coverage of the United States’ decision to ban Hungarian officials, but he refused to cooperate.6

Hate speech—including against LGBT+ people, Roma, and migrants and refugees—is commonplace online.

Bloggers and ordinary ICT users are not generally subject to physical violence by state authorities or any other actors. There were no reported incidents of retributive physical violence during the coverage period. though there have been instances of intimidation in the past.7

C8 1.00-3.00 pts0-3 pts
Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? 1.001 3.003

Independent media outlets continue to face cyberattacks attacks. In August 2023, the International Press Institute (IPI), a press freedom watchdog group, reported that at least 40 media outlets in Hungary, including Telex, hvg.hu, 444.hu, Magyar Hang, and Népszava, had experienced DDoS attacks since April.1 The report noted that the attacks increased in May and June and the attackers appeared to be based in Hungary, as messages in Hungarian were found in the code. Following the publication of its report, IPI’s website experienced DDoS attacks and other cyberattacks in September 2023, rendering it inaccessible for three days.2

In November 2022, the state-run education software used in all schools, KRÉTA, was hacked as the result of a phishing attack, giving the hackers access to all data in the system.3 The police accused two teenagers of conducting the hack.4

In March 2022, ahead of the parliamentary elections, several news websites owned by Mediaworks, a government-friendly media group, were hacked and defaced with messages supporting the opposition. In the messages, the attackers alleged that they represented the hacking group Anonymous.5

In October 2021, servers of the opposition primaries (see B8) were repeatedly impacted by DDoS attacks, which prevented voters abroad from casting their votes and forced the organizers to extend the deadline for voting by 48 hours.6 The voting systems for the second round of the primaries were also affected by a DDoS attack. In the same month, news outlets reporting on the results of the primaries, including Mérce, 24.hu, and 444.hu, were also targeted by a coordinated DDoS attack.7

Beginning in the second half of 2021, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade was allegedly hit with repeated cyberattacks by hackers linked to Russian intelligence services, including the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). The attacks, which gave hackers access to diplomatic communications, persisted into 2022.8

On Hungary

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Country Facts

  • Population

    9,643,000

  • Global Freedom Score

    65 100 partly free

  • Internet Freedom Score

    69 100 partly free

  • Freedom in the World Status

    Partly Free

  • Networks Restricted

    No

  • Websites Blocked

    Yes

  • Pro-government Commentators

    Yes

  • Users Arrested

    No