Myanmar remained one of the world’s worst environments for internet freedom. The military, which seized control of the state in a 2021 coup, continued to impose localized internet shutdowns, manipulate online information, and imprison people for their online expression of dissent amid an ongoing civil war between the military regime and its armed opponents. The military’s direct and indirect control over all major service providers enabled mass censorship and surveillance, including broad limits on social media platforms and anticensorship tools.

• A March 2025 earthquake in Mandalay severely damaged telecommunications infrastructure in the region, disrupting internet services.1 The disaster exacerbated similar damage throughout the country that resulted from the civil war (A1).2
• The military imposed frequent internet shutdowns at the local level, often in connection with armed attacks,3 impeding the documentation of rights abuses and the delivery of lifesaving medical aid (A3).4
• In June and July 2024, authorities blocked access to the encrypted messaging application Signal and major virtual private networks (VPNs); VPNs were widely used to circumvent website blocking and enable more private online activity (B1 and B7).5
• Over a dozen telecommunications providers and internet companies had installed surveillance and censorship technology on behalf of the military authorities by 2024 (B3 and C5).6
• In January 2025, the military regime adopted the Cybersecurity Law, which codified overbroad censorship mandates, limited the operations of VPN providers, and imposed local data retention requirements, among other provisions (B3, B6, and C6).7
• Authorities detained, forcibly disappeared, and killed people in retaliation for their online activities.8 For example, courts sentenced journalists Htet Aung and Than Htike Myint to 10 and five years’ imprisonment in June 2024 and April 2025, respectively, to punish their independent reporting for online outlets. They were among hundreds of journalists whom the authorities had unjustly detained or imprisoned since the 2021 coup (C3 and C7).9

• 1Amreesh Phokeer, “Myanmar Earthquake: A Crisis Within a Crisis,” Internet Society, April 1, 2025, https://pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/myanmar-earthquake-a-crisis-with…; Oliver Spencer, “Civic Aftershock: How Restricting Civil Society Obstructed Myanmar’s Earthquake Response,” International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, September 2025, https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Myanmar-Civic-Aftershock-ICNL.p….
• 2Myanmar Internet Project, “No End in Sight : Situation of Internet Shutdown and Infrastructure Damages in Myanmar,” Progressive Voice Myanmar, July 16, 2024, https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2024/07/16/no-end-in-sight-situatio….
• 3“Myanmar Communication Blackout, 2021 to Present,” Athan Myanmar, updated August 2025, https://athanmyanmar.org/myanmar-communication-blackout-2021-to-present/; “Number of times the internet was cut off by Region and State (Feb 2021 to Current),” updated October 2025, Myanmar Internet Project, https://www.myanmarinternet.info/internet-shutdown.
• 4Surachanee Sriyai, “Myanmar’s Internet Shutdowns: Silencing Resistance in the Battle for Connectivity,” Fulcrum, January 24, 2025, https://fulcrum.sg/myanmars-internet-shutdowns-silencing-resistance-in-….
• 5Grant Peck, “Myanmar’s embattled military government cracks down on free flow of news by blocking VPNs,” AP, June 14, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-censorship-virtual-private-network-f…; “Myanmar junta restricts more mobile apps, residents say,” Radio Free Asia, July 23, 2024, https://web.archive.org/web/20250329190006/https://www.rfa.org/english/….
• 6“The Internet Coup: A Technical Analysis on How a Chinese Company is Exporting the Great Firewall to Autocratic Regimes,” InterSecLab, September 9, 2025, https://interseclab.org/research/the-internet-coup/.
• 7“Myanmar’s cyber law a serious threat to privacy, speech, and security,” Human Rights Myanmar, January 13, 2025, https://humanrightsmyanmar.org/myanmars-cyber-law-a-serious-threat-to-p…; Republic of Myanmar, State Administration Council, Cybersecurity Law (State Administration Council Law No. 1/2025) [unofficial translation], January 1, 2025, https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/2025-version-Lincoln.pdf.
• 8“Myanmar: Arbitrary arrests, torture of political prisoners and digital repression used to crush the anti-junta movement,” Civicus Monitor, October 2024, https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/myanmar-arbitrary-arrests-torture-o….
• 9“Analysing 4 years of journalist detentions in post-coup Myanmar,” Human Rights Myanmar, June 16, 2025, https://humanrightsmyanmar.org/analysing-4-years-of-journalist-detentio…; “Myanmar journalist Than Htike Myint sentenced to 5 years in prison for terrorism,” Committee to Protect Journalists, May 2, 2025, https://cpj.org/2025/05/myanmar-journalist-than-htike-myint-sentenced-t….

Military commanders seized control of Myanmar’s government in February 2021, ending a period of power sharing between military and civilian leaders under a 2008 constitution that had been drafted by a previous junta. Since the coup, the military has violently suppressed peaceful civic dissent and battled a sizable armed resistance movement that has widespread popular support and includes various armed ethnic minority groups. The National League for Democracy (NLD), which led the civilian government before the coup and won a sweeping victory in the November 2020 elections, serves as the political backbone of a National Unity Government (NUG). Armed ethnic groups and resistance groups with ties to the NUG exercise partial or effective control over a growing swathe of territory. Millions of people remain displaced or have been newly displaced by the ongoing civil war, with many seeking refuge abroad.

This report has been abridged for Freedom on the Net 2025 due to ongoing budget constraints. Please consider making a donation to support future editions of this vital resource.

For additional background information, see last year’s full report.