Hungary
| A Obstacles to Access | 21 25 |
| B Limits on Content | 23 35 |
| C Violations of User Rights | 25 40 |
Hungary continued to enjoy high levels of affordable internet connectivity during the coverage period. While the government does not extensively filter content or punish people for online speech, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s office ordered internet providers to block 12 Ukrainian news sites during the coverage period.1 Despite obstacles introduced by the Orbán government, internet users in Hungary organized online to produce large turnout at LGBT+ events and electoral campaign rallies.2
Editor’s Note: Péter Magyar became prime minister in May 2026 after the opposition Tisza party won the April 2026 parliamentary elections, ending Viktor Orbán’s 16 years in power.3 The numerical scores and status here do not account for some of the reforms initiated by Magyar, since the Freedom on the Net 2026 report only covers developments during the period from June 2025 to May 2026.
This report has been abridged for Freedom on the Net 2026. Please consider making a donation to support future editions of this vital resource. For additional information, see the 2024 full report and 2025 abridged report.
- 1“Hungary Blocks 12 Ukrainian News Sites in Tit-for-Tat,” Reuters, September 29, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/hungary-blocks-12-ukrain….
- 2
Ashifa Kassam, “Hungary Bans Pride Events and Plans to Use Facial Recognition to Target Attenders,” The Guardian, March 18, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/18/hungary-bans-pride-events…; Budapest Pride, “30. Budapest Pride Felvonulás/March,” Facebook, event, June 28, 2025, https://www.facebook.com/events/726484322836829/?active_tab=discussion; Amnesty International, “Let Pride March in Hungary,” 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/petition/let-pride-march-in-hungary/; Justin Spike, “Around 100,000 March at Budapest Pride in Defiance of Hungary's Ban on the Event,” PBS News, June 28, 2025, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/around-100000-march-at-budapest-prid…; Endre Borbáth, “Explaining Tisza’s Hungarian Breakthrough,” European Consortium for Political Research’s The Loop, April 16, 2026, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/explaining-tiszas-hungarian-breakthrough/.
- 3
Ashifa Kassam and Flora Garamvolgyi, “Péter Magyar Sworn in as Hungary’s Prime Minister Ending 16-year Orbán Era,” The Guardian, May 9, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/09/hungary-prime-minister-pe….
| Do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet or the speed and quality of internet connections? | 6.006 6.006 |
| Is access to the internet prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population for geographical, social, or other reasons? | 3.003 3.003 |
| Does the government exercise technical or legal control over internet infrastructure for the purposes of restricting connectivity? | 6.006 6.006 |
| Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that restrict the diversity of service providers? | 4.004 6.006 |
| Do national regulatory bodies that oversee service providers, digital platforms, and the internet more broadly fail to operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? | 2.002 4.004 |
| Does the state block or filter, or compel service providers to block or filter, internet content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? | 3.003 6.006 |
Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 3 because the Orbán government blocked twelve Ukrainian news sites, in response to the blocking of eight Hungarian-language sites in Ukraine; the websites were made accessible again in June 2026, after the coverage period, by the government of Péter Magyar, who succeeded Orbán as prime minister in May 2026.1
- 1“Hungary Blocks 12 Ukrainian News Sites in Tit-for-Tat,” Reuters; Mariya Yemets, “Hungary Confirms Lifting of Blockade on Ukrainian Media Introduced under its Former PM,” Yahoo! News, June 20, 2026, https://www.yahoo.com/news/politics/articles/hungary-confirms-lifting-b….
| Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, digital platforms, content hosts, or other intermediaries to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? | 2.002 4.004 |
| Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? | 3.003 4.004 |
| Do journalists, commentators, and ordinary people practice self-censorship online? | 3.003 4.004 |
| Are online sources of information controlled or manipulated by the government or other powerful actors to advance a favored interest? | 2.002 4.004 |
| Are there economic, regulatory, or other constraints that negatively affect individuals’ ability to publish content online? | 1.001 3.003 |
| Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? | 3.003 4.004 |
| Do conditions impede individuals’ ability to form communities, mobilize, and campaign online, particularly on political and social issues? | 6.006 6.006 |
Score Change: The score improved from 5 to 6 because online mobilization facilitated considerable turnout at LGBT+ events and electoral campaign rallies, in spite of obstacles introduced by the Orbán government.1
- 1Ashifa Kassam, “Hungary Bans Pride Events and Plans to Use Facial Recognition to Target Attenders;” Budapest Pride, “30. Budapest Pride Felvonulás/March;” Amnesty International, “Let Pride March in Hungary;” Justin Spike, “Around 100,000 March at Budapest Pride in Defiance of Hungary's Ban on the Event;” Endre Borbáth, “Explaining Tisza’s Hungarian Breakthrough.”
| Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that lacks independence? | 4.004 6.006 |
| Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? | 2.002 4.004 |
| Are individuals penalized for online activities, particularly those that are protected under international human rights standards? | 5.005 6.006 |
| Does the government place restrictions on anonymous online communication or encryption? | 2.002 4.004 |
| Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on individuals’ right to privacy? | 2.002 6.006 |
| Does monitoring and collection of user data by service providers and other technology companies infringe on individuals’ right to privacy? | 4.004 6.006 |
| Are individuals subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor in relation to their online activities? | 4.004 5.005 |
| Are websites, governmental and private entities, service providers, or individuals subject to widespread hacking and other forms of cyberattack? | 2.002 3.003 |
Country Facts
-
Population
9,643,000 -
Global Freedom Score
65 100 partly free -
Internet Freedom Score
69 100 partly free -
Freedom in the World Status
Partly Free