Hungary
| A Obstacles to Access | 21 25 |
| B Limits on Content | 23 35 |
| C Violations of User Rights | 25 40 |
Hungary continued to enjoy high levels of overall connectivity and affordable internet access. While there are few overt restrictions on content in Hungary and people rarely are detained or imprisoned in retaliation for their online activities, the government exerts control over telecommunications and the online media landscape. Authorities have also launched smear campaigns and politicized investigations into online media outlets and journalists.
- In January 2025, telecommunications providers Vodafone Hungary and DIGI, both of which are owned by the Budapest-based 4iG, merged to form the One Hungary brand. The Hungarian Competition Authority had previously ruled that 4iG’s 2022 acquisitions of both Vodafone Hungary and DIGI were in the “national strategic interest” (A4).1
- A June 2024 report from Hungarian organizations Political Capital, Lakmusz, and the Mérték Média Monitor found that the ruling Fidesz party and associated media and influencer groups had spent €1.1 million ($1.1 million) to spread the narrative that European politicians and the Hungarian opposition wanted to lead Hungary into World War III by supporting Ukraine. (The Russian military had launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.) The media campaign took place ahead of the June 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections (B5 and B7).2
- In June 2024, Hungary’s Sovereignty Protection Office, which was created under the 2023 Defense of Sovereignty Act, launched investigations into the independent online news outlet Átlátszó because it received foreign funding, as well as Transparency International Hungary for allegedly using foreign funding to influence voters. A subsequent freedom of information request filed by Átlátszó found that the office had ordered state institutions, including the Media and Infocommunications Authority, the Tax and Customs Authority, and the Hungarian National Bank, to collect the personal data of citizens; the outlet said that some of requests appeared to go beyond the office’s legal mandate (B6 and C6).3
- In April 2025, Hungarian lawmakers passed a constitutional amendment banning LGBT+ events, a month after the approval of a March 2025 law that banned Pride protests specifically. The law also enabled authorities to use facial recognition tools to identify people attending LGBT+ events (B8, C1, and C5).4
- 1Capacity Global, “Vodafone Hungary and DIGI to consolidate in 2025,” November 27, 2024, https://capacityglobal.com/news/vodafone-towerxchange/; “Hungary,” in Funk, Vesteinsson, Baker, Brody, Grothe, Agarwal, Barak, Loldj, Masinsin, Sutterlin eds. Freedom on the Net 2024, Freedom House, 2024, freedomonthenet.org.
- 2“Fidesz & Co. flooded social media with anti-Western hostile disinformation in Hungary’s election campaign, reaching EU spending records,” Political Capital, Lakmusz, and Mérték Média Monitor, June 2024, https://edmo.eu/publications/in-hungary-sponsored-disinformation-ran-ra….
- 3Eva Bognár, “Branding independent newsrooms as foreign agents, and threatening them with financial sanctions: Hungary’s Sovereignty Protection Office in action,” International Press Institute, October 15, 2024, https://ipi.media/hungary-sovereignty-protection-act/; Márton Sarakadi Nagy, “Hungary’s Sovereignty Protection Office requested information on private bank accounts,” Átlátszó, August 13, 2024, https://english.atlatszo.hu/2024/06/25/the-sovereignty-protection-offic…; Transparency International, “Transparency International condemns investigation of its Hungarian chapter by Sovereignty Protection Office,” July 1, 2024, https://www.transparency.org/en/press/transparency-international-condem….
- 4“Hungary passes constitutional amendment to band LGBTQ+ public events,” NPR, April 15, 2025, https://www.npr.org/2025/04/15/nx-s1-5365421/hungary-lgbtq-rights-ban-o…; Cristian González Cabrera, “Hungary Bans LGBT Pride Events,” Human Rights Watch, March 20, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/20/hungary-bans-lgbt-pride-events.
Since taking power in the 2010 elections, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Alliance of Young Democrats–Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz) party has pushed through constitutional and legal changes that have allowed it to consolidate control over the country’s independent institutions. The Fidesz government has passed antimigrant and anti-LGBT+ policies, as well as laws that hamper the operations of opposition groups, journalists, universities, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are critical of the ruling party or whose perspectives Fidesz otherwise finds unfavorable.
This report has been abridged for Freedom on the Net 2025 due to ongoing budget constraints. Please consider making a donation to support future editions of this vital resource.
For additional background information, see last year’s full report.
| Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? | 6.006 6.006 |
| Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? | 3.003 3.003 |
| Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? | 6.006 6.006 |
| Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? | 4.004 6.006 |
| Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers and digital technology fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? | 2.002 4.004 |
| Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? | 4.004 6.006 |
| Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? | 2.002 4.004 |
| Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? | 3.003 4.004 |
| Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? | 3.003 4.004 |
| Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a particular political interest? | 2.002 4.004 |
| Are there economic or regulatory constraints that negatively affect users’ ability to publish content online? | 1.001 3.003 |
| Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? | 3.003 4.004 |
| Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? | 5.005 6.006 |
Score Change: The score declined from 6 to 5 because of the impact on online organizing of an April 2025 constitutional amendment that bans LGBT+ events.
| Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? | 4.004 6.006 |
| Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? | 2.002 4.004 |
| Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? | 5.005 6.006 |
| Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or encryption? | 2.002 4.004 |
| Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? | 2.002 6.006 |
| Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on users’ right to privacy? | 4.004 6.006 |
| Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? | 4.004 5.005 |
| Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individual users subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? | 2.002 3.003 |
Score Change: The score improved from 1 to 2 because there were fewer reported cyberattacks against online media outlets during the coverage period.
Country Facts
-
Population
9,643,000 -
Global Freedom Score
65 100 partly free -
Internet Freedom Score
69 100 partly free -
Freedom in the World Status
Partly Free -
Networks Restricted
No -
Websites Blocked
Yes -
Pro-government Commentators
Yes -
Users Arrested
No