Both AJK and GB have locally elected executive leaders. However, the Pakistani government controls—directly and indirectly—key executive functions, and it is unaccountable to voters in the territories. The ouster of a PTI-led Pakistani government in April 2022 was followed by similar changes in the two territories in 2023.

Under AJK’s 1974 interim constitution, a president elected by the Legislative Assembly serves as head of state, while the elected prime minister is the chief executive. After the PTI won the July 2021 elections, its nominees Sultan Mehmood Chaudhry and Abdul Qayyum Niazi took office as president and prime minister, respectively. Niazi resigned in April 2022 following a no-confidence vote by his own PTI legislators, and the assembly elected another PTI member, Sardar Tanveer Ilyas, to replace him. In April 2023, Ilyas was disqualified from office when the High Court found him guilty of contempt for criticizing the judiciary in a speech. Chaudhry Anwarul Haq was then elected as AJK prime minister, with the support of a breakaway faction of the PTI plus the PML-N and PPP—the parties that had taken power in Pakistan in 2022.

An AJK Council based in Islamabad comprises both Kashmiri and Pakistani officials and is chaired by the Pakistani prime minister. The council holds a number of executive, legislative, and judicial powers.

Under the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan Order 2018, executive functions in GB are shared between a Pakistani-appointed governor and a chief minister chosen by the GB Assembly (GBA). The governor’s decisions cannot be overruled by the GBA. The 2018 order also grants extensive executive and legislative authorities to the Pakistani prime minister.

Khalid Khurshid Khan of the PTI was elected as GB chief minister in 2020 after GBA elections returned a PTI majority. In June 2022, however, Raja Jalal Hussein Maqpoon, a former PTI party chief in GB, resigned as governor. The Pakistani government replaced him with a PPP nominee, Syed Mehdi Shah, in August. In May 2023, Khurshid was placed under house arrest in Islamabad for allegedly sheltering PTI leaders amid a crackdown on the party following violent protests by Imran Khan’s supporters that month. In July Khurshid was disqualified from the GBA, having been accused of using a fake degree to obtain his law license. As in AJK, a coalition comprising a PTI breakaway faction, the PML-N, and the PPP elected Haji Gulbar Khan as the new chief minister.

The AJK Legislative Assembly has 53 seats, including 45 directly elected general seats, five seats reserved for women, and three seats reserved for clerics, technocrats, and overseas Kashmiris; 12 of the general seats are elected by Kashmiri refugees living in Pakistan. Assembly elections were held in AJK in July 2021. Isolated incidents of voting interference were reported, and three campaign workers were killed in election-related violence. Most seats were filled by representatives of Pakistani parties, though the AJK-based Muslim Conference and Jammu Kashmir People’s Party (JKPP) each took one seat. The PTI won a majority with 26 elected seats, while the PPP took 11 and the PML-N captured 6. After the allocation of reserved seats, the PTI held 32 out of 53 seats in the assembly. This followed a well-established pattern whereby the parties in power at the federal level in Pakistan tend to win elections in Pakistani Kashmir.

The 33-member GBA is composed of 24 directly elected members, six seats reserved for women, and three seats reserved for technocrats. The GBA’s legislative authority is limited to certain subjects, and even discussion of some topics—foreign affairs, defense, internal security, and judicial conduct—is prohibited by the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan Order 2018. The Gilgit-Baltistan Council (GBC), which has a largely advisory role, is headed by the Pakistani prime minister and vice-chaired by the GB governor; it includes six members chosen by the GBA and six Pakistani ministers or parliament members chosen by the Pakistani prime minister. The GB chief minister also has a seat.

Elections to the GBA were held in November 2020. The PTI led with 10 of the 24 directly elected seats. Several independents then joined the PTI, and after reserved seats were filled through proportional representation, the party controlled 22 out of 33 seats. The PPP and PML-N—which took five and three seats, respectively—both initially complained of election rigging and refused to accept the results, but they eventually took up their seats in the new assembly. Smaller parties secured the remaining three seats.

During 2023, the PTI suffered from defections in both territories’ legislatures, with breakaway lawmakers supporting the new governments backed by the PML-N and PPP.

Both territories have local-level government bodies, but council elections have been rare in practice. Three rounds of local voting were conducted in AJK in late 2022, marking the first such elections since 1991; the PTI took a plurality of seats, though it was slightly less than the combined total for the PML-N and PPP. No parallel balloting was held in GB, which had not elected local councils in nearly two decades.

Neither AJK nor GB is represented in the Pakistani parliament.

The electoral framework in both territories facilitates indirect control by the Pakistani authorities. For example, the AJK Council appoints the chief election commissioner, and the electoral system for the AJK Legislative Assembly disproportionately favors nonresident refugees over AJK residents. The nonresident elections are more vulnerable to manipulation by federal Pakistani authorities, and the parties in office at the federal level tends to win these seats. Candidates in the AJK elections must formally endorse “the ideology of Pakistan” and Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan.

The election code of conduct for GB requires parties and candidates to refrain from any action or speech that could be deemed prejudicial to the “ideology of Pakistan” or the country’s security. This vague provision can be used to exclude candidates associated with nationalist parties or those disfavored by the Pakistani authorities.

Politics in both AJK and GB are dominated by local branches of the main Pakistani parties and some local parties, such as AJK’s Muslim Conference, that are closely allied with the Pakistani establishment. Small nationalist parties opposed to union with Pakistan are actively marginalized or barred outright from the political process. Activists accused of opposition to Pakistani rule have been subject to surveillance, harassment, and sometimes imprisonment. The interim constitution of AJK bans political parties that do not endorse the territory’s eventual accession to Pakistan, and similar rules prevail in GB.

There is ample precedent for transfers of power between the major parties, but these are typically influenced by parallel changes at the federal level in Pakistan. In 2023, as federal authorities cracked down on Imran Khan and the PTI in Pakistan, judicial and political pressure was similarly applied to remove the party from government in AJK and GB.

Because voters in GB and AJK cannot participate in Pakistani elections, Pakistani federal officials and entities are not democratically accountable to them. Security agencies operating in both territories are federal institutions. They work to block and suppress any parties or politicians that adopt positions deemed to conflict with Pakistani interests.

Men and women have the right to vote in both territories. Although there is no bar on women contesting general seats in the legislatures, women rarely exercise this right in practice. Instead, general seats tend to be filled by men. The seats reserved for women are filled proportionally from party lists based on the general vote, meaning the parties themselves determine who will represent women’s interests.

Shiite Muslims, Sunni Muslims, and members of the Ismaili offshoot of Shia Islam are represented in the GBA, having won directly elected seats. Members of the heterodox Ahmadi sect, who suffer systematic discrimination in Pakistan, are poorly represented in GB’s political system, as are members of the territory’s Christian minority.

The powers of the elected chief executives in AJK and GB are limited by the fact that the Pakistani prime minister, the Pakistani minister for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan, and the federal civil service exercise effective control over government operations in both territories. As in Pakistan, federal military and intelligence agencies also play a powerful role in governance and policymaking.

The territories lack any meaningful fiscal autonomy, as federal taxes are imposed on both, and they receive a share of the resulting funds from the federal government. The territories’ local representatives are excluded from the Pakistani bodies that negotiate interprovincial resource allocation.

There has been a sustained debate on whether to designate GB as a provisional province of Pakistan, which would enhance the powers of its legislature and give it representation in the federal parliament. In 2019 the Pakistani Supreme Court instructed the Pakistani government to address GB’s constitutional status, and in early 2022 the PTI-led Pakistani government submitted a constitutional amendment in line with the court ruling to the GBA for consultation, but the measure made no further progress in 2023. Although there seems to be broad support in GB for the provisional province proposal, some opposition is rooted in the idea that the territory is inseparable from AJK and Indian-controlled Kashmir, and that changing GB’s status would undercut Pakistan’s claims to the rest of the disputed region.

Both territories have formal safeguards against official corruption, and GB is within the jurisdiction of Pakistan’s National Accountability Bureau. However, as in Pakistan, corruption remains endemic, with enforcement actions subject to political influence.

Transparency and access to government information are limited. The AJK and GB governments have posted basic information about their operations online, but such disclosures remain infrequent and inadequate. Journalists in GB complain that in the absence of a right-to-information law for the territory, government departments have blocked information requests.

AJK and GB are subject to laws that curb freedom of expression, particularly regarding reporting or commentary on the political status of the territories. Media houses need permission from the AJK Council and the federal Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan to operate. Pakistani state agencies frequently issue media advice to AJK- and GB-based journalists to guide coverage of topics that are deemed sensitive, and journalists engage in self-censorship. Coverage of news and politics mirrors official Pakistani narratives, including the notions that India’s control of the Kashmir Valley is illegitimate and that all Kashmiris seek accession to Pakistan.

Both territories have a predominantly Muslim population, and there is no official or social tolerance of nonbelief. Tools used to compel expressions of belief and conformity with official interpretations of religious doctrine include laws criminalizing blasphemy, rules requiring observance of Ramadan, and an obligation to denounce the heterodox Ahmadi sect to obtain a Pakistani passport. There is a history of Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence in GB. Mass protests in August and September 2023 featured a strong sectarian element, though authorities successfully prevented an escalation into large-scale violence.

Academic freedom is affected by acute sensitivities around the issue of constitutional status, and debate or materials questioning Pakistan’s claims over Kashmir are not tolerated. Student union activity has long been subject to state monitoring. Local languages and scripts are not taught in government schools. There is a history of attacks on schools in the Darel Valley by Islamist militants who oppose secular and girls’ education.

Federal intelligence agencies maintain a prominent and intrusive presence in both territories. Discussion of heterodox political or religious views consequently carries significant risks. The authorities have increased their monitoring of social media, using Pakistan’s 2016 Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act to sporadically punish expression of anti-Pakistan or separatist opinions.

The authorities’ observance of freedom of assembly is highly discretionary. The Pakistani state traditionally uses AJK as a platform for protests against Indian control of Jammu and Kashmir, with multiple officially orchestrated demonstrations proceeding on key anniversaries each year. Protests that do not directly challenge Pakistani control or the territories’ constitutional status are more likely to be tolerated. The authorities rely on harassment, intimidation, security checkpoints, and targeted restrictions on activists to deter unapproved protests. Overall, assemblies are notably more frequent in GB than in AJK.

In August and September 2023, rival Sunni and Shiite protesters participated in demonstrations that were triggered by allegedly derogatory and sectarian remarks from a Shiite cleric and a Sunni cleric. Sunni protesters blocked the Karakoram Highway, and the authorities’ response included cutting mobile internet service and deploying the military. At least nine people were killed in related sectarian clashes.

Also in August and September, a long pattern of small-scale civic protests in AJK over inflated electricity bills escalated into territory-wide strikes involving traders, teachers, other government employees, and the public. Participants aired multiple grievances against the AJK government.

In November, the GB government’s decision to reduce wheat subsidies prompted the organization of mass protests by a political, religious, and civic alliance, the Awami Action Committee (AAC). Its demands included protection against state seizures of land, relief from federal taxes, and improvements to the electricity supply. The protests were ongoing at year’s end.

Humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are subject to strict registration requirements and thus operate at the pleasure of the authorities. NGOs working on political or human rights issues face more intrusive government scrutiny and, in some cases, harassment.

AJK is subject to labor laws similar to those in Pakistan, and civic alliances that include trade and labor groups have used strikes to protest economic conditions. However, unions and professional organizations are frequently banned. Labor laws and union activities are poorly developed in GB.

Both territories have nominally independent judiciaries, but the Pakistani federal government plays a powerful role in judicial appointments. On politically sensitive issues, the AJK and GB courts are not considered to operate with independence from the executive in Pakistan.

The president of AJK, in consultation with the AJK Council, appoints the territory’s chief justice. Other superior court judges are appointed by the AJK president on the advice of the council, after consultation with the chief justice. The chief judge and other judges of GB’s Supreme Appellate Court are appointed for three-year terms by the prime minister of Pakistan on the recommendation of the governor. In a 2019 ruling on GB’s 2018 governance order, the Pakistani Supreme Court essentially extended its jurisdiction to GB residents and courts, adding to the legal ambiguity surrounding the territory’s constitutional status.

The civilian court systems in both territories feature basic due process guarantees, including defense lawyers and a right to appeal, but arbitrary arrests and other violations are not uncommon, particularly in security-related cases. Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Act, which is often used to suppress dissent, includes vaguely defined offenses, allows extended detention without trial, and applies to juveniles, among other problematic features.

Torture and deaths in custody at the hands of security forces have been reported, especially in the cases of independence supporters and other activists. Separately, armed extremist groups devoted largely to attacks on Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir operate from AJK and GB and have links with similar factions based in Pakistan and Afghanistan. A lull in attacks by these groups on targets in AJK and GB continued through most of 2023, though some violence was reported. In the worst incident, terrorist gunmen ambushed a passenger bus in Chilas in December, killing nine people. Security forces conducted multiple counterterrorism operations in GB during the year. A commander of the Lashkar-e-Taiba militant group was shot dead in AJK in September, in what seemed to be part of a pattern of targeted killings in Pakistan.

A renewed 2021 cease-fire agreement between the Indian and Pakistani armies held through 2023, minimizing exchanges of fire across the Line of Control (LoC).

As in Pakistan, women in the territories face economic discrimination, disadvantages under personal status laws, and abusive customary practices, the perpetrators of which often enjoy impunity. LGBT+ people and members of ethnic minority or non-Sunni religious groups also suffer from discrimination, and Afghan refugees encounter harassment and pressure to return to Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities have been reluctant to offer citizenship to people displaced from Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir; these refugees have periodically been subjected to abuse and arbitrary arrest for demanding greater rights.

The people of AJK and GB have Pakistani identity cards and passports, allowing for external travel. However, there are reports of passports being denied for those suspected of questioning Pakistani control over the region. The heavy military presence and the threat of shelling along the LoC restricts internal movement for civilians. Residents and travelers risk accidentally straying across the LoC and being stranded or detained.

AJK’s pre-1947 state subject law, which bars outsiders from seeking permanent residency, allows only legal residents to own property. Since the 2015 launch of major Chinese-backed infrastructure projects in GB as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, there has been an increase in local protests over land rights. The AAC protests in 2023 demanded a repeal of legal provisions that allow the state to seize land for development and security purposes. Procedures for establishing private enterprises in both territories are onerous.

The legal framework in AJK and GB criminalizes domestic violence and so-called honor killings, but harmful traditional practices related to sex, marriage, and personal behavior often prevail amid weak enforcement of formal protections, especially in more socially conservative areas. Informal justice mechanisms operating at the village level are the first point of recourse for many incidents involving sexual or domestic violence against women, and their judgments can inflict further harm on victims.

Both territories, but particularly GB, have historically been less economically developed than Pakistan, and their population has depended on labor migration to supplement incomes. The lack of local control over extractive industries prompts periodic complaints that residents are being deprived of the benefits of natural resources.

Child labor is known to occur, though the AJK government has banned the practice. Under a 2016 law, amended in 2017, businesses in AJK cannot hire residents under the age of 17. Laws against sex and labor trafficking in general are poorly enforced.