|PR Political Rights||9 40|
|CL Civil Liberties||19 60|
Pakistani Kashmir is administered as two territories: Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB). Each has an elected assembly and government with limited autonomy, but they lack the parliamentary representation and other rights of Pakistani provinces, and Pakistani federal institutions have predominant influence over security, the courts, and most important policy matters. Politics within the two territories are carefully managed to promote the idea of Kashmir’s eventual accession to Pakistan. Freedoms of expression and association, and any political activity deemed contrary to Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir, are restricted.
- Firing and shelling across the Line of Control (LoC), in violation of a 2003 cease-fire agreement, continued during the year. According to the Pakistani military, Indian forces caused the deaths of 55 civilians and injuries to more than 300 others in AJK between January and early December.
- In May, the Pakistani government issued the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan Order 2018, which incorporated some but not all of the recommendations of a Pakistani parliamentary committee that had proposed greater integration for GB without granting formal provincial status. The order provoked protests and a legal challenge from those demanding full constitutional rights for the territory.
|Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?||1.001 4.004|
Both AJK and GB have locally elected executive leaders. However, the Pakistani government also controls—directly and indirectly—key executive functions, and it is not accountable to voters in the two territories.
Under AJK’s 1974 interim constitution, a president elected by the Legislative Assembly serves as head of state, while the elected prime minister is the chief executive. After the 2016 elections, the new assembly elected the local leader of Pakistan’s then ruling Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PML-N), Raja Farooq Haider, as prime minister, and Masood Khan, formerly a senior Pakistani diplomat, as president.
An AJK Council is based in Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad, consisting of both Kashmiri and Pakistani officials and chaired by the Pakistani prime minister. The council holds a number of executive, legislative, and judicial powers, such as control over the appointment of superior judges and the chief election commissioner.
In May 2018, the Pakistani government adopted the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan Order 2018 to replace GB’s previous basic law, the 2009 Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order (GBESGO). Under the new order, which took effect in June, executive functions are shared between a Pakistani-appointed governor and a chief minister chosen by the GB Assembly (GBA), which was formerly called the GB Legislative Assembly. The governor signs legislation and has significant power over judicial appointments; his decisions cannot be overruled by the GBA. The 2018 order also grants extensive authority to the prime minister of Pakistan, including exclusive executive and legislative powers on a long list of specified topics.
Hafiz Hafeezur Rehman of the PML-N became chief minister of GB after the territory’s 2015 elections and is scheduled to remain in office until 2020. However, after the July 2018 victory of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party in the Pakistani general elections, the GB governor resigned, and the new Pakistani government replaced him with the local president of the PTI, Raja Maqpoon, in September.
|Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?||2.002 4.004|
Neither AJK nor GB is represented in the Pakistani Parliament.
Of the AJK Legislative Assembly’s 49 seats, 41 are filled through direct elections: 29 with constituencies based in the territory and 12 representing Kashmiri “refugees” throughout Pakistan. Another eight are reserved seats: five for women and one each for representatives of overseas Kashmiris, technocrats, and religious leaders. In the 2016 elections, the PML-N won with 31 seats. The local branch of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won three seats, as did the Muslim Conference, and the PTI secured two. The remaining two seats were won by the Jammu Kashmir Peoples Party and an independent. The election process was largely peaceful, though both the PPP and the local PTI leader complained of preelection manipulation, including the use of federal development funds to boost support for the PML-N.
The 33-member GBA is composed of 24 directly elected members, six seats reserved for women, and three seats reserved for technocrats; the reserved seats are filled through a vote by the elected members. The GBA’s legislative authority is limited to certain subjects, and even discussion of some topics—foreign affairs, defense, internal security, and judicial conduct—is prohibited by the 2018 order. However, the order does allow the GBA to exercise legislative powers that were previously allocated to the Gilgit-Baltistan Council (GBC). The council, which now has an advisory role, is headed by the Pakistani prime minister and vice-chaired by the GB governor, and includes six members chosen by the GBA and six Pakistani ministers or Parliament members chosen by the Pakistani prime minister. The GB chief minister also has a seat.
Elections to the assembly were held in 2015. In keeping with the well-established pattern of victory by the party in power in Islamabad, the PML-N took 15 of the 24 directly elected seats. No other party won more than two seats, including the previously governing PPP.
|Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies?||1.001 4.004|
The electoral framework in both territories facilitates indirect control by the Pakistani authorities. For example, the AJK Council appoints the chief election commissioner, and the electoral system for the AJK Legislative Assembly disproportionately favors nonresident refugees over AJK residents. The nonresident elections are more vulnerable to manipulation by federal Pakistani authorities, and the party in office at the federal level tends to win these seats. Candidates in the AJK elections must formally endorse “the ideology of Pakistan” and Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan.
Elections in GB are governed by Pakistani election law and a code of conduct drawn up by the local election commission. The first clause of the code of conduct dictates that parties and candidates must refrain from any action or speech which could be deemed contrary to the ideology of Pakistan or the country’s security. This vague provision can be used to exclude candidates associated with nationalist parties or those disapproved of by the Pakistani authorities.
|Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?||1.001 4.004|
Politics are dominated in both AJK and GB by local branches of the main Pakistani parties and some local parties, such as AJK’s Muslim Conference, that are closely allied with the Pakistani establishment. Small nationalist parties that are opposed to union with Pakistan are actively marginalized or barred outright from the political process. Activists accused of opposition to Pakistani rule have been subject to surveillance, harassment, and sometimes imprisonment. The interim constitution of AJK bans political parties that do not endorse the territory’s eventual accession to Pakistan, and similar rules prevail in GB.
There were no high-profile cases in which GB political activists were jailed during 2018. However, those previously jailed remained in detention, including Baba Jan, a leader of the left-wing Awami Workers Party who is serving a life sentence for his participation in protests.
|Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?||1.001 4.004|
There is ample precedent for transfers of power between the major parties, though these are typically dictated by parallel changes at the federal level in Pakistan. The PML-N Pakistani government’s decision to replace the GB governor in early 2015 was criticized as a bid to ensure the party’s victory in the GB legislative elections, and federal authorities were similarly accused of working to manipulate the 2016 AJK Legislative Assembly elections in favor of the PML-N.
|Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign powers, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group that is not democratically accountable?||1.001 4.004|
Because voters in GB and AJK cannot participate in Pakistani elections, Pakistani federal officials and entities are not democratically accountable to them. Security agencies operating in both territories are federal institutions. They work to block and suppress any parties or politicians that adopt positions deemed to conflict with Pakistani interests.
|Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities?||1.001 4.004|
Men and women have the right to vote in both territories. Although there is no bar on women contesting general seats, prevailing norms mean that women rarely exercise this right. Instead, general seats tend to be filled by men. The seats reserved for women are filled proportionally from party lists based on the general vote, meaning the parties themselves determine who will represent women’s interests.
|Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?||1.001 4.004|
The powers of the elected chief executives in AJK and GB are limited by the fact that the Pakistani prime minister, the Pakistani minister for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan, and through them the federal civil service, exercise effective control over government operations in both territories. As in Pakistan, federal military and intelligence agencies also play a powerful role in governance and policymaking.
The territories lack any meaningful fiscal autonomy, as federal taxes are imposed on both, and they receive a share of the resulting funds from the federal government. The territories’ local representatives are excluded from the Pakistani bodies that negotiate interprovincial resource allocation.
There has been a sustained debate within GB on the idea of enhancing the territory’s status in the Pakistani constitution by designating it a provisional province, granting its legislators powers on par with those delegated to Pakistan’s four existing provinces, and giving GB representation in the federal Parliament. Proponents have claimed that this would reduce any legal concerns hampering Chinese investment as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) infrastructure project and grant GB residents the constitutional rights as those enjoyed by Pakistani citizens. However, figures associated with the struggle against Indian control of Kashmir have criticized the GB proposal as a weakening of the commitment to full Kashmiri accession to Pakistan.
A Pakistani parliamentary committee, headed by Sartaj Aziz, reviewed the constitutional status of GB in 2017 and recommended granting GB integration with Pakistan that stopped short of de jure provincial status. The report was formally submitted to the Pakistani prime minister in January 2018 for consideration by the cabinet. This eventually led to the Pakistani government adopting the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan Order 2018 in May. The order was criticized for failing to grant the provisional provincial status that many GB politicians had demanded. It took effect in June, was challenged in the courts and suspended by GB’s highest judicial body later that month, then restored by Pakistan’s Supreme Court in August.
|Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective?||1.001 4.004|
Both territories have formal safeguards against official corruption, and GB is within the jurisdiction of Pakistan’s National Accountability Bureau, which has an office in Gilgit. However, as in Pakistan, corruption is believed to remain endemic, with enforcement actions subject to political influence.
|Does the government operate with openness and transparency?||1.001 4.004|
Transparency and access to government information are limited in practice. The AJK government has made a gesture toward transparency by posting basic information about its departments online.
|ADDITIONAL DISCRETIONARY POLITICAL RIGHTS QUESTION||-2.00-2|
Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group? −2 / 0
The Sunni Muslim share of the population in GB—historically a Shiite-majority region—has increased significantly in the decades since a pre-1947 rule was abolished to allow immigration from different parts of Pakistan. State agencies are suspected of deliberately encouraging this migration to engineer a demographic change. Under the 2009 GBESGO, settlers were given formal citizenship rights in GB; critics of a clause in the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan Order 2018 have argued that it appears to extend GB citizenship rights to all Pakistani citizens, further encouraging settlement. The pre-1947 restrictions on acquiring residency and citizenship are still in place in AJK.
|Are there free and independent media?||1.001 4.004|
AJK and GB are subject to laws that curb freedom of expression, particularly related to the political status of the regions. Media houses need permission from the AJK Council and the federal Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan to operate. A wide range of media are present and active. However, coverage of news and politics does not diverge from official Pakistani narratives, including that India’s hold over the Kashmir Valley is illegitimate and all Kashmiris aspire to Pakistan accession. This compliance is achieved through a mixture of censorship, self-censorship, and harassment. A number of outlets have faced closure by authorities in recent years.
|Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?||1.001 4.004|
Both territories have a predominantly Muslim population, and there is no official or social tolerance of nonbelief. Tools used to compel expressions of belief and conformity with official interpretations of religious doctrine include laws criminalizing blasphemy, rules requiring observance of Ramadan, and an obligation to denounce the heterodox Ahmadi sect to obtain a Pakistani passport. Although there is a history of Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence in GB, there were no major outbreaks in 2018.
|Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination?||2.002 4.004|
Each territory is home to a growing education system, and education is much valued as a path to migration and employment. However, in academia there are acute sensitivities around the issue of constitutional status and no tolerance of debate or materials questioning Pakistan’s claims over Kashmir. Student union activity has long been subject to state monitoring for signs of nationalist political views. Local languages and scripts are not taught in government schools. A series of bombing and arson attacks on schools in the Darel Valley and nearby areas during the summer of 2018 were attributed to Islamist militants who oppose secular and girls’ education.
|Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution?||2.002 4.004|
Federal intelligence agencies maintain a prominent and intrusive presence in both territories. Discussion of heterodox political or religious views consequently carries significant risks. The authorities have increased their monitoring of social media and sporadically punish expression of anti-Pakistan or separatist opinions.
|Is there freedom of assembly?||1.001 4.004|
The authorities’ observance of freedom of assembly is highly discretionary. Protests that do not directly challenge Pakistani control or the territories’ constitutional status tend to be tolerated. Local business interests in Gilgit continued their tradition of activism by protesting in May 2018 against the latest changes in taxation procedures. Earlier that month, police employed tear gas to disrupt protests against the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan Order 2018. In AJK there is official encouragement of demonstrations to condemn Indian atrocities on the other side of the LoC. However, protests and other activities by local nationalist groups are harshly punished. In March 2018, authorities used a ban and police violence to suppress a demonstration by the independence-oriented Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) against cease-fire violations along the LoC.
|Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations, particularly those that are engaged in human rights– and governance-related work?||1.001 4.004|
Humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are subject to strict registration requirements and thus operate at the pleasure of the authorities. NGOs working on political or human rights issues face more intrusive government scrutiny and, in some cases, harassment.
|Is there freedom for trade unions and similar professional or labor organizations?||2.002 4.004|
AJK is subject to labor laws similar to those in Pakistan. However, unions and professional organizations are frequently barred. Labor laws and union activities are poorly developed in GB.
|Is there an independent judiciary?||1.001 4.004|
Both territories have nominally independent judiciaries, but the Pakistani federal government plays a powerful role in judicial appointments. On politically sensitive issues, the AJK and GB courts are not considered to operate with independence from the executive in Pakistan.
The president of AJK, in consultation with the AJK Council, appoints the chief justice of the territory’s Supreme Court. Other judges of the superior courts are appointed by the AJK president on the advice of the council, after consultation with the chief justice. The chief judge and other judges of GB’s Supreme Appellate Court are appointed for three-year terms by the prime minister of Pakistan on the recommendation of the governor.
|Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters?||1.001 4.004|
The civilian court system in both territories features basic due process guarantees, including defense lawyers and a right to appeal, but arbitrary arrests and other violations are not uncommon, particularly in security-related cases. Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), which is often used to suppress dissent, includes vaguely defined offenses, allows extended detention without trial, and applies to juveniles, among other problematic features. Since 2015, the Pakistani government has allowed civilians facing charges of terrorism or sectarian violence to be tried in military courts, which have fewer due process protections and can impose the death penalty.
|Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies?||1.001 4.004|
Torture and deaths in custody at the hands of security forces have been reported, especially for independence supporters and other activists. Separately, extremist groups devoted largely to attacks on Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir operate from AJK and GB and have links with similar factions based in Pakistan and Afghanistan. A 2003 cease-fire agreement between the Indian and Pakistani armies is supposed to protect AJK from attacks across the LoC. However, intermittent firing and shelling continued throughout 2018. The Pakistani military reported in early December that 55 civilians had been killed and more than 300 had been injured in cease-fire violations during the year.
|Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?||0.000 4.004|
As in Pakistan, women in the territories face economic discrimination, disadvantages under personal status laws, and abusive customary practices, the perpetrators of which often enjoy impunity. LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) people, ethnic minorities, and non-Sunni religious groups also suffer from discrimination, and Afghan refugees have encountered increased harassment and pressure to return to Afghanistan since 2015. Pakistani authorities have been reluctant to offer citizenship to migrants displaced from Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Periodically these refugees have been subjected to abuse and arbitrary arrest for demanding greater rights.
|Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education?||2.002 4.004|
The people of AJK and GB have Pakistani national identity cards and passports. They are internationally recognized as Pakistani nationals. However, there are reports of passports being denied or not renewed for citizens suspected of questioning Pakistani control over the region. The territories’ heavy military presence and the threat of shelling and other violence along the LoC restricts internal movement for civilians.
|Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property and establish private businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors?||2.002 4.004|
AJK’s pre-1947 state subject law, which bars outsiders from seeking permanent residency, allows only legal residents to own property. In GB, residents have raised concerns about possible displacement by CPEC development projects, and at least some forcible evictions have been reported to date. Procedures for establishing private enterprises in the territories are onerous in practice.
|Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance?||1.001 4.004|
In both territories, the legal framework criminalizes domestic violence and so-called honor killing, but harmful traditional practices related to sex, marriage, and personal behavior often prevail amid weak enforcement of formal protections, especially in more conservative areas. Informal justice mechanisms operating at the village level are the first point of recourse for many incidents involving sexual or domestic violence against women, and their judgments can inflict further harm on victims.
|Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation?||1.001 4.004|
Both territories, but particularly GB, have historically been less economically developed than Pakistan, and their population has depended on labor migration to supplement incomes. The lack of local control over extractive industries prompts periodic complaints that residents are being deprived of the benefits of natural resources. There are divergent views in GB regarding the extent to which local people stand to gain from economic activity generated by the centrally managed CPEC.
On Pakistani Kashmir
See all data, scores & information on this country or territory.See More
Global Freedom Score29 100 not free